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
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EDITED BY

R. N. Dandekar

H. D. Velankar



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
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JANUARY-APRIL 1958

[PARTS I-II

POWER IN ANCIENT INDIA :
2 KINGSHIP & AUTHORITY

BY

RONALD M. SMITH

When one turns to consider the theory of power and kingship in India, one cannot help being struck with the fact, how little there is of it, and how unanimous that little is. One must wonder if there ever was any more, or any disagreement, and compare China, where between the VI and III centuries B. C. it looked as if widely varied and freely individual patterns of thought might develop, but we know they didn't, and we depend for our knowledge of some who interest us most, on refutations by their opponents. But the Chinese were interested in good government from an earthly point of view, and Confucius was concerned with the treatment of men, that is ethics. But India is not interested in men; they are not perfect, and therefore not static; things are static, and a static truth can be known about them. It would thus seem that even by the III century B. C. the best minds of India are turned to religion, not politics or science; and there is certainly meaning in the Buddhist legend whereby Buddha would have been a universal emperor, cakravartin, had he not chosen the higher and more beneficent office of becoming a Buddha, who will teach men to refuse the merciless competition into which nature throws them - hence the attraction of Buddhism to the defeatist of the modern West.

We find in Hindu political thought the same distinguishing traits that appear in other cultural developments and achievements of that mentality. For instance, just as in philosophy there are big differences in theory that have a negligible effect in the sum of belief and practice in India, but which same differences have had a commensurate effect in our Hellenic tradition, so modern Indian scholars could easily find statements that would indicate a vigorous political democracy in ancient India; but our sum of evidence does not indicate that these statements made any difference in the actual social structure in which the individual of classical India lived. Certainly no spirit of Hellenic individualism or scientific differentiation appears. The world order is fixed and appointed; therefore the job of theory is to justify and not to change it, and any theory that does justify it may well be correct: facts can be justified from very different angles, but no one feels much call to alter what is justified. One might say we have here an extreme of Baconian method, deduction from fact, yet coinciding with an extreme of scholasticism, because there is only (super) fact. The crucial difference from us in the West here is that to us facts are limited, and possibilities many: hence the mind has more liberty, and width, if less intensity of action. So we find politically also in India the static and limited extreme.

Indian philosophy, not in spite, but even because of the emphasis on and consequent disrespect of becoming, is a philosophy of being: the thinker seeks to know what is, unqualified, unchanging and beyond time. That, of course, is the absolute, so that the relatives must be seen in their abstract, i. e. static relation to it. So in Indian literature characters do not develop; they are one thing or another. But also, by classical times, there is one thing static about any Indian, his caste. Viśvāmitra was able to become a Brahman, and his descendants retained that status which was not willingly conceded. We might have said he was deciding to be his own purohita, but that tradition strongly asserts he renounced his kṣatriya status to do so. But by the Christian era castes might subdivide, but could not change. We can see rules being tightened up in Gautama 4.22-3. The traditional rule is exactly the same as Hitler's; mixed blood

disappears in the 5th generation if there has been no further admixture. This is given as the traditional rule, the teachers', *ācāryāḥ*, pl., not singular, which would mean Gautama's own view. He says the blood is only pure in the 7th generation, if no further admixture, and only when the male partner is superior can such redemption take place. *Manu* 10.64 follows Gautama; but *Baudhāyana* is a southerner, and in the south Aryans are in a very decided minority. He is therefore enforced to be more liberal, and in I 8/16.13-4 he still accepts purity in the 5th generation, though still only where the father was higher caste: but he allows it in spite of further admixture of the same kind, and by the 7th generation there is no difference.

Perfection by its inherent definition is static, and it shares this quality with truth: we want to know what is true; and since the proposition is by its nature defined, the approach to truth is by steps: there is no intellectual continuum for humanity, and this may be seen in the old attempts of intellect to understand space: space must be made up of points, like of truth of propositions, because without proposition intellect cannot understand. Perfection then is the culminating point, to which one comes, as it were, out of a tunnel - it is somehow disconnected with what preceded - and at which one hopes to stay. The perfect state is similarly static, and continues. So in *Mbh.* 12/78, the *Kaika* king (who was a perfect king) can tell the *Rākṣasa* there *are* no thieves, adulterers or other thorns in my kingdom. The perfection is set up a new creation at a certain point, just as a young mathematician thinks at last he will add 1 and reach infinity. We see this idea in our own days. *Fabian* socialism carefully shirks the problem of perfection and motion; *Communism* does not, because its perfect state (always attained and always progressing - at nebular speed) always can (and does) double productivity targets, however useless the result. Power is expressed by any action, which is thus justified. But in these dispensations perfection of life is political; freedom is to be a politician, i. e. in *Russia*, a *Communist*. But in *India*, they at least used to be a little bit more mature; the state is not an end in itself, and it is a rather silly mistake, that may be made, to think so. In the perfect state, the social sacrament is being correctly performed.

In the Brahmana world of IX-VI centuries B. C., the power of sacrifice, and later the magical brahman formula which is its inner being, controlled the order of nature, and compelled its proper continuance. Human life is part of the *ṛta* of universal life, and kingship is also a ritual. Humanity is always considered in its context and part of it; the context is not as in Greece, a background. The Brahman of great will force, mahātapas, may as a man have far greater power than the Greek; but he has far less significance, with nothing unique. The working of the universe is *ṛta*, a divine or ritual act, in fact a *yajña*, or sacrificial act, though sanctifying (-ed) would be a better translation. Everyone who is fulfilling his prescribed duty (only) in the world is thus performing a *yajña*, or as we translate poorly, a sacrifice. So in Mbh. 12/99 battle is very elaborately compared to a sacrifice, only it is the *kṣatriyas* that perform it. Bṛhaspati in 1.42 tells us that a king protecting creatures rightly *dharmena*, and killing those who deserve it, performs daily a costly sacrifice - as we have seen, his subjects might well find it costly. Or in Kautālya 39.10 the king performs a *yajña* in attending to business. Here too one must think of the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, (revived for classical times by Puṣyamitra) which elaborately symbolizes kingship. But kingship also symbolizes it, as it is carrying out the great sacrifice in practice, and the correctly performed sacrifice is *ṛta*.

The ritual side is elaborated in later writings, but already in Gautama 8.1-3 the king and brahman uphold the order of the moral world and the physical, which is itself double, human and natural, and depends for its life on these two; so that if the king does not observe *ṛta* barrenness should follow. This is the explicit theme of the phenomenally repetitive Devendraparivarta of the *Suvarṇaprabhāṣottama Sūtra* of c. 150 A. D.: a work which though completely Buddhist has only orthodox ideas of kingship. If the king does not wield *daṇḍa*, authority, properly, crops, men and beasts are ruined with plague and blight; everything in nature and out goes wrong. Mbh. 12/68.21 and 23 asserts a similar connection of the king with fertility by *ṛta*; and because of his services for *ṛta*, he is in .40 called a great divinity in human form.

In Manu 7.28-9, *danda*, authority is very like a mantra or brahman that is exceedingly dangerous in the wrong hands or misapplied, and this is practically the view of the Buddhist author too. If the king is bad, the ministers follow suit, and the whole circle is corrupt. This is commonplace, and is echoed in M.Bh., Kauṭalya, etc. A flaw in the ritual, or its performer, especially its central performer vitiates the whole performance, which is valueless, if not disastrous. This ritual attitude explains Manu 8.170 where the king must not only have, but take by the exactest letter of the law. Weakness would kill him in this world and the next and is excluded from the caste requirements of *ksatra*. So too justice, which is emphasized by Buddhist, Hindu and even Lokāyata is not without its ritual setting. Injustice is also *anṛta*, a conception not very different from Plato's *πλεονεξία* = *pleonexia* or Heraclitus' more original idea of the injustice of the elements resulting in flux.

In this connection the king must also be *śuci*, which would include ritual cleanliness as much as the perhaps more prized judicial impartiality (failure in which would, of course, be *anṛta*). Yet the former is so important and necessary that it is even said the king cannot be unclean (Gautama 14.43). We are not told much about public rites, but 11.17 implies there are many of them; at any rate the king must know the rituals for the peace or war life of the community, and in 18 *daivotpāta*, interpreted as a *dvandva* astrology and bird flight, and even if not a *dvandva*, omens. There is a very close parallelism with the position and duties of the Roman king. Anyone who is going to consult the superhuman must be ritually clean, and even better if he is also auspicious, *maṅgala*. So the *Āṅguttara Nikāya* 34 (which seems to be post-Asokan) demands 7 degrees of royal ancestry, which we are not sure if Asoka could have supplied, but 7 is an auspicious number, and even according to Gautama eliminates any previous impurity of birth. The ritual cleanliness would however probably include a physical standard, the body to be without blemish. The blind *Dhṛtarāṣṭra* might well be disqualified for practical reasons, but *Devāpi* had only a skin disease, not necessarily leprosy. In a *Jātaka* the owl, (a bird of ill omen) could be disqualified for royalty by its ugly looks, and in M.Bh. etc. the king has to be pleasant to everyone (unless there is good reason to the contrary)

as it would be inauspicious if he wasn't, an imperfection contrary to *rta* and prestige. Similarly, if the king is to represent the powers of nature, or take part in a ritual that symbolizes (or keeps) the universe working in its proper order, magically, he must be physically whole. This requirement seems to be Indo-European, for it reappears in Ireland where Cormac had to abdicate very unwillingly—because of the loss of only one eye, ruined, but not necessarily physically ejected by a blow in a fracas. Instances of putting the king to death when his sexual powers fail can easily be found in the Golden Bough, while both in Ireland after Cormac, and at Nemi in Italy, the successor may or must kill his predecessor in fight, a death to which a fighting class of predecessor had no objection, and warriors often preferred, even if we shudder.

Something similar may explain the reported behaviour of the kings of Magadha: Bimbisāra, enthroned at 15, was 52 when Ajātaśatru killed him. Ajātaśatru would then be about 30, and after a reign of 25 years could hardly be less when his turn came. Udayin would then be almost 30, and when he suffered the same fate from his son 33 years later; he would be 63. This would amply account for Buddha's lack of repugnance at the parricide, which has scandalized some Westerners, though we are today trying to bludgeon a nation's conscience to silence to praise murderers provided they are politicians and successful and murder in a big enough scale in a vile enough way. If this possible interpretation is correct, Udayin's successors could be impotent at 40 and 43, perhaps over uxorious, and the Śāiśunāgas put an end to the antiquated custom of Magadha on their usurpation. When Empire has grown and kingship pays pleasurable dividends, so that a certain intellectual advance has been made to broadmindedness, the king has no intention of letting himself be killed, and in Egypt the king has a ritual rejuvenation, in Sumeria he found a substitute. Manu's king too, 9.323, must die in battle.

Just as the king must be benign and auspicious to those who meet him, and necessary to the ritual purity of the priest in the mundane ritual, we find he must be shielded from all magical influences of evil omen. So in M.Bh. 12/84.53 all dwarfs, eunuchs, unclean misshapen people must be expelled from the council chamber (if the king is here). Manu in 7.149 agrees,

but tries to rationalize the prohibition in 150. One might well ask how by his time such people except for eunuchs could ever get into the council chamber, but he still says such despised low caste people, women and tairyag yonas let out secrets. The last named could conceivably be the parrots that always memorize heroines confessions of love, and accidentally divulge amours to the chief queen, but we doubt it Manu took them so seriously. A comment on this is the way is cleared of all such ill-omened people both in the Jātaka and Āśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita before a royal progress.

The important auspiciousness will be increased by personal qualities; but not very much helpful is said about the king personally. In M. Bh. he has continually to be endowed with all qualities, however little use he makes of them, like Nala, and at least in popular morality successful use of vice is another virtue. It seems quite easy to be a paragon; you are or are not one by definition, the static scheme of Indian expression which we have shown elsewhere is normal in Indian storytelling. For instance Vicitravīrya was possessed of all qualities but debauched himself to death by an oversight. In Kālidāsa Raghuvamśa 19 Agnivarman is in a similar position; we are practically told he died of V. D., from unbridled lust, and had long delegated all his business to others. But this is only a tragedy, like the fashionable treachery of today, into which gifted diplomats fall by a trivial oversight; in neither case should ordinary mortals dream of withdrawing their reverence from the divine, or at least superhuman class. Yet kings are continually being warned against becoming enslaved by sensuality. The practical world cannot be wholly ignored, and already in Gautama the king must have control of his senses, jīṇḍriya. This is a constant refrain of Indian political thought; it may be obvious wisdom, but where everything depends on the king, as is emphasized in M. Bh., Kauṭalya and Pāṇini, it cannot be over-emphasized.

We have mentioned the ritual value of benignity. Naturally that is its least value, and we find the demand for moral character in Gautama: the king in 11.2 is to be of right and helpful act and speech. Asoka's title of Priyadarśin is in line with this, and certainly it is connected with sarvabhūtānāṃ rakṣaṇam, protection

of all creatures, and the king's impartiality ; indeed the import may have widened since Gautama's time. Barua is probably right in connecting this title with Asoka's conversion, and I do not see that there is any necessity for the Aramaic Inscription of Taxila bearing it to date from Asoka's vice-regality there : after all it remained a capital, and doubtless in quite unstrategic cities in British India inscriptions could be found referring to the King Emperor without mention of his viceroy.

As to judicial impartiality little need be said, because it is almost half of *sarvabhūtānām rakṣaṇam*, the protection of creatures. It is demanded *passim*, and deciding quarrels is one of the earliest duties of kingship. But one might emphasize the need of that impartiality, because when men decided to elect a king to save (or enable) society, they did not dream of making a contract with one another. That is, there is an obligation to one's caste : one should do one's caste duties, but there is no further obligation within or without. This idea reappears by logical necessity in the modern total state ; because the more one throws into the care of our public relations and obligations, the less one needs to think of them and the more time one has to think of oneself, that is there must be an increase of selfishness, especially with the emancipation of intellect. Once you deny God you do not need to care about man ; neither Hitler, Lenin or Anna Pauker cared for the whole of their contemporary generation. Just as all atoms are equal to one another, and independent, so with individuals any obligation to one another must be through something higher. Hence, the only alternative to a loving God is a fearful man (because by the sexual equality and competition of nature we are precluded from complete love). Hence the importance of *danḍa*, punishment and authority in India. Yet the Indian fearful man is also limited, (by caste and world order, which is above any man), and as we want something more than severity in our God (or substitute) he is told time and again to love his subjects *prajāḥ* like a father his son—which ought to be a stronger simile in India where a son is a religious necessity. The tie is not reciprocal, and fear not love is the basis of the reverse relationship ; because love makes some sort of equality, whereof there is none in India.

Impartial justice means that the king must know the law and administer it, and subjective justice is reduced to a minimum. This is quite clear from Gautama 11.19-25 Veda Dharmaśāstra Aṅgas Purāṇam (sing.) are the authorities in law. Quite clearly, the law is there; there is no question of inventing it or altering it; it has only to be applied (when one has found out the truth). Law is not the creation of men or government, but the expression of society, and as society is static, (in the main), so there can only be minor adjustments of law. As society is sanctioned by religion, law also has some of that sanction; so that the Vedas are not quite so irrelevant as might appear. Dharmaśāstra is not distinguished from-sūtra, either because such a distinction has not yet arisen, or more likely, because the king must know the whole science; a few cryptic sūtras wouldn't get him very far, or even might only confuse. But, even so, the law based on religion might not have much more contact with daily life than it does today, so that local, caste, family and guild laws are recognized provided they do not contradict smṛti, .20-1, and the king may very well not know them. If he doesn't, he will be informed about them .22; we are not going to have any personal or arbitrary ideas that may be reversed tomorrow. When he has heard the relevant laws, he shall use his common sense, tarka, reasoning. Here we feel Buehler's translation gives a wrong impression: tarka is a means of arriving at nyāyam .23, what is fitting, i. e. the legal right, not the truth (of the facts). Inferring, abhyūhaya, a good Yāska word, by means of it (i. e. reason, or common sense), yathāsthānam gamayet; let him decide rightly; but gamayet might mean explain; i. e. justice must be seen to be done; let him give him verdict with reasons .24. If there is a conflict vipratipatti, let him advise with Brahmins who know the Veda, and decide. Surely the conflict is of law, which might well need a Brahmin to decide, not witness; a king or judge shouldn't need a Brahmin to tell him who is a liar.

It will be seen that the king is not to make the law if it can be helped, India recognizes the distinction between law and administrative order, which modern politicians hardly understand. It was a distinction well understood till the French Revolution, and for instance the Parliament in the Civil Wars was demanding

2 [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

England's ancient liberties. It is significant that the attempts at absolutism, the (fairly few) essays favouring it in ancient India come from a confused and demoralized, but materially prosperous period, of the foreign invasions, and contact with a morally chaotic West. When a society is settled and integrated there can be no question of altering the law, much less the presuppositions on which it rests. The law does alter, but slowly, with the society.

Tarka next occurs in Kath. Up. 2. 9, and needs no learning. Anvikṣiki, which along with trayi is necessary to the king in 11. 3, does. Manu and Kauṭalya repeat the words, whether they meant the sense or not. The classical science of logic, the usual translation could hardly have arisen in Gautama's time. Kauṭalya explains it as Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata, generally taken as the three philosophies, and this is rather confirmed when Manu connects it with knowledge of the ātman. Gautama's phrase then might be an assertion of the need for orthodoxy in the ruler; it would be a religious and not a political qualification which few seem concerned to fulfil at least in Magadha, till the Śunga Puṣyamitra.

We may suspect a theocracy in Mohenjodaro and expect that divine kingship would be easy and natural in India. For some reason it wasn't, though it often seems easy and useful to rulers, who will tolerate equals, but are not keen on acknowledging superiors; so that the acquisition of divine (invisible) sanction, which must in fact depend on faith, makes superiority certain and justifies irresponsibility. This is still true today; for even if God is abolished, one represents the new one; one is, or is inspired by the new Holy Ghost, the will of the people, the mystic invisible and categorical entity no one can lay hands on or define. And the required faith has a double advantage, that it releases energy in the ruler by destroying inhibitions necessary to the (old) society, and confines the danger of assassination (which is now more profitable) to his immediate entourage. It will not therefore be surprising to see certain claims to divinity from Indian kingship, or its rebuttal by a society that needs all the inhibitions it can get for its continuance.

The claim was not easy to sustain, because the Brahmin had his in already, e. g. M.Bh. 12/60.40 *daivatam paramam viprāḥ*, and Egypt could hardly be fuller of divinities. Gautama almost precludes the king from divinity because in 11.1 he is described as the first of men, except for Brahmins. Vasiṣṭha does nothing to promote him. This is an important social check on pretensions, and should be recognized as such, though it is easier to condemn it as an instance of the aspirations of priests. It means the king has an equal—the humblest Brahmin, and there will always be some one to stand up to him. The king cannot think of himself as omnipotent, and that is important. The parallel is close with the position of Christian priest in the Middle Ages; we know that humble as he was, he could and did rebuke kings; and the Christian check was better than the Indian, because any one is encouraged to become a (humble) priest, whereas nobody can become a Brahmin.

If the king had at one time been divine, he should have had more priestly functions, of which we would have heard more in the Brāhmanas — and he might well not have needed a *purohita*, which Gautama 11.12, and Vasiṣṭha 10.3 hasten to assign him. By the time the claim to divinity was made, it was too late, and owing to far reaching developments in philosophy the prestige of gods was not very high. They were creatures of a certain felicity but no importance in Buddhism, and somewhat illusory existence in orthodoxy. Hence one's best that could be done was to make the king several gods at once. This is done in Manu 5.96, 7.4-7, 9.303, M.Bh. 12/67.4, 68.40, 73.26, Brhaspati 1.6-8 as well as the (Buddhist) *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* Sūtra. In Manu 7.8ff. and M.Bh. 12/68.42-51, the apparent irresponsibility of the king, the omnipotence of his wrath, and his difference from ordinary humanity are emphasized, and the connection is not accidental. Regal divinity then is a theory much encouraged by someone about the 1st and 2nd centuries A. D. (rather than orthodox Brahmanical renaissance of the 2nd and 1st centuries B. C.). Brhaspati does not say this, but in 1.7b all property is ultimately the king's, and only fear of the king keeps people in caste duties. The Buddhist source too emphasizes the enormous difference between the ordinary man, and the Emperor, *devaputra*. This

source is fairly well fixed to the reign of Kaniska; for which we accept Ghirshman's date of c. 150, noticing that it fits perfectly with dates given by Pelliot from Chinese sources (Tung Pao 1923) showing that the Kushan Empire had collapsed by 266, or probably 281. We suggest the Kushans did propagandize for kingly divinity, though they may not have been the first.

The Buddhist asks why is the king called devaputra when he is purely human in his physical constitution, perhaps even birth (i. e. the position could be usurped)? He is the son of (made of) all the 33 gods, hence above man. His version is then the latest in that line. Manu followed by Brhaspati was content with 8 gods, and they are the Lokapālas, obviously fit for the cakravartin. In M.Bh. 12/68.41 the Lokapāla pattern has not yet been created; Mrtyu is added, but Varuṇa, Indra, Soma, Vāyu omitted. More over M.Bh. does not seem to like the theory, for while Manu and Suv. tell us how the king is a god, rather like Gilbert's heavy dragoon, M.Bh. does not, and though the question, very like Suv., is put in 68.1, it is only answered by a quibble in 37: the king is so necessary, who wouldn't worship him? 33-9 then advise obsequiousness, and 40 asserts his divinity, 41-7 according to his activity. That is his divinity is asserted, but not justified. In 12/73. 26 the king is Yama, Indra and Dharma, in 67.4 he is Indra, but these are rather symbolical, as in Kauṭilya, where he is Yama and Indra. Yama is judge of the dead, and the king's duty is to judge and restrain *ni yam*, to keep them in the bounds of dharma, while, Indra is king of the gods, so naturally the king is Indra to men. It is not easy to know when Indra is first applied to men, but Asoka's queen is devī in the inscriptions, so presumably the king might be, or was addressed as deva by 250 B. C. It is perhaps owing to his personal character that Asoka does not call himself so.

The Kushans' title devaputra, Levi traces to China. F. W. Thomas doubts, but says if so, not immediately. We wonder if possibly the Romans are the model; for while there is so little else we can trace to China, the Kushans copy the coinage of imperial Rome, which normally bore the title *divi filius*, an exact equivalent of devaputra. Maybe Vasudeva's name is a pointer to the extent of Kushan divinity, for of straight god names I only notice 2 in the Purāṇas, namely 2 Kṛṣṇas, Nārāyaṇa, and

Vasudeva, who is in some MSS Vāsudeva - both Vishnuite. Being a god after the manner of Antiochus Theos is a possibility but it is not clear how far this flourished in India proper; it certainly appears in Indo-China, and under the Śailendras of Java, which only takes us back to the VIIIth century. But it does seem to explain the Sigiriya of Kaśyapa I 479-97 in Ceylon, and we know that by his time there was a god worth impersonating: for Śaivism must already be strong by 400, as we can infer from Kālidāsa. One wonders if Manu 7.72 is a trace of this idea, where hill forts are inhabited by gods.

There are, however, more earthly arguments for royal power which show no sign of being foreign, and therefore one must wonder if some are to be traced to the Lokāyatas, whose patron is Brhaspati, and whose study is ordered by Kauṭalya, and who, though materialists can quote scripture like the devil in the Vedāntasāra. But besides the Bārhaspatyas, the Aindra and Auśanasas would seem to be closely allied, if that is the meaning of Mbh. 12/59.88-91, where Svayambhū's super-arthaśāstra was condensed by Śiva (in the Vaiśalakṣa) Indra, Brahspati and Uśanas successively. Certainly a theory of absolutism is all that could be expected of the materialists (as is again the case of the logical today, hence the rehabilitation of Hobbes from Oxford).

Privileges of subjects irk secular rulers. So M.Bh. 12/56.22-4 forbids killing (or punishing) Brahmans, quoting Manu. But 28-30 contradicts flatly, quoting Uśanas, that a Brahman may be killed if he is fighting or a criminal: the first may be a refreshing concession to common sense, but it may have had reference to warrior Brahmans such as we hear of in the Punjab. In .31 we again do our best to repent of such a bold sentiment. In 57.7 even the guru can be punished if he takes the wrong road and forgets his position. This was evidently approved by Marutha, and Brhaspati, 57.6, because in .5 guru and friend who oppose royal policy may be put to death. This is shocking, evidently, and .7 has an alternative reading, surely not so well in line with Brhaspati, but adopted by the Crit. Ed., that he should be "abandoned". But the other sentiment is repeated in 138.47-8,

where father, son or brother should be killed if in the way of artha. At least in some schools of thought this is not a mere extreme of statement, even if the shocked compiler adds at the end of the chapter that any crimes advised are only temporary measures. 12/128 is a similarly amoral chapter.

Freedom from taxation is a troublesome privilege. So in 12/77.7 we have permission to extract tax (in money and labour) from Brahmins who don't know the Veda (and therefore don't do their caste duties), a kind probably not uncommon. In 78.2 all property is the king's except Brāhmins' who do their caste duties. Brhaspati 1.7^b agrees, without the qualification. This gives the king a right to tax, without the awkward theory that taxes are his wages, a recompense which must be limited, for doing a duty to society. So Manu 8.39 allows the king $\frac{1}{2}$ of old hoards and metals bhūmipatir hi saḥ, because he is the lord of the land, or soil. This can thus be a text to support royal ownership of the soil, so that the landlord or farmer has at the most usufruct. So on this theory, taxation would be justified not as a payment for services rendered or due, but for favour received; and the king has the right to fix what he wants for his favours or property.

It will be seen the desire for and tendency to absolutism was not wanting in ancient India; and if we knew more facts, we might well see very much more of it. But it was not able to impose itself, and the Brahmins did not bless its theory with propaganda. The king may run the state for his own benefit, and no one can stop him; but it is a matter of exploitation; no one is going to assist him with religious sanction to get the willing offering of all to a divine ruler that could be hoped in Ancient Egypt. That is to say, there are bounds, if no check to the king's power. This is analogous to the Indian achievement in literature and philosophy; there the range is again narrow, and one might say, the more intensively exploited, the narrower; we have the extreme of statement, the extreme of probability, the extreme of virtue (claimed), and cleverness: and these same extremes reappear today in the similarly bounded but unchecked Communism, which gives also the extreme of (unthinking) assertion, and pure power. But India separating the spheres of life has many limited

(and less violent) extremes, and the separation means they act as mutual checks. Communism knows only one sphere of life ; nothing has no reference or any other reference than to the extreme of power ; hence the unlimited, and unchecked violence of its extreme.

We may have an instructed, or even an uninstructed antipathy to the Hindu social system ; but it is well to remember that it has given some answer to the problems inherent in society, even if not ours, and not formulated in modern terms. And caste, while it may intend to limit the clashes of different members and groups of society, making class hatred difficult, does also attempt to limit power. Here, it is well to realize how much the Brahmins suffered from the protestant and anti-clerical propaganda of the XIXth century. They had been far more successful than Pope, and their exaggerated claims filled the protestant caste of British with disgust. But we long did not realize that the Indian uses the artistic extreme of language, which he would never expect to be taken literally, and the abject sentiments might not be more to his liking than ours. We referred the (literal) Brahman claims to the background of our own struggle against Popery : in those days secular absolutism was enlightened, scientific, realistic, and going to be humane, without the superstitious vetos of priests on fundamental enquiry. Today, we can know better, and even if the pro-Brahman and pro-ascetic propaganda is often repulsive, it does serve as a check on secular power, and makes secular control of thought impossible. We may not be very grateful for this, any more than we are for oxygen, because it is very hard to imagine the magnitude of the disaster avoided ; but if we compare the technique of Kauṭilya, several chapters of the Rājadharmā (M.Bh. 12/128, or 136-8) with the totalitarian techniques that are flourishing today, we ought to know that it is a service. Moreover the prestige of the ascetic excoriates the importance of this world. For instance, if the Communists had not got the idea that they were going to transform this world, and always had almost succeeded, there would be no stimulus for a policy of cruelty and fanaticism : it would be short lived and personal. The caste system in India made it plain to all that the world was not going to be transformed : it was, with transmigration, an incessant weary

round, labouring to an appointed end, but no rest: no human effort could change this development, which Brahman had created, in a manner analogous to the foreknowledge we predicate of God, saving our free will.

One might say the Hindu has no interest in attaining the ideal state; he has no faith in the power of human nature to reach it, or keep it; we are in the Kali age. His answer to this is that it is beside the point; we have the ideal state if people would only make it work, by justice and doing properly and only their caste duties, without avarice. Everyone has something to do in the caste system and there is no wastage. Here the Hindu had an irrefutable appeal to experience; because all he knew as history, the Puranic tradition, told him we had the golden age and fell from it: Vedic and caste duties were neglected or transgressed, desire increased, and things have gone from bad to worse ever since. It is significant that Eve or Pandora do not appear in Indian mythology. Sin (of a kind) is asserted but not explained: that is it is not felt as an urgent problem; it is a fact like caste, and the story that did explain it in the Aryan period, the lie or taboo breaking of Yama, disappeared in India. The reason for this is simple, that orthodoxy recognized the fact, but no sense of sin; it is too intellectual. The legends of the golden age are sometimes rather contrary; there was no kingship, as it wasn't necessary to coerce people to their dharma; alternatively there was, and it worked perfectly, government without tears. But the outlooks of each version are compatible, because none have any faith in or respect for human nature—paradoxically a sense of sin produces that, and this is natural in an intellectual culture; because so many people are not so clever as ourselves, and we are clever enough to see the disproportion between their words or promise and performance. The corollary to all this is that (our) ability does not get its deserts, but Indian ability is not plaintive in this matter as ours. It does not need to be, because karma will make full recompense in another life.

M.Bh. 12/59 tells us that all was perfect in the golden age, but it was too much effort to keep it up. The importance of indolence, quite as much as other people's vice as a source of

misfortune and evil, is a wholesome insight. Everything went downhill, and finally the gods, in danger of becoming human had to apply to Svayambhu for help. Castes were being confounded. So he instituted kingship to keep everyone in their places, and remedy evils of *matsya nyāya*, chaos, he had omitted to foresee. So, combining Manu 7.3, 15-20, he created kingship because without it the strong devoured the weak, and civil life had become impossible. Kingship is similarly explained in M. Bh. 12/67.17ff, and the author is trying to reconcile two theories of election and appointment. Brahma appointed Manu, but the people had had to persuade him to take on the job. Heredity comes to be respected, because by the III century A. D. it has become bad taste to uproot a family and annex out-right. Hence the gallantry of Samudragupta, the pattern of kingship.

Men have nothing to hope from one another, except theft and rape, and rapine. Consequently government is controlling. The Buddhists have no other belief. In Suv. 12.11 the king's duty is to restrain; here the author uses euphemisms, *śamana*, soothing, *nivāraka*, ward off, fit for the gentleness of the Dharmarāja; but in .19 all goes wrong if the king doesn't use *danḍa* properly, punishment that is not gentle. Already in Gautama 11.28 *danḍa* is derived from the $\sqrt{\text{dam}}$, to tame, or control, which is the king's duty. That is to say, just as there is no faith in human nature, that nature could never evolve law. Law is imposed, and goodness rather an unexpected intellectual effort, or initiative, than a natural ebullition. The source of neither is in the nature of things (which would permit evolution and development); of goodness, because the relations on which it depends are relative, and even illusory; of law because the social order (indeed the world order) is arbitrary (hence static), and just happens to be the one the creator imposed for reasons best known to himself. There is no antitheses of nature *poos* and *nomos*, human custom nature and convention, the substance and accident of human behaviour that is so formative in Greek and Western thought. Inevitably there is an ethical absolute, because nature abhors a vacuum; but it is obedience to caste duties, just as Communism's to the party line. Both these are quite useless as ethical ultimates, not because they demand an irrational act of

faith first, but because their range is limited, and nature has to fill the rest of the vacuum without permission. From Gautama on, there is only one theory of royal duties that ever exists; the king has to uphold the existing order; and there is really only one way of doing it, punishment, or coercion, the *nyāyadaṇḍatvam* of 10.8, explained also in 11.10 as *calatas svadharma sthāpayan*, coercing deserters back to their own caste duties. Nobody after him (except possibly Asoka) ever thought that anything else than force would ever keep them there. So in M.Bh. continually, Manu, e. g. 7.15, 20, agree with Brhaspati 1.8, by fear of the king people keep their caste duties. Only if everyone is confined to his place is everyone protected, and the protection of all creatures, *sarvabhūtānām rakṣaṇam* (Gaut. 10.7) that sums up kingly duties has always a connotation of watching (to see that they don't stray) too.

Vasiṣṭha, using the $\sqrt{\text{pal}}$, (with similar background) 19.1, confirm the same coercion and duty of upholding castes and āśramas, just as Gautama 11.9. This never changes. But while the orthodox are agreed on the need to keep everyone in his caste duties, and prevent mixture of castes, so that everyone remains what he is, they are not so particular about what he is, and the caste system to be upheld is always changing. By the time of Gautama there seem to have been 9 castes, and these are worked out schematically, already a theory imposed on fact; and his system underlies Manu 10.8-12. From the Brāhmaṇas to the earlier Upaniṣads there is a considerable difference of opinion as to the extent of each parent's share of conception, and there are three views that count; it is all from the father, mostly from the father, or equally from the mother. These discussions are not vapid as some of us might think; nor are they all magical or medical. They are really discussions on the caste of children of mixed marriages, which in early times must have been legion, and as with us, in early times, what we call legitimacy was not very important. The final view is equality of contribution, which means the children have caste of neither parent, but in Gautama 4.16-7, the father seems to have had more share in the business, or shows traces of total responsibility.

According to Gautama, the child takes the father's caste, if the mother is just one below; and this rule holds even for Vaiśya and Śūdra, as is proved by the result, the Rathakāra having religious qualification in the early Sūtra. If the mother is two castes lower, equality is not possible; Brahman and Vaiśya give an Ambaṣṭha, Kṣatriya and Śūdra an Ugra: Brahman and Śūdra produce a Niṣāda. For the last, the names Dausyanta, Parāśada, Parāśava Niṣāda can be found, and more than the text seems to have got confused. The child does not take its caste from the mother, nor wholly from the father; so a Kṣatriya and Brāhmaṇi produce a Sūta, Vaiśya and Kṣatriyā a Magadha, and Śūdra and Vaiśyā, Āyogava. Vaiśya and Brāhmaṇi give Kṣattr, Śūdra and Kṣatriyā a Vaidehaka, Śūdra and Brāhmaṇi a Cāṇḍāla. Baudhāyana and Manu (followed by Yājñavalkya, who at least proves Manu's text) seem to invert Kṣattr and Vaidehaka, doubtless by the etymology Kṣattr, kṣatriya. Pulkasa sometimes appears for Vaidehaka, while Vasistha 18.1-6 has a decidedly mixed version; Magadhas, Vaidehakas, Kṣattras, and Āyogavas are missed out, and other names appear. One can suggest a reason for this, that he lived far away from the areas of these peoples, and therefore had to fit other peoples into his system. To Gautama in the Madhyadeśa, Magadha and Videha would be the outlying countries on his horizon. At any rate, a high proportion of the mixed castes are known as tribal names, and though a calling is assigned to each later, it is ridiculous to suppose a nation was reduced to one livelihood. The Aryan conquest was probably like any other, where for the bulk of the people life goes on as nearly as possible as before; and the majority of the natives in India would almost always be peasants.

Gautama has properly nine names. The Savarṇas have been mistaken for a caste (obviously by someone familiar with the later system) and two names added 4.16-7. Baudhāyana 18/16. 6-7 follows Gautama 4.16 uninterpolated: .8 follows Gautama 4.17, but with 3 interpolated names which are explained contrarily in .10-12. Vaina appears instead of Sūta; either it is a synonym, or there is a bad pun on the Sūta's need of a lute vīṇā for his recitations. But however that may be, .10-12 give 5 new mixed castes, so Baudhāyana's original total is 12. However in the

next chapter, 19/17, we are promptly given 15 names, not without contradiction of the preceding. Vasiṣṭha 18.8-9 still follows Gautama, but has also Parāśava as a synonym for Niṣāda, but in 2-6 has substitutes for 4 names of Gautama's, of which 2 are new. Āpastamba, curiously, has nothing about mixed castes; but in Gautama 4.18-21 we have an interpolation that brings the number up to 18. This includes the Yavanas; and they were certainly not of enough importance in India to need a caste till the great invasion of Demetrius, c. 170. But by the time of Manu 10.8-39, we have 45 brands, and in 10.44 the Greeks are a tribe of Kṣatriya who have become Śūdras by heterodoxy, not as to Gautama's interpolator, the offspring of kṣatriyas and śūdras individually. Some of Manu's are perhaps rather sub-castes, e. g. the offspring of Vrātya (fallen) Brahmins, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, who are divided into species for reasons unspecified; but the Vaikhāṇasa Dharma Sūtra can make 45 without such subterfuge, and the development goes on.

One might notice that in the Dharmasūtras, including their interpolations, no correlation is attempted between these mixed castes and economic employments: in fact we saw that the pure castes were in the V-III centuries paying very little attention to the theoretical restrictions on their occupations. Manu is the first author who attempts to correlate; and his assignments are often rather strange, or even contradicted. We think, therefore, that caste had not economic consequences before the II or even I centuries B. C., whatever de facto tendencies there were.

It is said the lower Indus was only being Aryanized between Darius I and Alexander: one might support this thesis by reference to Baudhāyana I 1/2.13, which declares the mixed origin of the people of Avantī (rather surprising) Aṅga and Magadha, Deccan (as one would expect), Upavrt (= ?), Surāṣṭra, Sindh and Suvīrā; and in 14 a journey to the Sauvīras requires a penance to get rid of the stain. If the Aryanization of Sindh was slow obvious reason suggests itself: that the Indus valley population retained their language and customs long after their political fall, with the capture of Mohenjodaro. They must have had cities that survived, and been far more numerous than the invaders - in fact, checked the invasion for some centuries, so

that the Aryan tide flowed down the easier natural route along the foot of the Himālayas to the Ganges valley. Indeed, the Ambasthas in the south of the Punjab are assigned a mixed origin, though evidently early Aryanized.

In Buddhist Jātakas, much of which must be contemporary with the DSS, a similar mix up of occupations seems to hold. But occupations do tend to heredity, especially in a static society. Under the Mauryas, Indian economy also had reached what they thought was a peak of expansion, so that Megasthenes may not be factually correct when he relates a rigid heredity of occupation: but he may very well be relating what official policy desired (and enforced where it could) for the sake of stability. But also guilds are not keen on accepting new members, especially if, as in India, families tend to be large: hence one might also look to the growth of guilds as a source of the economic implications of caste. Hence if the Buddhist writers say little about it, and the Buddhist king need not worry about the biological admixture of castes, yet his attitude on this matter makes little difference if he has in the end to uphold the same social and economic system; and broadly speaking, Buddhism could hardly say anything new or fundamentally different on government, because it takes the same view of human nature as orthodoxy—hence the need to renounce it. Government is still controlling, and Asoka's idea of government by teaching and precept is strongly original: and it is worth while remembering that his edicts were not imitated.

The modern idea of government by education derives from Rousseau, and presupposes man is fundamentally good: this is best illustrated by its popularity with the liberal English socialists, who retained non-Conformist morality, but denied its basis, original sin. Socrates did not go so far: he belonged to a trading and bargaining nation, and one might call his basis commercial: everyone wants his own advantage, and if you educate people, they will see goodness is their advantage. That is, if we interpret at all, man is fundamentally selfish—and why not? He is himself. Asoka makes none of these presuppositions; he does not raise the question of human nature, being here, like the Buddha, severely practical. His is a fundamentally religious and individual (ethical) idea. He does not anticipate that his teaching will have

any effect on the social order. He neither wants nor expects to turn everyone, or anyone, into politicians, like some modern saviours. He is trying to put and get other people to help to put religion into practice, and his optimism about the prospects (if we may assume from the uncynical tone of his edicts, and his expectations for sons and grandsons) has more rational justification than our modern creators: for while to them the past is a nightmare of misery, and they have therefore not the slightest empirical support for their faith that the never present future will compensate the non-existent dead in their not yet, if ever to be born, descendants, to Aśoka the golden age had in fact existed—he only had to read the Jātaka or the Purāṇa; and he directly copied the ancient royal share in making that golden age; in digging wells, planting gardens, providing medicines etc: he is inspired by the example of these kings of old times. It was only because people had abandoned dharma (in the Brahman version, caste duties) that we are in the present Kali age. Unless man makes a (constant) effort, evil will result in misery, evil. This is inevitable by the Buddhist doctrine of karma; when he became a Buddhist, Aśoka determined to make the effort.

It might be said Buddha preached. But even a new method of advertisement requires some originality: and it was a highly original idea to turn the state power to help moral forces. All previous kingdoms had been for political ends (i. e. ultimately, the rulers). Orthodoxy has nothing better to offer. In M.Bh. this is not surprising, as it is a repository of popular morality. But in Manu 9.251 a king who governs his own country properly may extend the blessings of his rule. We know what that means. So M.Bh. passim, especially e. g. 12/128, Manu 7.152-215 (possibly an interpolation, as .216 seems to follow on .151, the king's time-table), but certainly 7.99ff which is not interpolated, Br̥haspati, and above all, Kauṭilya bless and enjoin the normal policy of political aggrandisement, the policy of Macchiavelli and Ferdinand the Catholic, wherein vice and virtue are to be assumed at the prince's convenience, and have alike to be successful, however contradictory, like the modern demands for amorality without opprobrium, and even with moral applause. These are all counsels for artha, worldly wealth and power, and

the authors constantly realize that honesty is the best policy. Protecting the subjects from internal and external enemies (thorns) has a very practical value. So does justice; and while upholding castes is a kingly duty, it doesn't seem to have meant much in practice till Manu, and even so, is rather for class than an individual benefit, and was only a small part of the whole. Moreover, it leaves the king a free hand in foreign policy, and there is no moral repugnance to war. But Aśoka abandons political ends, and therefore abandons foreign policy - in a policy of pacifism there can't be one, as we have seen in our own day, and Akhnaton saw in his. It might be said that Aśoka was fortunate that he could do so, by his pre-ponderating power. But, in fact, he could have continued political aggression against the Cholas and Pandyas in the south; he might be said to have had a bloodless and unsought victory when the Singhalese Devānāmpiya Tissa requested consecration from him; and the idea that war shall not exist, that it is unthinkable in the world ruled by the Dharmarāja reappears in the *Suvarṇaprabhā-sottamasūtra*, which may well be encouraging Kaniṣka to be a new Aśoka. That author, however, does not realize the greatness of the first, and relies on plenty *daṇḍa* control, or punishment. The feeling of responsibility for the moral uplift of the subjects, the personal benevolence that speaks through Aśoka's edicts, his care for the individual though he had probably over 100,000,000 to look after, were something new, and bespeak considerable originality of mind; and it is very likely that the transition from wood to stone in monuments is Aśoka's decision.

We are often encouraged to suppose that all religious conversions of rulers are really political, and in India that empires always tend to seek non-Brahman faiths. If so, they seem often to take a long time to find out their own interests; Mahāpadma Nanda may have favoured the Ājīvakas; but they were a far more popular sect than we can realize, and there is no sign that his sons did so. Candragupta's revolution is represented as thoroughly orthodox, and the only result of his becoming a Jain (if he did) was that he abdicated; he is not presented as a propagandist for Jainism. Bindusāra was again orthodox, and so was Asoka till his conversion, which was very clearly personal; yet though it had great

effect on his policy, there is no sign of any danger of forced abdication to him. Puṣyamitra's revolution was strongly Brahmanical, Kanīṣka would know Buddhism from Central Asia where he would not learn Hinduism. If he preferred Buddhism politically, it would be as much because it linked Bactria and India as because it provided a status above Brahmans. Vāsudeva is clearly Hindu.

That many kings found Brahmin pretensions irksome is likely, especially in the formative period of Indian culture. Janamejaya had evidently done so, c. 900. Quite possibly Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru were not averse to unbrahmanical cults, if they recognized the novelties as such. They may have: because we find (Gautama 8.1-3 asserting the complementary necessity of king and brahman. This is a common burden in M.Bh., e. g. 12/74-5, written or assembled in the days of the invasions of India, when orthodoxy needed all the support it could get. We have also seen a willingness, at least in some quarters, to treat worldly Brahmans as ordinary subjects, but whatever the pretensions of Brahmans were, or could later become, in the orthodox theory they were not meant to be a wealthy or worldly caste. It is certainly meritorious to give to them; but theoretically they have no other means of earning, and the proper brahman is not attached to the things of sense, trade gives the greatest wealth, and this is a Vaiśya province. Theoretically, therefore, the effect of the system is to divide power between Brahman and Kṣatriya, and wealth between Kṣatriya and Vaiśya: and while Kṣatriya or Brahman may have wealth, their power is limited by their spheres of activity. The fact that practice did not tally with theory does not prove theory had no effect: we know that it had.

But while Brahman pretensions might be galling to the secular state, we have no proof that the Indians usually wanted a secular state. Many of our mediaeval ancestors didn't want one, and we are again imposing the attitudes of XVIII century enlightenment on an Indian environment that would regard them as irrelevant. I do not know that we have enough copper plate grants or other inscriptions to show that Hindu temples or priesthods had enough property to form any threat to royal power, or e.g. attempt to control foreign policy. The organization of the Buddhists made them much more liable to provide such a danger, and that might have something to do with Puṣyamitra's persecutions after the fall

of the Maurya dynasty. But, generally speaking, the unworldly religious ideal divorces religion from politics (where as Europe heresy was continually apt to have political implications) and limits the value, hence to some degree the power of each order. We might also say that though the Hapsburgs provide a conspicuous exception, generally speaking the secular state must become a group state, that is, usually, a national state, such as emerged at the renaissance in Europe, and again in the Third Reich and modern Russia. It is generally held that such internecine nationalisms did not afflict India till modern times; and, if so, some credit for this fact must go to Hinduism.

Just as Brahmanical claims have been misinterpreted, so much of the search for democracy and consequent discovery of it in Ancient India has had either a contemporary purpose or flavour. As Marxism has long struggled to make people politically conscious to rouse hate, such consciousness was the hall-mark of progress and intelligence, whatever blunders, ignorance or meanness its articulate might commit. If, therefore, the Indian today was to be as good as the Briton, it was necessary to show that his ancestors some millennia back were politically conscious and enjoyed a vigorous civic political life—in other words, were always quarrelling with one another, preferably on class lines—because a healthy political life today evidently means a free-for-all scramble for power leading to the chaos and discontent necessary for and contrasting with the peace of party dictatorship. Accordingly, there was democracy, which is synonymous with freedom.

Unfortunately freedom is not a synonym of democracy. There was considerable freedom in XVIII century France, or XVII century Poland: no one would say there was democracy in the modern sense. There is considerable freedom in the caste system; there are democratic elements. But the decisive fact against what we call democracy is that there is no sign of the people or guilds having any control over the appointment of the royal officers, much less ministers. Nor is it clear that there is any legal obligation on the king to follow the advice of his councillors. Even their number is not fixed, and the schools have various opinions. This lack of obligation is quite clear, because *Manu*

4 [*Annals*, B. O. R. I.]

7.57 the king should hear opinions singly (privately) or collectively (publicly): in 58, perhaps wishing to restore purohitas, he should have one super councillor, a Brahman. Kauṭalya 28.18 gives similar licence in consulting, and quite decisively in 29.13 says follow the majority's advice, or the better advice, vā.

Again, in democracy there is a popular voice in affairs, so that people are always legislating or approving legislation. But legislation is altering society, and the people of ancient India were doing nothing of the sort. There was nothing to alter. The caste system, or rights of property have set the pattern; or rather Brahman made them and it is not to be tampered with. It is the king's central duty to uphold it, and force people back into their position in it. The Indian problem of society is that of administering it. The king is an administrative official, and he can make any amount of administrative legislation; but he can't alter the nature of society. The law exists, and the problem is to apply it. Hence the importance laid on judicial probity.

This means quite explicitly the king is not the source of law, the caste system doesn't trust him any more than it trusts anyone else. Men have neither the goodwill nor the better nature to stay in their own place themselves; and theoretically the Brahman is quite as much distrusted here as the Śūdra: the king has authority to coerce both back. But he too must be checked; hence there is this very great check on him, that however despotic he may be as king, in his own sphere, there are many spheres where he is not permitted to intrude. He may in fact try, just as God forbids sin, but we do it, - at a risk. The king may utterly neglect his duties, or grab more than is his, but it will be at the risk of riots (or assassination) that will end his reign. Mankind needs its sport, and it is not likely that it was any harder to start a riot in antiquity than it is today. Evidently Śiśunāga organized a most successful one in Magadha in 403. Śibi is threatened with trouble in the Vessantara Jātaka. But it seems to us far too much to assert from such occurrences any general democracy in a modern sense in ancient India. As to the republics, we only know they had no king; we do not know their exact territories; archaeology has not yet revealed their economies; we do not

know how caste affected them, or why there were some republics, amidst monarchies, whether they were feudal oligarchies or what. Obviously, they must have had some sort of regular assembly attended by somebody; but in the monarchies there is no sign that any such thing existed, where the people could initiate or deliberate, or were even asked to: but if they could depose a king or his ministers could, and had to approve a new one in some form, that could have been said of absolutist France, or the Roman Empire, but doesn't make a democracy.

Nothing is more likely than that the people lost freedom as the kings gained it. In England, the king had not enough money, had no army, hence he could not indulge wars on his own account. There was a class to take advantage of this, and in the narrow boundaries of the country there was a national consciousness. It is not clear that any of these conditions held in India. As early as the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa there is a Commander in Chief, *senāni*, but there is no evidence that the army was other than in complete control of the king, who in Gautama has to have military accomplishments. But once the king has an army, he does not need to consult the people on his foreign policy. The growing empires of the V century must have given kings armies. Warfare was becoming professional, and must have been fully so to the Nandas or Candragupta who had a standing army. This is reflected in Manu and M. Bh., where you should aggress on the weak only without hesitation, but avoid battle if there is any doubt, e. g. M. Bh. 12/94.21, 104.12, Manu 7.170, .199. The armies and the growth of spies must have made heavy demands on the king's purse, but we have seen, the growth of taxation, the trends to authoritarianism, the growth of trade (probably therefore of cities), gave the king the revenue to support the army which could ensure the collection of the revenue, just as today the unarmoured citizen is helpless against the organized monopoly of force of the state to extract any higher taxes it likes. And once the people don't have to fight themselves, they don't worry much about foreign policy.

Finally there is no sign of any popular control over taxation. There would certainly seem to be popular custom over the matter of finding it; so long as tax was collected by the village headman, that is government was at a minimum, and what democracy there

was in the village council, and in so far as the ordinary Indian's life was bounded by the village, there was doubtless much democratic in it, and more free, especially as restrictions of custom deter the mind from aspiring to the contrary. But custom is not law to the emancipated, and taxation would seem to have been customary in its amount. It seems clear that technically the king is untrammelled in his demands except by prudence, in favour of which there are countless admonitions in Manu, M. Bh. and Kautalya, not always regarded, as rulers of fact and fiction alike are not uncommonly deposed for excessive taxes. To alienate the subjects in this way is recognized as stupid, *mūlacchedin*, cutting one's own roots: i. e. it is recognized that the king's subjects are not bound to him by a categorical loyalty (for which there was support in Europe). Clearly this is also a check on power, and like the others, customary, not written, though the ethic of such loyalty appears, e. g. the faithful minister of a worthless king, who leaves traces in history and literature. True, the more worthless the king the more creditable his loyalty; but we do not believe the literary extreme is the sole reason for the type. In Manu 7. 128 the king has to fix the taxes (however reasonably).

One may see some traces of the growth of officialdom. Majjh. Nik. 1.85 knows several types of clerical work; but one cannot say whether they are in private or state employment, and the date is uncertain. But Āpastamba II 10/26.4 tells the king to appoint good officers, and they have to do the same for under-officers. This does not suggest very strong central control. If it refers to Maurya times, we might remember the Viceroys were of royal blood, and that would not tend to their subordination, especially after the strong hand was withdrawn. Manu seems to have a double check; in 7.115ff. there are heads of one village, 10, 20, 100, and 1000. But in 7.120 and 122 there are inspectors of officials, (which implies crown appointments). This scheme reappears in M. Bh. 12/88, but not in Kautalya, whose scheme is 1, 10, 200, 400, 800. Administration is through village heads. Each town has an officer, Manu 7.121, M. Bh. 12/38.10. These officers are responsible for any theft within their jurisdiction, 1 *krōṣa* from a village, 1 *yojana* from a town, according to Āpastamba II 10/26. 6-7, and 8 must make restitution if the property is not recovered.

In Gautama the king had that duty 10.47, and they represent him. The liability reappears in M. Bh. and Kautalya.

In Manu we find there is to be a detachment of troops for every 2, 3 or 5 villages, and similarly for every 100. This is not strictly parallel to the civil organization, but probably represents an effort at dividing the power of local authority, and having one to check another. A detachment could not be under 10 men : nor the bigger units under 100 (Vasistha 19.19 possibly), and we can calculate that 100 villages would have to support not possibly under 300, but probably up to 1000 men. This distribution certainly solves the problem of keeping an army out of mischief, and keeping a hold on the kingdom, *rāṣṭrasya saṁgraham* 7.114; but it might well burden the country, considering the great numbers employed in Indian armies. Candragupta's army might thus have absorbed the revenue of 40,000 villages. And, an addition out of each 1000 villages, the revenue of 1 village and 35 families goes to support the civil officials apart from the checking inspector, and the keep of the (100) headmen (7.118-20); while the overseer of 1000 villages has 1 town for his support *nagara*, Manu, *śakhānagara*, M.Bh. 12/88.8. One might also note that there is some check on this last, because he would get his pay through the town official, rather than himself. But however little corruption, the burden must have been heavy. By the time of Manu, the bureaucracy justify themselves; it is utterly trite to say the king needs assistants : 7.30 and .55.

It will be seen that Kautalya's division is considerably more centralized. Over 8000 villages there would be 70 officers of senior grade (100 and over), with 800 junior officers immediately under them. Under Manu there would be 88 seniors, but 1200 juniors, in tiers as it were. It would therefore seem *prima facie* that Kautalya's scheme is also an economy, as well as centralizing power at the top instead of distributing it at the bottom. A ruler of 1000 villages would quite overawe one of 100; but a ruler of 800 not so easily one of 400. The government is thus less at the mercy of its chief servants. Considering the gap between upper and lower responsibilities in Kautalya, 1, 10, 200, 400, 800, and the gradual ascent of Manu and M. Bh. 1, 10, 20, 100, 1000, one cannot help wondering, especially as economy and concentra-

tion of officialdom requires strong power, if between the two periods someone has reorganized the civil service on class lines. The village headman may rise to be over 10, but it is a different class to have 200 villages to oversee. New dynasties of conquerors often want new classes, as may be seen in the Communist empire today. Between Manu and Kauṭalya, lie the Kushans, of whom Kaniska at least was in a position to affect all north India.

In the extensive empire, and the growth of kingly power, one would expect encroachment, successful or attempted, by the crown on the guilds. This may explain the appearance in Vasiṣṭha of the supervision of weights and measures as a royal duty, 9.13. It does not so appear in Gautama or Baudhāyana, so that it might then have come under the guild rules that are valid if not opposed to smṛti. As Nanda is post Pāṇini but pre-Vasiṣṭha, we may here connect Nandopakramāṇī mānāni of Kāśikā II 4.21. Manu 8.403 continues Vasiṣṭha's claim, and orders how often the duty is to be carried out. In 8.401-2, the king has to fix prices. These duties descend to the king's officers in Kauṭalya; e. g. 103 they have to see to the weights and measures; in 206.11 prices (or rather profits) are fixed; but in other places, e. g. 98, the king is rather encouraged to the market. Another possible incursion of royal power is on the coinage. The Achaemenid official coinage had to fight for recognition in Babylonia; coinage is generally taken to be official in Maurya times in India. We cannot say if it always was. One thinks of the Naigama coins of Taxila.

Gautama wants his king to study philosophy, but he spares him the study of economics: the state is not yet much concerned with trade. In Vasiṣṭha the state seems to be getting interested in trade, because it makes wealth. But Manu, M. Bh. and Kauṭalya understand wealth as a source of power (which implies that their armies depend on mercenaries, not on local levies); hence their kings must understand trade and business. (Manu 7.43, vārtārambhān, Kauṭalya, 6 6, vārtā). The Vasiṣṭha passage, 19.13ff is very corrupt. .13 says weights and measures should be safeguarded. We suspect that the very corrupt .21 should come next; it gives some weights (if we are correct). Karāṣṭhīla is

then a hailstone quite a possible name for the smallest weight; but Karaka is used as a name for some fruits, so their stone is possible; cf. guñjā, Kauṭalya's least weight. Māshās is the next word. The next word is quite corrupt śaramadhyāpaḥ; but possibly a half-pada, ardhapāda lies behind it. Next pādaḥ, 1/4 and finally Kārṣāpanāḥ syuḥ; let there be cash. The Sūtras 19.14-5 are obscure, but seem to deal with tax. .16 is hopelessly corrupt, but seem to contain the words sthāna, storehouse, or resting-place, and pathaḥ, road. .17 is obscure because we do not know its context; but there is nothing so far that leads us to expect an army. On the journey is good enough for saṁyāne; daśāvāha vāhinī must do double duty - evidently has the duty of self protection as well as moving. Buehler's translation of vāha=patti = a company of 10 cannot well be right, because such a unit seems to belong purely to armchair strategists; e.g. M. W. gives 1 elephant, 1 chariot, 3 horses, 5 infantry (which at least adds up to 10). Buehler gives 2 horses and 3 foot; but surely no military man would want such a mixture in a section: how could they really support one another? And when others (M. W.) say a patti is really 55 infantry, surely that gives them all away; they don't know. We therefore suggest with diffidence (for perhaps the passage is really corrupt) that a detachment of 10 vāhas (vehicles, or possibly beasts, cavalry) has to do double duty, protection, and internal police of a caravan. And they are to (feed and) water separately pratyekam from the civilians: quarrels could well arise over that sort of thing or security be forgotten .18. Possibly the watering prapāḥ means separate for men and beasts, but pratyekam can hardly mean at every camp, because no camp has been mentioned, and in .22 we come to ferries, where no army is going to pay toll. .18. could well be pratyekam prapāḥ syuḥ puṁsām, instead of taking puṁsām with .19. which would allow ca, to be the second word of .19. For .19. we would suggest, "let him cause to be called together 100 as the minimum - for the caravan". Āhvē does usually mean challenge; but the form here, āhavayet does not even appear in Whitney. Whether it is war or foreign trade, the women (of absent men) should be looked after (.20). Finally, .22, ferries should be removed (moṣya is surely a strong word with rather different

connotation of taking with violence: should we read mocya?) (with their tolls) when there is no water.

The growth of armies and spies must have needed much money. M.Bh. has no doubt of its political importance and uses, more or often less honourable. So e. g. 12/128.35, a king depends on money and power, on money; hence his dharma and merit really depend on it, and the people depend on him doing his dharma. You can't fill the treasury without hardship - no omelettes without breaking eggs, in the modern phrase - so .36, it is no fault if a king oppresses for that purpose; sins are committed for sacrifice (e. g. against ahimsā), without dishonour. The whole chapter is in this tone of amorality for wealth: in .18 and 129.8 a king must save himself at all costs. This is all so shocking that a verse had to be added at the end of the chapter, 123.50 contradicting it all: but the Crit. Ed. ends with .49, so the author of the treatise was unashamed.

Cynicism and amorality in India as elsewhere is the ally of absolutism: it is the outcome of that wealth and insecurity which complete power is to end. Hence it did not fail to arise in the wealthy and unsteady centuries around the Christian era. New achievement both destroys old inhibitions, and enters fields where there is no experience to guide, i. e. where there are yet none new, and because men far oftener operate than understand their society, a new age is apt to reject from ignorance the wisdom of its predecessors. Developments are enormous; in the new expansion there is room for all, at first; the lack of inhibition has not yet produced disasters, so that there grows up some generations with a tradition of non inhibition, whose yardstick must therefore be success. The victims may doubt but the aggressive are cynical. So in M.Bh. amid much that could charitably be included in worldly wisdom, one finds chapters like 12/132, 136.8. Get power if being a kṣatriya, you can. Power is more than dharma, dharma springs from power. Might is not right but makes it: get power first and then you can worry about right. All love and friendship is greed, a means of getting gain, artha, so there is no permanence or obligation. Trust or forgiveness are impractical sentimentality. This has a very modern ring. Yet evil is suicidal; hence you either have to conceal your evil nature with

successful hypocrisy, or you must demand an utter forgiveness of your subjects you have no intention of giving and are advised not to believe. Hence we find also the ethic of loyalty of the minister to a probably soon late king, or his family ; that loyalty being a categorical imperative, quite apart from possible unworthiness of the object. Yet the more the state meddles, the more assistants it needs ; the more organization the easier it is to capture it, and the easier conspiracy. The growth of spies runs parallel to that of government ; and kings are repeatedly warned against having full confidence in anyone, even their sons, e. g. M.Bh. 12/57.16, 86.32, etc. They are equally warned against that advice and having no confidence ; while e. g. 12/83.25 laments the insecurity of kings' servants, who have as much to fear from their master as their enemies. The king, equally insecure, is advised to live, e. g. M. Bh. 12/69.8-12, in what must have been a very trying atmosphere of suspicion of friends, servants and enemies alike. Yet when everyone is following the same policy, it only means an enormous lot of unhappy effort cancels itself out. Here is the value of cynicism that it stifles conscience, since God is under no obligation to the devil, who can only get his deserts. Hence the release of inhibited energy, whose direction cannot be foreseen, and which is accordingly hardly less devastating than the atom bomb, which Bhāradvāja will doubtless foresee—indeed the bomb itself does not cause so much fear as the fact that no one expects to get any notice of its probable arrival.

FIRST PART OF SAMUDRAGUPTA'S PRAŚASTI

BY

S. V. SOHONI

An idea of good draftsmanship was given by Kautilya —

"Hence one who is possessed of ministerial qualifications, acquainted with all kinds of customs, smart in composition, good in legible writing, and sharp in reading shall be appointed as a writer (lekhaka).

"Such a writer, having attentively listened to the king's order and having well thought out the matter under consideration, shall reduce the order to writing.

"As to a writ addressed to a lord (Íśvara), it shall contain a polite mention of his country, his possessions, his family, and his name; and as to that addressed to a common man (anÍśvara), it shall make a polite mention of his country and name.

"Having paid sufficient attention to the caste, family, social rank, age, learning (śruta), occupation, property, character (śÍla), blood-relationship (yaunānubandha) of the addressee as well as to the place and time (of writing), the writer shall form a writ befitting the position of the person addressed.

"Arrangement of subject matter (arthakrama), relevancy (sambandha), completeness, sweetness, dignity, and lucidity are the necessary qualities of a writ.

"The act of mentioning facts in the order of their importance is arrangement.

"When subsequent facts are not contradictory to facts just or previously mentioned, and so on till the completion of the letter, it is termed relevancy.

"Avoidance of redundancy or deficiency in words or letters; impressive description of subject-matter by citing reasons, examples, and illustrations; and the use of appropriate and suitably strong words (asrantapada) is completeness.

"The description in exquisite style of a good purport with a pleasing effect is sweetness.

"The use of words other than colloquial (*agrāmya*) is dignity.

"The use of well-known words is lucidity."

An outstanding example of such drafting is Hariṣeṇa's *prasaṣti* of Samudragupta. It was referred to as "*kāvya*", in its concluding portion. There can be no doubt that Hariṣeṇa must have put in his best literary effort—it was a composition about a great personality, who besides being a powerful emperor was also a literary genius.

This record measures 6' 8" × 5' 4" or is of a size of an ordinary door curtain. Its position on a pillar first erected by Aśoka at Kaushambi, 28 miles west of its present location, is significant. Its last line is 6 feet above ground level, Aśoka's sand stone pillar itself being 35 feet high.

Anybody wanting to read this inscription is bound to find it easier to read that which was nearest to his eyes.

On this principle, it is possible to understand what may be called a scheme or structure of this composition. This is divided into three parts: the first and top-most consists of 8 verses which deal with *glory*; the second, occupying the middle portion consists of a large prose passage describing Samudragupta's *career* as a soldier, administrator and a versatile genius; and the third, nearest to the ground, describing his immediate *family* tree followed by a few details regarding Hariṣeṇa himself.

Thus what is nearest is Samudragupta's genealogy. A little further away is a detailed reference to his campaigns and achievements. Furthest removed are those 8 verses.

As is well-known, "There is a large crack in the column, from above the first word of the first line, and extending down to the beginning of the fourteenth. And the upper part of the inscription has suffered very much, partly from some of the mediaeval inscriptions which are so abundant on the column, being engraved on and between the original lines here, and partly from the peeling off of the surface of the stone in several places." Thus noted Fleet, who proceeded to observe, "But nothing of a historical nature appears to have been lost; except, perhaps, after the mention of Naga Sena in line 13, and in connection with the mention

of Puspapura in line 14". Such a conclusion regarding damage to this inscription was not an original finding in 1888 when Fleet made his remarks. In 1837, Prinsep had stated, "The mutilation of the poetical part does not necessarily prevent the understanding of the general purport; and it is evident that the verse was no less a string of high flown descriptions of the prince lately defunct."

Although discovered 123 years ago for historical analysis, interpretation of this *prāśasti* cannot be deemed to have been finally concluded yet. It is true that a very impressive group of scholars had handled it—Troyer, Mill, Prinsep, Bhagwan Lal Indrajī, Bhau Daji and Fleet. But it cannot be confidently stated that the text as settled by Fleet would qualify for passing the tests set forth by Kautilya as to what constitutes good drafting.

An attempt has to be made, firstly, to fill in the blanks in this record caused by its mutilation; and secondly, to try and reconstruct that sequence of ideas which governed its composition. It would be seen that even Fleet had done such restoration work to some extent; and that, on being further examined, it was not only capable of being improved upon but even extended.

II

Hariṣeṇa, a courtier of Samudragupta, had undoubtedly set forth to compose a *campoo* in praise of his emperor. He selected a pillar originally set up by Aśoka, not because his resources were incapable of fetching an altogether new column but because prestige of Aśoka as an emperor of India had to be shown as having been exceeded by Samudragupta with his conquests in the Uttarāpatha and the Dakṣiṇāpatha, followed by his fame travelling towards the heavens, as if to seek, what it was to make progress without any opposition. Or, as Hariṣeṇa put it, "*lalita-gamana-sukha-vicakṣaṇāya*". A larger claim was made in this *prāśasti* on behalf of Samudragupta than that made anywhere by Aśoka. Hariṣeṇa was determined to enlarge upon, what was later on, a familiar Gupta theme put briefly on their coins—"*Pr̥thivīm vijitya divam jayati sucaritaiḥ*". This pillar was treated as a finger pointed out by the earth towards that ascending spiral of Samudragupta's fame.

In a record, according to administrative convention, genealogy of a king is mentioned first. It is called "*purvā*." In this case

it was deliberately mentioned last, as it was inscribed at a level which was nearest the reader's eyes.

Fortunately for students of history, what may be called a middle part of this record has been preserved more or less intact. Had there been any damage to it, restoration would have been difficult as it is entirely in prose and considerations of meter etc. would have been of no help. After being furnished the details of his family, one has been given, in this part of Samudragupta's prasasti, a comprehensive idea of his many-sided achievements.

As one looks further up, there is what I have called, part I, consisting of 8 verses which have suffered maximum damage. Until recently, and definitely till Fleet's time, these verses were regarded as of little historical importance, as was noticed earlier. But had they contained a mere poetic re-statement of what was later inscribed in prose, such a repetition could not have been regarded as quite creditable, granting that it was well intentioned.

III

I venture to suggest that there was but little repetition between parts I and II; and that these verses contained an element of real value not only to a prasasti composition but to our understanding of Samudragupta's career.

Two scholars have already made a fruitful re-examination of 3 out of 8 verses. Dr. Chhabra¹ made a significant correction in Fleet's text of verse no. 4; and Dr. V. Raghavan² followed Dr. Chhabra's suggestion about verse no. 8 and also revised Dr. Fleet's translation of verse no. 3. In this recent revision of Fleet's text what proved valuable was a close acquaintance with Sanskrit literature. I think that a re-examination of Fleet's version of remaining 5 verses would not be unrewarding. Since, however, a blank would remain a blank in an inscription, physically speaking, such a study is bound to involve an element of pure speculation.

Verse no. 1 — The meter of this verse cannot be determined as it is almost fully lost. What did it contain? An important word

¹ Indian Culture: Vol. XIV, pp. 141-150.

² Journal of Oriental Research: Vol. XVI, pp. 159-162.

is "Kulyaiḥ" and its occurrence in the very first verse is significant.

Verse no. 2 — The meter cannot be determined in this case as well, as its first line has been almost completely obliterated. Its second line, however, contains some words which are legible; and two among them are significant for purposes of attempting a restoration viz. *sita* which is followed by a gap and thereafter by another word *pravitata*, which again is followed by a gap. *Sita* and *pravitata* are more likely to be adjectives of *chatra*, since a white (or *sita*) umbrella is spread (or *pravitata*) over royalty, as an indispensable accompaniment. The first part of the last line in verse no. 2 is [sphu] *radvam* (?)..... *kṣaḥ*; and if there were a description of Samudragupta's royal emblems promoting his personal appearance, this might as well be a reference to "Sphurat prabhā maṇḍala" and 'kṣaḥ' might be a part of 'vakṣaḥ' or, of broad chest. There is reasonable possibility of this verse containing a reference to holding a white royal umbrella on Samudragupta and his impressive personal appearance.

The only verb form available in verse no. 3 is employed in the present tense — "bhunakti". It is, therefore, not unlikely that verses 1 and 2 also were based on the use of present tense i. e. referring to a state of affairs which was contemporary. It could be a continuing circumstance — which began with Samudragupta's reign and persisted subsequently all along.

If this were correct, verse no. 1 might as well have referred to Samudragupta's beneficent and aggressive rule.

Verse no. 3 -- This has been discussed adequately by Dr. Raghavan who has replaced 'avināśi' by 'viśāle,' proceeding from what was left, viz. 'vi.' Dr. Raghavan has discussed a double entendre on *virodha*, *budha*, *guṇa* and *ājñā*. Verse no. 3 proved that Samudragupta ruled over a realm of poetry as well as a realm of the earth, equally ably.

Verse no. 4—On epigrammatic grounds and other considerations, Dr. Chhabra has corrected Flæet's reading of *ūryohi* to *ehyehi*; and (*pāhye vamurvi*) *miti* to (*pāhi tvamur*) *vimiti*. Dr. Chhabra has referred to similar employment of words in comparable contexts.

Harīṣeṇa has apparently mentioned this incident because it was one of selection of Samudragupta, on his merits, by his father, in order to ensure proper management of the kingdom.

Verse no. 5 — The first letter in line no. 1 has been correctly restored as *dri*, making the first word, "*dr̥ṣṭvā*". What was intended was to convey the consequences of seeing the super-human deeds of Samudragupta. They led either to joy (*harsāḥ*) or fear *bhīti*, (for a broken *bha* followed by a small gap can only stand for *bhīti*) or enmity (*vaira*). *Āsvādayantaḥ*, is noteworthy. The sarcasm of that verbal form is continued even to this day in India. Thus, different categories of reactions have been stated — joy or fear or feelings of hostility.

Verse no. 6 — It is continuation of what was stated in verse no. 5 i. e. results of emergence of Samudragupta as a military factor. Line no. 1 is generally based on splitting up of *nityam utcāpakārāḥ* into *nityam* + *utca* + *apakārāḥ*. I venture to suggest that this is not correct and that this phrase should be divided into *nityam* + *utcāpakārāḥ*. Firstly, *utcāpakārāḥ* as meaning 'high' evil doers, had use of two words. An evil cannot be high. Secondly, if correctly split up, this phrase gives a very consistent meaning with the rest of the line viz. that in battles he always conquered with his own arms those who had raised their bows high. There was glory in conquering with one's arms, a person or persons who were armed with bows. '*Utca*' as qualifying '*apakārāḥ*' is hardly poetic. '*Nityam*' stands for continual progress and accounts for fresh conquests.

In line 2, only a few words have been preserved viz. "*śvaḥ śvaḥ mānapra*". If anybody had thought of "tomorrow and tomorrow" in connection with honours, it was not Samudragupta. The uncertainty lay in the minds of the conquered who had actually feared severe reprisal against their past hostility. "*Pra*" might have preceded, '*dāna*'.

Line 3 contained a really poetic effort of Harīṣeṇa. Pleased minds (obviously, of those who were conquered) have been compared with fruits high on trees, full of juice. This third line is based on *double entendre*. Such a fruitful development is explained by one word in line 4 which follows.

Line no. 4 — The reference to the spring season or 'vasanta' throws light on line no. 3. Samudragupta's subsequent actions towards his erstwhile enemies were such that even they, on being conquered by him, flourished inspite of altered conditions, following their submission. The word, '*paścāttāpa*', is used with two meanings viz. repentance as well as the summer heat which follows the spring season. '*Va*' is obviously the first letter of a verbal form, like '*vahantah*'. The subject of the sentence in this verse is those who were conquered by Samudragupta with his own arms and treated so reasonably thereafter, although they had raised their bows against him. The stanza purported to tell that on their submission, the conquered kings who had once been up in arms against him, were like trees having spring season conditions, unaffected by any withering effect of the fierce summer heat of Samudragupta's valour, as they had repented their follies and made proper amends.

Verse no. 7 — It has its second and fourth lines partly destroyed. Its first two lines are apparently based on the fancy of the sea (samudra) on which "he who is not disturbed" (acyuta) was resting, being completely upset by Samudragupta. The popular conception is that Acyuta rests on the sea, on a bed furnished by a serpent (nāga). A delicate pun on Samudragupta's name was a common occurrence in his reign.

A poetic statement was made that Samudra completely uprooted Acyuta and Nāgasena etc. But sudden movement has been particularly brought out in the very first word in the stanza, a word "*Velā*" which is essentially connected with the sea—viz in '*udvelodita*'.

That there was a lightening action against his Nāga enemies is indicated beyond doubt. That these Nāga kings paid a penalty with their lives for their hostility towards him in contrast with other kings, is also equally clear. That this effort was done solely by Samudragupta was undoubtedly intended to be stressed. In fact, the main suggestion of this entire *prāśasti* was that there was unaided heroism on the part of Samudragupta. This point has been urged in the previous verse and emphasised in the prose passage which immediately follows. That Samudra-

gupta acted only on his own prowess i. e. personal valour, has been stated both before and after this reference to Nāga kings and to a Kotakulaja contained in this stanza.

Against this background, must be viewed a traditional interpretation of lines 2 and 3 in this verse. According to this interpretation, Samudragupta was *playing* in Pāṭaliputra and his *armies* - not one army, but armies - captured Kotakulaja. This, to my mind, would amount to an exact opposite of the main purport of the inscription.

In my opinion, Kotakulaja was not captured by Samudragupta but *liberated*; that this liberation was from the clutches of the armies of Nāga kings who were admittedly given a knock-out blow; and that because this was a unique rescue, it had found a mention in this introductory verse portion of Samudragupta's prasasti as an example of one of his qualities.

There are reasons to support this conclusion. Firstly, although Nāga kings referred to in this stanza had been uprooted i. e. destroyed, their names have been again repeated in the prose text which follows this verse. The prose list of conquered kings is thus a more comprehensive list and involves some reference to events referred to in these earlier verses. Yet there is no mention of a Kotakulaja in that prose catalogue of kings conquered and either destroyed or kept in subjugation. The late Dr. K. P. Jayaswal assumed that Kotakulaja was also a Nāga king and that his being a Nāga king had been made clear in that portion of the verse which was damaged. But there is no basis whatever to warrant this assumption. On the other hand, if anything were known about Kota dynasty, it is that it was not a Nāga dynasty. Kota coins were generally recovered from eastern Panjab; and there is reason to hold that some of them must have been issued in the 3rd and 4th centuries A. D., as they copied the type of Vāsudeva Kuśāna.

Accordingly, one gets a perfectly plausible military position. There were three political entities - Kotakulaja in eastern Panjab (whoever he was); a Nāga confederation in Central India and middle parts of Uttarpradeśa; and Samudragupta, near Prayāga. Samudragupta rescued Kotakulaja by a sudden thrust against

Nāga kings. Helping a neighbour of a neighbour in one's operation against that neighbour was an elementary policy of kings in ancient India. Kotakulaja was rescued when Nāga armies were about to get at him. He was a "*Prakṛti mitra*".

I now come to the traditional interpretation of the reference to Puṣpa. Would a principal courtier refer to the capital of his Emperor as "that which is called Puṣpa?" Is it not plausible that a statement that a king was playing in his capital was strange method of referring to his sports? In Mihirakula's Gwalior inscription, where also there is the use of the word "āhvaya," there is clarification that it refers to a hill. I do not claim that Puṣpāhvaya refers to any hill known as Puṣpa. I would concede that it might refer to a town, taking into account what Dr. Altekar and Dr. Majumdar have said in their history, on this point, that there was probably involved a reference to Kanauj and not Patna. But the *assumption* and this is what I want to underline specifically - that Samudragupta was *playing* about in Pātali-putra and that his *armies* dealt with a Nāga king of Kota dynasty is one which has little evidence in support. Jayaswal equated Magadhakula with Kotakula - and this equation again rests upon pure speculation. It is contradicted directly by the numismatic fact that Kota coins are found only in eastern Punjab.

What I have said above is supported by the next line in the verse. In that line, the first two words have been put as - '*Surye*' (?) followed by a word '*nitya*' (?) followed by a gap, followed by a word '*tata*,' followed by a gap.

Fleet thought that *Puṣpāhvaya* was a reference to a town on the bank of a river, presumably the Gaṅgā, because in the next line there was reference to the bank of a river in the word '*tata*'.

I cannot dispute that this word means a bank of a river. But I suggest that it has also another meaning viz. the slope of a mountain. I further suggest that if the first two words in the line were taken into account, the only association of ideas in which three words like *Sūrya*, *Nitya* and *Tata* could play a significant role is a common association viz. of the Sun perpetually revolving around the mount Meru. How this imagery was employed can be easily guessed.

Verse no. 8 — It has been already discussed brilliantly by Dr. Raghavan and it brings out a point of some importance. The key passage in this verse is, '*dhyāna pātram ya ekah*' i. e. who alone is worthy of being contemplated upon on account of his 'gunas'. Verse no. 8 purports to state that a study of Samudragupta's fame would reveal how there was a foundation of ethics for his varied achievements, how he had a penetrating intellect, how his literary output was worthy of frequent repetition and study and how his literary genius promoted capacity of other poets (e. g. of Hariṣeṇa himself—he has more explicitly stated this later).

IV

Hariṣeṇa's purpose is clear. He was dealing with 'rāja gunas'—virtues of his emperor, in this part of his composition. Being an administrator himself, his reflections on this subject were closely based on his study of authoritative pronouncements on merits of kings. In other words, being well versed in standard works on polity or *daṇḍa-nīti*, his description of Samudragupta's gunas was patterned on standard discussions of the subject.

Hariṣeṇa undoubtedly must have had access to a number of such standard discussions regarding rāja gunas, including that in Kauṭilya's *Artha-Sāstra*, for Kauṭilya wrote nearly 7 centuries before Hariṣeṇa and quoted several other authorities now not available. Indian political theory must have also developed during this interval.

However, part no. 2 in Hariṣeṇa's prasasti, which is much better preserved and is in prose, clearly consists of words and phrases which could be directly traced to similar terms used in Kauṭilya's *Artha-Sāstra*. Thus Samudragupta's political relations were expressed in what amounted to Kauṭilya's technical parlance. As I have shown elsewhere, Hariṣeṇa used terms defined by other thinkers as well i. e. did not exclusively draw upon Kauṭilya's phraseology, in other parts of his prasasti. But, comparatively speaking, he used more terms occurring in Kauṭilya's *Artha-Sāstra* than from other texts, as far as one can now judge this matter.

There is understandable reason viz. the considerable mutilation of verses, why it was so far not even suspected that Hari-

śeṇa's 8 introductory verses were also based on a standard analysis of what constituted excellence in a king; and that it was mainly Kauṭilya's analysis which was kept in view by Hariśeṇa.

Since an attempt has been made in this essay to fill up blanks and to make as reasonable a speculation as to the contents of these verses as possible, help from any quarter was welcome - particularly, if it had independently verifiable merits of its own. It is suggested that Kauṭilya's analysis¹ of what is "svāmi-sampat" and "ātma-sampat" is definitely valuable in this context - vide Appendix A.

Kauṭilya's description of merits begins with a reference to birth in a high family as an asset. Verse no. 1 of Hariśeṇa, more or less completely damaged, contains a word "kulyaiḥ" i. e. by family members which very likely refers to those of Samudragupta's family. If this were correct, it explains why Hariśeṇa mentioned father, grand-father, and great-grand-father of Samudragupta and referred to Lichhavis as a community, while dealing with genealogy. Kauṭilya has referred to "vṛddha-darśi," as yet another point. This suggested to Hariśeṇa what is perhaps his most fascinating verse viz. verse no. 4. In Hariśeṇa's verse no. 6 was undoubtedly an example of Kauṭilya's criteria of great industry (mahotsāha) and having no procrastination (adīrgha-sūtraḥ). The connection between Kauṭilya's reference to "prajñā-guṇa" and use of that term by Hariśeṇa is obvious: Hariśeṇa refers to "prajñā-anuṣaṅga" as well as to "vaidusyam tattva-bhedi". Kauṭilya mentions a number of terms whose illustration in Samudragupta's personality was enumerated, as it were, by Hariśeṇa.

Thus, how intimately were these verses associated with prevalent political doctrine about kingship was completely obscured, chiefly by the translation given in Fleet's Corpus, regarded as standard text for over 70 years since its publication.

Hariśeṇa saw in Samudragupta, a living example of all that was best in royalty, as stated by political thinkers. That is why he concluded this part of his praśasti with what is perhaps his most poetic expression in his narration, in which he stated that

¹ Kauṭilya's Artha-Sāstra: VI. 1.

Samudragupta alone was worthy of being contemplated upon by those who were learned, since there was no virtue which did not exist in his conduct. By "learned persons" was meant, chiefly, political thinkers. By 'virtue', was meant that listed in a catalogue of qualities enumerated in standard authorities and not a virtue in its ordinary sense. Harisena has quite openly concluded part I of his prasasti by a direct reference to this topic of gunas, explained in his introductory verses. He went into raptures as it were while dealing with it and hence chose expression cast in meters. His whole emphasis was on welfare and fame arising out of ethics as moulded into a living concrete illustration viz. Samudragupta's biography. One phrase leaves a profound impression. Harisena made out a point that Samudragupta's fame was like a living creeper which grew on a platform of dharma or good conduct - and that this creeper was continually developing further offshoots (*kirtayah sa-pratānāḥ*). This striking description alone should have been sufficient pointer to the fact, only recently acknowledged, viz. that Harisena's prasasti was not about a person who was dead when it was composed, but about a great emperor who was then very much alive. Nothing brings out more effectively this vitality in Samudragupta's career than these two words, "*kirtayah sapratānāḥ*".

APPENDIX A

स्वाम्यमात्यजनपददुर्गकोशदण्डमित्राणि प्रकृतयः ॥ १ ॥ तत्र स्वामि-
संपत् ॥ २ ॥ महाकुलीनो^१ दैवबुद्धिः सत्त्वसंपन्नो वृद्धदर्शी^२ धार्मिकः^३ सत्य-
वागविसंवादकः कृतज्ञः स्थूललक्षो महोत्साहोऽदीर्घसूत्रः शक्यसामन्तो
दृढबुद्धिरक्षुद्रपरिषत्को^४ विनयकाम इत्याभिगामिका गुणाः ॥ ३ ॥ शुश्रूषा-
श्रवणग्रहणधारण विज्ञानोहापोहतत्त्वाभिनिवेशाः प्रज्ञा^५ गुणाः^६ ॥ ४ ॥ शौर्य-
ममर्षः^७ शीघ्रतादाक्ष्यं^८ चोत्साहगुणाः^६ ॥ ५ ॥ वाग्मी प्रगल्भः स्मृतिमति-
बलवानुदग्रः स्ववग्रहः कृतशिल्पोव्यसने दण्डनाय्युपकारापकारयोर्दृष्टप्रतीकारी
ह्रीमानापत्प्रकृत्योर्विनियोक्ता दीर्घदूरदर्शी देशकालपुरुषकारकार्यप्रधानः संधि-
धिक्रमत्यागसंयमपणपरच्छिद्रविभागी संवृतोऽदीनाभिहास्यजिह्वाभ्रुकुटीत्रणः
कामक्रोधलोभस्तम्भचापलोपतापपैशुन्यहीनः शुक्लः स्मितोदग्राभिभाषी वृद्धोप-
देशाचार इत्यात्मसंपत् ॥ ६ ॥

This classification of royal virtues must have been famous in ancient India; and praise of kings naturally took it into account. Harisena undoubtedly was technical to this extent.

The prose portion of the Praśasti can also be related to such a discussion, particularly relating to personal virtues or "ātma-sampat".

^१ Cf. कुल्येः (verse no. 1).

^२ Cf. यस्य प्रज्ञानुषंगोचित सुखमनसः (verse no. 3).

^३ See verses no. 3 and no. 8.

^४ Cf. विद्वल्लोके विशाले (verse no. 3).

^५ Verse no. 4 is based on this point.

^६ Verse no. 6 is based on this point.

^७ Verse no. 7 is based on this point.

^८ Cf. धर्म प्राचीर वंधाः । (verse no. 8).

SOME CONCEPTS BASED ON REVELATORY EPISTEMOLOGY

BY

D. K. BEDEKAR

In an essay, entitled "The Revelatory Character of Hindu Epistemology," (published in B. O. R. I. Annals Vol. XXIX 1949), I had attempted to show that the concept of knowledge, in Indian thought-world, is based on a dualism of the 'knower' and the 'illuminator'. I had further tried to compare this dualism in Indian epistemology with the dualism involved in the thought-process of the primitive magician-hunter. I had also discussed there how, with this approach, we may better understand the 'revelatory', 'pragmatic' and 'realistic' character of knowledge affirmed in Hindu systems.

In the present essay I have studied, with the help of the foregoing analysis, the following :—

- (1) The problem of 'illusion'.
- (2) Concreteness of the 'Universal' in Rāmānuja's system.
- (3) The concepts of *citta* and *puruṣa* in *Yoga-Sūtras* 16 to 22 in *Pāda* IV.

1. *The Problem of 'illusion'.*

The concept of 'illusion' or *adhyāsa* forms a very important issue in Hindu thought and fierce as well as subtle controversy has revolved round this problem. It may appear, on superficial inquiry, that the phenomenon of 'illusion' has been given undue and exaggerated importance in Hindu epistemology in comparison to that given to it in modern thought.

But I propose to show in the following paragraphs, that the real issue in the analysis of 'illusion' was not a simple straightforward inquiry into the nature of erroneous knowledge and the causes thereof, but an inquiry into the very nature of knowledge and of consciousness. It may even be said, with justification, that the whole inquiry into the nature of 'illusion' was taken up from a point where epistemology had ended and given way to

ontology. What naturally puzzles a modern mind, is the Herculean effort with which the Indian thinkers tried to unravel the 'mystery' behind the utter transparency and simplicity of the phenomenon of erroneous perception. One is tempted to ask: Why did the ancient thinkers engage themselves in apparently hair-splitting discussions about this simple fact of experience?

On serious consideration, however, one can see that what appears to the modern mind as a banal everyday occurrence, was for the Hindu thinkers a very vital fact which explained, in a quasi-analogical way, the true nature of knowledge and consequently of the relation between matter and spirit or between the phenomenal world and the *Brahman*.

It is, therefore, necessary to see the unique manner in which the Hindu thinkers analysed 'illusion'.

The reality of the content of 'illusion'.

The first point to note is that, in Hindu systems, illusory revelation is on par with non-illusory revelation. Thus, discussing the Vedānta theory of illusion, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta thus refers to the views about the existence of the contents of an illusion; one view is 'realistic' in the sense that it affirms the existence of the 'silver' seen in an illusion of the same, based on the sense-data of a conch-shell. This existence is "not regarded as dependent upon the perceiver and it might exist in the absence of perceivers".¹ The other view is less 'realistic,' but is the generally accepted one. In this view, "the illusory silver only exists as an object so long as it is perceived. *It is not a mere idea as Berkeley would have it, but an external object.* The fact that it is soon destroyed is no reason why it should not exist as an object so long as it is perceived ... In the case of dreams also, the dream objects are there and are perceived. They are illusory only in the sense that they cease to exist when they are not perceived, yet they are there while they are perceived as external existents".² (emphasis mine. —D. K. B.).

In the case of illusory silver there is at least the basis of the conch-shell but the Hindu epistemologists affirmed the objectivity

¹ "Philosophical Essays", page 253.

² Ibid, page 253.

even of such illusory objects as an elephant seen in a dream. Thus, Dr. Hiriyanna says, in his essay on the theory of knowledge of *Viśiṣṭa-advaita*.¹ "It is stated on the authority of the Upaniṣads (Br Up. IV. iii, 10), that objects like the elephant (say) seen in dream, are actually there at the time". It is of interest to note that this doctrine of the reality of dream-objects has been propounded in a mature system developed in the Twelfth century.

This 'objectivity' or externality of the contents of illusions or dreams is a unique feature of the revelatory theory of knowledge and this has been noted by various modern Indian Scholars. But, unfortunately, they consider this feature to be an anticipation of modern realism. Before proceeding further I will quote from another important scholar on this point. Dr. Hiriyanna, in his 'Outlines of Indian Philosophy', page 351, says:

"... that the foregoing account shows how mistaken is the common belief that Śaṅkara views the objects of everyday experience to be false or unreal. So far from doing this, he claims some kind of reality even for objects of illusion. To be perceived is for him to be, and his theory may therefore be described as an inversion of the one associated in Western philosophy with the name of Berkeley".

So, the first unique point in the Hindu concept of illusion is the objectivity or reality of its content. How does this point relate itself to the general 'revelatory' theory of knowledge?

Two steps in the act of knowing.

In trying to answer the above question, I will use certain symbols for economy of expression and take the usual case of illusion referred to by Hindu thinkers.

Os ... Snake as Sense-data, or the object.

Is ... Sensations and other mental pictures related to a snake.

Or ... Rope as Sense-data.

Ir ... Sensations and other mental pictures related to a rope.

R (Os Is) ... Revelation of snake on seeing a snake.

R (Or Ir) ... Revelation of rope on seeing a rope.

Now, what will constitute an illusion? The answer, in terms of our symbols, will be:

¹ Indian Philosophical Congress Proceedings of 1925, pages 72 to 85.

7 [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

R (Or Is) ... Revelation of snake on seeing a rope, i. e. illusion of a snake.

This illusion is however negated thus :

R (Or Ir) ... revelation of rope negates R (Or Is), the illusion of snake.

Now we have seen that R (Os Is) i. e. revelation of snake in seeing a snake, R (Or Ir) i. e. revelation of rope on seeing a rope and R (Or Is) i. e. illusory revelation of snake on seeing a rope are after all only revelations and as such exist on one single plane of reality.

Now, if we refer back to the analysis of revelatory knowledge, achieved with the help of the analogy of the magician-hunter, we will be able to discover the main motive and purpose of the analysis of illusion, which was so assiduously undertaken in the Hindu systems.

In revelatory knowledge, the hunter in the role of the 'illuminator' had a dual relation to the object (stag). His ideations and the objects as if fused together to form a whole, 'the knower,' a 'complex' of psycho-physical elements, and we found that his 'knowledge' of the stag consisted of a 'revelation of' or 'illumination of' the 'stag-complex' or of the 'knower' by the 'illuminator'.

Thus in the act of revelation, or in the knowledge-process which is characterised by revelation, we find two distinct aspects or elements :

(1) Revelation as a single and whole experience of the agent.

(2) In revelation, however, the psycho-physical complex (i. e. the 'knower' or the 'stag-complex'), stands *along-side* the 'illuminator' who illumines this complex.

The Paradox in revelation.

In a way, the act of revelatory knowledge involves a paradox. On the one hand, the *wholeness*, the self-evident and self-contained nature as well as the immediacy of revelation is patent. But, what about the content of this revelation? And, when this question of content is brought in relation to revelation, we find that we are face to face with a dualism. This is a dualism or paradox of the 'illuminator' and 'the knower'. The latter integrates

within itself the sense-data, sensations and other ideations of the agent and even includes his egoity, which serves as the focal point of all these ideations. This 'knower' is the content of the revelation but only in a partial way. By itself it remains dark and fruitless as the unseen but potentially visible reflection of an object standing before a mirror in a dark room. This content of the revelation comes into overt existence only when there is illumination provided by the illuminator.

A problem, therefore, arises as to the relation between the 'illumination' and the illumined 'complex'. It is this peculiar relation that was sought to be described by Hindu thinkers, with the help of an analysis of 'illusion'.

How did they succeed in doing this? How did they solve the 'paradox' of revelatory knowledge?

Resolution of the paradox.

It will be seen that the solution was simple and was based on the very premises on which the revelatory theory was based. I will explain below how the paradox could be adequately resolved. Referring to the symbols, one may state the following:

Taking all single revelations such as—

R (Os Is), R (Or Ir), R (Or Is) ... R (Om In), as moments in our infinite stream of knowledge. The Buddhists called it the *Kṣaṇa-saṃtāna* while others called it *Vastu prapañca*. From this flux of revelation, however, the Indian epistemologists abstracted the category of 'illumination'. This could be easily done without doing any violence to the general theory of revelatory knowledge, because in this theory illumination stands in a mere contact-relation with the psycho-physical complexes like (Or Ir), (Os Is), (Or Is) etc.

In the language of symbols, this can be expressed thus:

Out of the series:

R (Or Ir), R (Os Is), R (Or Is) — *ad infinitum*,

R was abstracted.

But this abstraction gave rise to the problem of defining the nature of R as abstracted from all revelations. The nature of this abstracted R could only then be that of a pure contentless relationless illumination, and that is exactly the Hindu concept of

Brahman, as that supreme illuminator who reveals everything else but is in himself relationless.

How the Brahman is revealed ?

After determining the relationless nature of the illuminator R, the question of the nature of its contact with the psycho-physical complexes was solved by reference to the fact of illusion. In an illusion, such as R (Or Is), it was held that the following relations exist between the several factors involved : The illusory revelation R (Or Is), i. e. idea or memory of a snake fused with the sense-data of a rope, stands illumined by R ; following this illusion comes another revelation R (Or Ir), i. e. the idea of rope fused with the sense-data of the rope, which earlier caused the preceding illusion of a snake). Now, this second revelation negates R (Or Is) and reveals the sense-data of the rope (Or) which was kept hidden or screened from illumination by the memory of a snake (Is).

It is not of importance, however, for Hindu epistemology, that R (Or Is) has been negated as an illusion and substituted by a true knowledge of R (Or Ir) ; at least, that is not the aim of the analysis of illusion. What is the cause of the fact that a concrete substance, the rope (Or), is here seen to be the cause of two revelations, R (Or Is) and R (Or Ir) ? This is primarily the question that they ask themselves and they provided the following answer :— The former revelation R (Or Is) though valid as revelation, screens the real nature of the concrete substance (Or), while the subsequent revelation completely rejects the earlier one and reveals the true nature of the substance.

This phenomenon is first taken as an analogy to affirm and explain the concrete substantiality of the 'common ground', the supreme illuminator of all revelations, the Brahman.

The relation between R (Or Is), the snake illusion, and the rope (Or) is variously described in different systems and thus we have the five main *khyātis*, which attribute more or less intimate contact between these two factors. But common to all *khyātis* is the fact of 'revelation' based on the identification between the rope and the memory of a snake, illumined by an 'illuminator.' This common illuminating principle is the Brahman and this, in

its turn, is not revealed, unless a person comes to know this whole 'mystery' of revelation, through adequate *sādhana* or Divine grace.

In Jain and Buddhist systems the abstracted R was conceived not in the manner of a concrete substance like the 'ghana, pūrṇa, sat, cit, ānanda' Brahman of orthodox Hindu systems, but as a pure negation of the infinite stream of revelations. This mode of negation was further elaborated by Śāṅkara, but these various modes of negation did not alter the main theme of Indian thought. The Buddhist Vijñānavādins also did not propound Nihilism but affirmed the reality of the stream of revelations (*artha-kriyā-kṣaṇas*).

Some corollaries of theory of revelation.

The foregoing discussion is an attempt to show that Hindu epistemology has the same essential characteristics as the knowledge process of the magician-hunter and that the concept of Brahman is based on this revelatory epistemology.

Before concluding, I will refer to some stories of Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha, which may vindicate this view about the revelatory theory of Hindu epistemology. These are the stories of Lavaṇa and similar ones based on the reality of the dream-world or of the desire-world. They form an integral part of Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha and are neither to be taken as fantasies or fables. As we have already seen before, according to the revelatory theory, whatever is revealed is real. Thus, things revealed to us in a dream are as real as those of waking experience. If a thing is revealed to a person in the form of a dream, which in itself is a part of another dream, then also the thing is on the same level of existence as those in the first dream and also as the things in actual waking life.

Thus the world of normal waking experience can be considered as one world in a series of worlds either created by one person in his dreams or created by other persons or gods, in their dreams.

Such an ever-extending series of worlds, even residing inside each other like a Chinese puzzle, is not merely an epistemological theory, but an ethical necessity, in the Hindu system. I will not dwell on this point further because it will take us to the doctrine of *karma* in its ethical ramifications.

2. *Concreteness of the Universal in Rāmānuja's System.*

There is a growing tendency amongst modern Indian scholars to emphasise the realistic aspect of Hindu thought.¹ It may be viewed as a compensatory swing away from the earlier over-emphasis on the idealistic aspects of Indian systems. But this new trend has the unfortunate effect of blurring the real and sharp distinction between the ancient thought-world and the modern one. I shall, therefore, attempt to bring out the apparent similarities as well as the basic contrasts between the aspect of realism in Indian thought on the one hand, and on the other, the schools of realism and empiricism belonging to the modern period.

I shall select for this discussion the problem of the 'universal' because this problem, and the varied solutions offered by the ancient and modern systems, provide a very suitable ground for comparing and contrasting the two thought-worlds.

Firstly, I shall state the problem in modern terms. The discoveries of natural sciences, particularly those of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, have given us a concrete picture of the universe of inorganic and organic things, which follow certain laws of their own. Thus we comprehend today a universe which is capable of being rationally understood in terms of scientific concepts and laws. This universe is known to have existed prior to the emergence of sentient beings. The 'rationality' of the universe is, therefore, its own mode of existence and not 'given' to it by man or by any other rational being.

The laws of Nature are objective and self-sustained and form the foundation of the scientific thought-world of modern man. This view of Nature leads us to an obvious and self-evident idea of the 'Universal'. It is, on the one hand, a human rational concept, but on the other hand, it also indicates, as closely as a symbol or concept may do so, the laws and uniformities belonging to real things. The concepts of 'cowness' and of 'humanity', for

¹ Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, for instance, discusses the implications of realism in his 'Philosophical Essays'. Dr. S. C. Chatterjee also tries to bring the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories of perception in line with the realism of Russell. (See his 'Nyāya theory of knowledge'; page 182). Also Dr. D. M. Datta discusses the problem of perception in the same manner in his 'Six ways of knowing', page 107.

instance, have for us real contents, defined by zoological and social sciences.

The 'universal' is ideal in the sense that it is conceptual but it is not 'in the mind' alone. It has an objective counterpart in the uniformities, essential characteristics, laws, etc. of the universe. The 'universal,' as a concept, tends to meet the reality of things but never fully does so. As Engels, the materialist follower of Hegel, has put it, concept and reality move like asymptotic curves.

Realistic view of the 'universal'.

On the background of this scientific comprehension of the 'universal' as a concept, we can try to understand the position taken by some of the modern realists and also by the Indian thinkers. Firstly, let us see how some modern realists view the problem. They proceed on the one hand, on the Kantian belief that the ultimate of the physical world can never be known; on the other hand, they think that there is nothing in physics to prove that "the physical world is radically different in character from the mental world".¹

Their agnosticism seeks to refute both materialism as well as solipsism, but only succeeds in affirming the existence of a 'neutral' world in which "distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal".²

This affirmation of 'neutrality' between mind and matter in post-Hegelian thought is very significant. It represents a refusal, on the part of the modern realist philosophers like Russell, to accept the solution of the problem of mind-matter dualism given by Hegel. Instead they simply reject the categories of mind and matter, and affirm the reality only of the relations between them. Thus, relations alone are valid and the related entities are either declared to be unknowable or non-existent.

Keeping this general position of the realists in view we can examine their theories about the 'universal.' For them the 'universal' is a relation and as such, is not merely a concept, but has a being which some realists like Russell call subsistence.³ Some

¹ Bertrand Russell, 'Analysis of Matter', page 270.

² Bertrand Russell, 'Analysis of Matter', page 402.

³ Bertrand Russell, 'Problems of Philosophy', page 156.

universals like 'redness' are actually perceivable and others like 'humanity' are not so perceivable, but all have a subsistence in realistic systems.

Here it will be fruitful to compare this modern view with those of Plato and Hegel. During the pre-Hegelian period, when philosophical thinking in Europe, was guided by a mechanical dualism between mind and matter, the problem of the universal could be resolved in two ways: (1) Materialistically, the universals can be conceived as human mental devices having no vital connection with the material world which alone is held to be real, and (2) Idealistically, the universal can be conceived as a special type of ideas in a world of ideas. Both these solutions were given in the period of dualism, but they could not satisfy Hegel. For him "the universal" in the opposition of the subjective and the objective, is that which is as subjective as it is objective. The subjective is only a particular, the objective is similarly only a particular as regards the subjective, but the universal is the unity of both.¹

The nature of this unity of subjective and objective, of concept and reality, is best explained by the simile of the asymptotic curves, to which I have already referred. This unity in Hegelian thought is entirely different, however, from the 'participation' of which Plato speaks when he discusses the Universal. The universal is for him the eternal, immutable, perfect Form, essence of the 'Idea' of a class of things. Thus 'cowness' is the 'Idea' inherent in all cows and it 'participates' in all individuals of the class. Plato holds that it is this participation by the Idea, that gives 'life' to the particular individual. This concept of participation is essentially similar to the Indian concept of *anupraveśa* by an *ātman* or by a *devatā*, in a particular body or image.

The realist view, viz. about the subsistence of the universal, is neither Platonic nor dualistic nor Hegelian. As such, realism cannot and does not take the position taken by philosophers in the pre-Hegelian period, nor does it accept and develop the Hegelian view. The result is an eclectic view which has as its components the views of Hegel and also of the idealists and materialists of the pre-Hegelian period. This eclecticism also leads some of the

¹ Hegel, 'History of Philosophy', Vol. I. p. 410.

realists to the views of Plato. In his earlier book 'Problems of Philosophy' Bertrand Russell affirms that his views about the 'universal' are mainly Platonic, (see page 156). This liaison between modern realism and Platonism also may explain why modern Indian scholars could discover an affinity between Indian systems and modern realism.

Indian concept of 'Universal'.

This brings us to the point, where we can introduce the Indian concepts of the 'universal'. Superficially, the Indian view may be said to agree to that of the realists, because all knowledge is *pratyakṣa-viśaya* and *yathārtha* in Indian epistemology. The concept of *brahman* is conceived by *Śaṅkara* as an impersonal (*vastu-tantra*) objective fact. But if we probe deeper we shall find that this realism of Indian systems is different from that of the post-Hegelian realists. In Indian realism the 'universal' is neither conceived as a concept, nor has it mere subsistence as a relation, but it is put on par with the concrete and palpable attributes or aspects of a thing. Thus in *Rāmānuja's* system, for instance, it is held that the 'universal,' say 'cowness,' is actually perceived by a person even when he sees a cow for the first time (*prathama-piṇḍa-grahana*). He believes that this initial comprehension of 'cowness' is a perception evoked by a palpable *saṁsthāna* (e. g. the dew-lap etc. of the cow). He thinks that the comprehension of the second and the third cow only makes the perceiver aware of the repetitive character (*anuvṛtta-kārita*) of the *saṁsthāna* of 'cowness'.

This direct perception of 'cowness', is also affirmed in other Indian systems. For instance, the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vedāntins* hold that "in the perception of a particular (say, a table), the universal (e. g. the tableness) is also perceived¹" While discussing this point Dr. Datta shows that the two systems agree on the fundamental question of the directness of the perception of the universal, but while the *Naiyāyikas* believe that the relation between the thing and its universal is that of a *samavāya*, the *Vedāntins* believe that the same is of *tādātmya*. But, even if they view the relation in two different ways their agreement on the

¹ Dr. D. M. Datta, 'Six ways of knowing'; page 116.

palpability of the 'universal' is of significance to us, as in this respect they are in agreement with Rāmānuja.

In the system of Rāmānuja, we get a closer view of the concept of 'universal', when he compares the *goṭva* of a cow with the *daṇḍa* of an ascetic. He says that both are palpable attributes of things and they differ only in the fact that while the *daṇḍa* has a *saṁsthāna* which enables it to exist by itself even apart from the ascetic, the 'cowness' has a *saṁsthāna* which cannot exist apart from the cow.

We can see how this Indian view of the 'universal' differs from the modern realistic concept. Superficially, in both systems the 'universal' is given a palpable reality. But, this similarity is only apparent. In essence, the substantiality is of two diverse kinds, because, whereas in modern realism, the subsistence is neutral, i. e. it is neither mental nor material, but only refers itself to a relation between two unknowables or often between a perceiver and his environment, in Indian realism, the subsistence is 'psycho-physical' in the *karmic* or *māyic* sense of the word.

I will refer back to the concept of the 'stag-complex', and relate it to the concept of *saṁsthānas*. One may say then that the 'universal' in Indian thought is a complex on par with other complexes, and we have before us a chain of *saṁsthānas* or complexes of which some are in close inseparable mutual relationship, while some are in loose contact. The different views on the nature of this relationship or *yoga* in Advaita, Viśiṣṭa-advaita or Nyāya systems do not alter the fact that all systems take the same view about this stream of *saṁsthānas*, which are the constituents of the phenomenal world.

From the foregoing discussion it will be clear that the 'universal' in Indian thought is real in the same palpable sense in which the stag-complex was real to the primitive magician-hunter. In this respect, it is totally different from the universal of modern realism. On the other hand, it has a family resemblance with the 'Idea' of Plato or the 'Number' of Pythagoras. The 'Number' or the 'Idea' were endowed with the same kind of magically potent reality and it was held that the 'participation' of these in individuals endowed the latter with reality. Aristotle was the first ancient thinker who criticised and rejected

this theory of 'participation' and put forward a new conceptual theory of the 'universal' as an abstract form.

The unique and concrete character of the concept of the 'universal' in Indian systems can be further understood with reference to the practical application of the same in the *yoga* system. It is the yogic attainment of 'universal' hearing, 'universal' sight, etc. It was not a mere metaphysical hypothesis but people implicitly believed that such 'universal' hearing or sight could actually be attained by an individual after adequate *sādhana*. We come across this concept of the 'universal' hearing (*divya-śrotrīva*) of the *yogin* in Pātañjala Sūtra (3, 41). We read there that because 'ether' (*ākāśa*) is the 'common ground' (*pratiṣṭhā*) of all 'ears' as well as of all 'sounds,' therefore if a *yogi* can establish a complete communion between his ears and 'ether', it is inevitable that he should hear all sounds. This peculiar control (*niyama*) of the relation between 'ear' and 'ether' is the method of attaining to the power of universal hearing. In a similar manner, the *yogin* could attain the power of universal sight or invisibility etc.

3. The concepts of *citta* and *puruṣa* in *Yoga-Sūtras*.

As a corollary of the theory of revelatory knowledge, I will discuss here certain Sūtras from Patañjali, because they will bring out the unique nature of Hindu epistemology in a comprehensive manner. In pāda IV, the Sūtras 16 to 22 are of importance to us, because in them we find not only the *Yoga* theory of epistemology but also the relation between this theory and its ontological counterpart. We have here a discussion on the relationship between *Citta* and the *prakṛti* or *sarvārtha* and between *Citta* and *puruṣa*.

In the first place, in Sūtra 18, (*na tat svabhāsam-draśyatvāt*) we have a categorical statement about the nature of *citta*. It is said that *citta* is an object of knowledge of the *puruṣa* who never becomes modified by contact with objects. Now, from the above it is further deduced that since modifications of *citta* (*citta-vṛttayaḥ*) are known, (i. e. are objects of knowledge), therefore, *citta* can never be *svabhāsam* or self-illuminative.

Thus we are provided with two elements, viz. the *citta* which is not self-illuminative but which has still the unique capacity of acquiring the shape, etc., of objects. This quality of the *citta* makes it possible for us to 'know' external objects. Secondly, we have the self-illuminative principle, viz. *puruṣa*, which has not the capacity to get identified with objects, but has only the power of illumination.

Let us pause, for a while, on this dualism of *citta* and *puruṣa*. What is the exact meaning of that capacity of *citta*, which enables it to acquire the 'knowledge' of objects. It will be considered, in view of our bias of modern epistemology, that the *citta* is like a very impressionable wax-like material and that it receives the impressions of external objects. It is however, necessary to distinguish between this modern concept of 'impressions' and the unique mode of the knowledge-process involved in the activity of *citta*.

The function of citta.

It is stated in Bhoja's commentary on Sūtra 16, that every object requires certain apparatus or material (*sāmagrī*) to acquire its individual existence (*ātma-lābha*). Thus, when an object becomes known to the *citta* it also acquires this selfness due to its contact with *citta*. What is meant by this *ātma-lābha* acquired by an object by coming in contact with *citta*? How does *citta* provide the material (*sāmagrī*) for the *ātma-lābha* of the object? These questions can be answered only if we assume that the object has a sort of 'unreal' existence till a *citta* comes to help it in becoming fully 'real'. It means also that only by being 'known' does an object realise itself. This is the obvious import of the word *ātma-lābha*.

The *sāmagrī* that *citta* provides is some unique material which is furnished to the object through the medium of the sense-organs (*indriya prañālika samagatam*). But what is this *sāmagrī*? Here we have again to refer back to the magic identification of mental and material aspects into what we called 'complexes'. *Ātma-lābha* means, therefore, a process similar to the '*prānapratīṣṭhā*' of a deity in an image or symbol. So long as the image has not undergone the proper ceremony, it is a stone figure or an empty symbol. It is a *bāhyārtha* and is 'unreal' in the unique sense in

which the ancients understood 'reality'. The image or symbol could not be said to have acquired its own self, its full and potent reality, till it had absorbed or identified in itself the deity, which it was intended to represent. It may be realised here that the word 'representation' sounds hollow in this whole context. It would be nearer the mark to say that the image 'finds itself', or acquires *ātma-lābha* when the deity is embodied in it.

The nature of 'saṃvit' and 'avadhāraṇam'.

I will now refer to Bhoja's notes on Sūtra 19. There he defines the meaning of knowledge thus: "the cognition of an object is to make it capable of being regarded as such and such;" i. e.¹ pragmatically real. It is necessary here to explain a phrase, which is crucial for my interpretation of this definition. Bhoja says that cognition (*saṃvit*) is *vyavahāra-yogyatāvādanam*² Dr. Ballantyne and Deva have rendered it as the object becoming "capable of being regarded as such and as such", i. e. "as an object of pain or pleasure." This meaning of *vyavahāra yogyatā* is given by Bhoja himself, following his first statement.

This interpretation of the term given by Dr. Ballantyne does not however, fully bring out the fact that the process of cognition is in itself an operation which renders the object real in the pragmatic sense. He seems to think that to know an object is only to know how it may be the source of pain and pleasure. His interpretation implies that the cognitive process gives the object a capacity of being regarded as cause of pleasure or pain, but the full meaning is that the process gives the object a capacity to exist and function as a cause of pain and pleasure — a capacity which the object newly acquires. If we do not take the latter interpretation, we will not be able to see the real significance of the Sūtra 19, which states that "it is not possible to support two objects simultaneously".³ Dr. Ballantyne has translated *anavadhāraṇam* as 'impossibility to attend'. But, here too, I think the meaning of word is not adequately brought out by the rendering

¹ "The Yoga Philosophy", (the text of Patañjali, with Bhojarāj's commentary. Translated by Dr. Ballantyne and Govind Shastri Deo. Edited by Tukaram Tatia, Bombay Branch of Theosophical Society 1882). See page 214.

² Ibid page 215.

³ Ibid page 215.

'attention'. This will be clear if we inquire into the meaning of the Sūtra 19. It says that it is not possible to have two *avadhāraṇas*: one the cognition of the object and the other that of 'egoity', which is involved in the cognition of the object. From this the Sūtrakāra wants to prove that *citta* is non-self-illuminative.

I will try to explain the above, by referring to Bhoja. He says that *citta* is non-self-illuminative, because in the moment of cognition, it cannot hold-(*avadhāraya*), simultaneously, the object (*artha*) and its own egoity (*svarūpam*). He goes on to say that, in experience we find that in cognition, we do not get two fruits (*phala-dvaya*), viz. the *vyavahārayogya* object and the egoity. Bhoja says that this phenomenon proves that *citta* is extrovert (*bahir mukha*) and objective (*arthaniṣṭha*). It is, therefore, that the fruit of cognition is objective and not egoistic or subjective (*svaniṣṭham*). This discussion will show that 'avadhāraṇa' cannot be the same thing as 'attention,' but means that power which holds together the 'complexes' that form the objects that are illumined.

'*Citta*' compared to the modern concept of individuality.

If we now compare this concept of *citta* with the 'I' of Descartes, we will see that the two concepts are completely different. The *citta* of Yogasūtras is the mental element in the psycho-physical complexes, which, in an infinite series, form phenomenal reality. We had taken the stag-complex as a 'brick' or unit of this reality. In this reality, the merely psychic or the merely physical does not exist, on the other hand, every object has to meet its corresponding *cittavṛtti* to realise itself as a *phala*. In other words, only identification with a *citta* can create reals and ultimately these do not belong to any individual; they are fruits of the identification of *citta* and *artha* and are impersonal Karmic reals.

The above explanation will show the aptness of Bhoja's remark that *citta* is extrovert and *arthaniṣṭha*. The mind, as conceived in modern psychology, also takes impressions from the objective world and is extrovert in that sense. But the mind is also introvert, in the sense that impressions, knowledge, emotions etc. are all taken to be an individual's ideations.

We can see that the *citta* is extrovert and objective, in two distinct ways:

(i) it becomes 'saṃvit,' or knowledge, when it comes in contact with *artha*. This knowledge is a psycho-physical 'real.' *Citta* has, thus, a tendency to participate in forming such 'reals' and is thus always moving out (*bahirmukha*). It is objective, in the sense, that it participates in these reals which remain external to the 'illuminator.'

(ii) Apart from this extrovert character, the *citta* has another unique characteristics. It is without egoity. The 'fruit' of the knowledge-process is only to create the real which is capable of causing pleasure or pain to an Ego, if and when it presents itself to him.

The problem of egoity.

So the next problem before the author of Sūtras was to explain this phenomenon of egoity (*asmilā*). The answer to the above is given in Sūtra 6 of Pāda II. Here we observe another phenomenon. Hitherto, we saw how *artha* and *citta* got identified to form reals. Now we come across the identification- (*ekarūpatvam*) of the illuminator (*draṣṭṛ*) and the *citta*.

This second identification is possible because the *citta* has *sāttvic* quality and this enables it to identify itself with the illumination (*cidrūpam* or *puruṣa*). The 'fruit' of this identification is the creation of egoity.

Thus with the help of two identifications, we have firstly, the *artha-citta* complex, and secondly the emergence of egoity, which enjoys the *citta - artha* and the corresponding psychic situation. We can recognise these two distinct identifications in the case of the hunter-magician. In comprehending the stag, he also took these two steps. Firstly, he thought that his own mental images were *bahirmukha* and *arthaniṣṭha*, so that the form, motion, colour etc. of the stag, as well as his consequent desires and urges evoked by it, were objectified by him in the form of the stag-complex. For this objectivisation, he either painted a picture of the stag, thus creating an abode for the stag-complex, or he danced with stag-horn masks to make himself a suitable abode for the stag-complex. Thus we have the first identification.

Having fixed an abode for the stag-complex, he then seeks to operate with this *vyavhāra-yogyā* 'real'. He proceeds to 'enjoy' it. In this operation, he is acting as a purposeful self, as an ego,

towards the stag-complex. Here, he achieves the second identification. The stag-complex, which hitherto existed outside of him, has now been appropriated to himself after performing the ritualistic dance. The dance enables him to release (or create) a kind of energy which floods the complex with illumination and gives to the ego a new sense of enjoyment and appropriation of the object. This final appropriation is actually the end or aim of the double process of identification. In the magic period of human thought, this double identification was the only available method of appropriation on the psychic plane.

The double identification.

Leaving the hunter-magician, let us return to the two identifications described in Yoga-Sūtras. To complete the picture of the second identification, we may look into some similes, given by Bhoja, to illucidate the nature of the *citta-puruṣa* identification.

Bhoja says that the first (*citta-artha*) identification is like the reflection of an object in a mirror. But, it is not enough that an object is so reflected unless there is light to illumine the reflection. Secondly, the *citta* participates in the nature of *puruṣa* (*tadrūpatām iva prāptam*), being itself endowed with a *sātvic* character. Thus, *citta* not only 'reflects' *artha*, but also derives light from the *puruṣa*. With the help of this two-fold identification it produces *vyavahāra yoga* reals as well as their enjoyer, the Ego.

Bhoja, here adopts the very apt simile of the magnet and the iron-piece. The magnet is the *puruṣa*. It has a potent force in it but it by itself does not move. By its sheer presence, however, it causes in the otherwise 'dead' pieces of iron a movement. Thus, though itself not moving, the magnet 'infects' the iron pieces with the power of movement. In a similar manner the *citta* acquires by virtue of its contact with the *puruṣa*, inspired potency. This *abhivyāṅgya caitanya* gives *citta* the power of relating the external impersonal reality of *citta - artha* to the particular individual Jīva. This is the meaning and origin of *asmīdā*.

Unique relationship between citta and puruṣa

Bhoja explains, while commenting on sūtra 22 of Pāda IV, that though *citta*, even in its *sātvic* form, is not fully pure like the *puruṣa*, still it can reflect it, in a peculiar way. He says that reflection (*pratibimbam*) in this unique case, is the phenomenon of

inspired *caitanya* in *citta* due to the nearness (*sāmnidhya*) of the *puruṣa*.

He further points out that this inspired *caitanya* of the *citta* is the basis of the phenomenal world (*prakṛti*). The *citta* unfolds outwards and becomes *bāhyālakāra saṁkrānta* and since it had its inspiration from the *puruṣa*, this unfoldment is for him. It is easy to see how the whole doctrine is quasi-biological, and it is no accident, therefore, that in Sāṁkhya and other cognate system, we find simple biological similes used to illustrate the *prakṛti-puruṣa* relation. The simile of the cow and its calf, or of the dancer and the observer or of woman and man, are all apt, because they correctly indicate the unique nature of the *citta-puruṣa* contact.

If once we grasp this basic two-sided identification, which lies at the root of this peculiar epistemology, then we can resolve some apparent paradoxes, e. g. that *prakṛti* is said to be *jaḍa* but still it alone produces movement; another paradox, which has caused much confusion in modern interpretations, is that while egoity is only a fruit of *citta-puruṣa* contact and hence is only a *saṁvit*, i. e. has the same nature as *prakṛti*, still it is this egoity (*kāmātma-rūpa sattva-buddhi*) which seeks liberation, the supreme motivation behind all Hindu philosophical thought. Thus egoity is like *prakṛti*, a Karma-bound entity, but it also is free as an agent. In fact, this egoity, with its *saṁvit*, is both bound and free in its essential nature.

I will make one more observation in this respect, which is in the nature of a suggestion regarding the cosmic implications of this doctrine of Egoity. We have seen that 'knowledge' and 'egoity' are two fruits respectively, of *artha-citta* and *citta-puruṣa* identifications. But, this theory does not merely explain the nature of knowledge and egoity, but also postulates the nature of the Cosmos. As Sūtra 22 puts it explicitly the *Citta* identifies itself with *artha* and *puruṣa* and thus brings into existence the Cosmos (*sarvārtham*). The Cosmos is, therefore, merely an infinite chain of psycho-physical complex. It is real only in a unique sense. We should remember that the *artha-citta* identification is held to be not only independent of the *puruṣa* but also outside and external to all egoity and hence the Cosmos is

'objective'. This view of the Cosmos is certainly opposed to the modern Idealist view and easily lends itself to the notion that the ancients had held a naturalistic or materialistic theory of universe.

It will, however, be wrong to consider that this concept of Cosmos in Yoga, Sāṃkhya or other systems, is materialistic. This will be evident if we take into account another aspect of the Cosmos, held with equal force and validity, in these systems. This aspect comes into prominence as a result of the *puruṣa-citta* contact. Egoity is the fruit of this contact and it is also held to be the root of the Cosmos. In this sense, egoity provides the sole aim and therefore the cause of movement for *prakṛti*. *Prakṛti* is held to be *jaḍa* because its movement is caused solely for the enjoyment and liberation of the Ego or *jīvātman*. This doctrine places the *jīvātman* at the centre of the whole universe and as such, gives a quasi-idealistic colour to Sāṃkhya and other similar systems.

The Karmic nature of Cosmos.

Here, I will like to emphasise, even if it means some repetition, that Hindu speculation as a whole, in its epistemological as well as cosmological doctrines, does not accept either materialism or idealism, in the modern sense. Instead, the basis of all speculation is what may be briefly indicated by the process of identification discussed above. As a result of this process, we get a dynamic picture of a psycho-physical and teleologically developing universe. It can be viewed, once, as a *jaḍa* but evolving Cosmos of psycho-physical elements like the three *guṇas*, the *tanmātrās* etc.; secondly, the same can be viewed as an 'evolute' of the Ego which again is only a fruit of the contact between *puruṣa* and *citta*.

The concrete function of māyā.

The concept of *avidyā* or *māyā* acquires a very tangible significance in this process of double identifications. As we have already seen, they are unique in their nature and cannot be understood as reflections of one thing into the other. It is a unique type of contact and the ancient Hindu systems called it *yogatā* and elevated it to the principle of *māyā*. This *māyā* was postulated to be co-existing with *puruṣa*, *citta* and *artha*, and was

held to be the Cosmic power which effected the realisation of the mutual participation of these three entities.

It is easy to see that *māyā* is thus a postulate of necessity for Hindu epistemology and cosmology,—in fact, for all Hindu speculation. It is also, like the rudimentary concept of '*mana*', the basis of all theories and practices of participation in primitive magic and ancient ritualism.

Magic or ritual presumes the possibility of such 'participation' between real and ideal entities, by the mediation of a 'force' or 'substance' which has a unique potency of effecting such participation. It is easy to see, in this light, why *māyā* in Indian thought has been considered to be the 'mother' of all things, the great mysterious creative force, the indescribable and the inexorable motivating principle in Cosmic as well as human life.

In conclusion, one may say that this principle of *māyā* reveals the basic foundation on which different systems and speculative doctrines, such as the concepts of 'universal' in Rāmānuja's system, the concept of 'illusion', and of *citta* and *puruṣa* in Yoga system, have been built up through centuries of philosophical speculation.

THE CONCEPT OF TIME ACCORDING TO BHARTṚHARI

BY

SATYA VRAT

Bhartṛhari has discussed time: What it is and how it functions, in Section IX of Kāṇḍa III of his Vākyapadiya. This Section, herein termed the Kāla Samuddeśa contains 114 Kārikās. Of these the first 79 Kārikās deal with the philosophical views held about time by the various schools of thought, and with the nature and function of time as understood by Bhartṛhari himself, and the rest offer well-reasoned justification for the various uses of the tenses in Pāṇini's Grammar, and serve to elucidate the pertinent passages in the Bhāṣya. Before I reproduce here and discuss the various other theories about time recorded by Bhartṛhari, I propose to put down what this great thinker has to say about time, what is his personal view of it, for that must have precedence over others.¹

SECTION I BHARTṚHARI'S OWN VIEW

In Kārikā 62² of this Section, Bhartṛhari sums up the three recognized views about time. Time is either a Śakti, or an ātman or a devatā. Helārāja, the commentator tells us that time is Śakti is the considered view of Bhartṛhari himself. While

¹ One thing must strike a critical student of the Vākyapadiya, and that is that there is no perfect order in which Bhartṛhari presents the various views about Kāla. Usually a verse or two is read to enunciate a particular view. This is followed sometimes by some discussion on questions arising out of a clarification of it; sometimes it is left severely alone with a summary remark. Bhartṛhari glides along in his own masterly way apparently unmindful of setting in complete order what he says. No link is sought to be established between the various views; they are not presented in a string; they lie scattered here and there. Sometimes it is his view, sometimes another's. But whosoever it is, it is always supported and never refuted. Thus the Kāla Samuddeśa of his is a veritable repertory of the various theories and views that once held ground and still hold it. (Op. Kārikās 57, 58 and 68).

² Śaktyātmadevatā pakṣair bhinnam Kālasya darśanam.

commenting on III. 9. 14, he refers to the above Kārikā with the words—'ihāpi siddhāntayisyati'. He assimilates the other two views to the first, since, to him they seem to conform to the first in the ultimate analysis. I however differ.¹ True it is that to the author of the Vākyapadīya, Kāla is a Śakti, and a Śakti of Brahman. While discussing the nature of Śabda-brahman in Kāṇḍa I. 3,² he tells us what he thinks of time.

In his lucid gloss on the said Kārikā, he declares it unequivocally that all other generated, dependent subject-forces are pervaded by Kāla, which alone is independent and follow the operation of this Śakti in their working'.³

How this Śakti of Brahman operates and with what results is given in kārīkās 3-8 of this Section.⁴ We are here told that Kāla is the instrumental cause in the creation, persistence and destruction of all things that have an origin, etc. ... Kāla seems to be itself diversified by the diversity of limiting adjuncts

¹ To me it appears that Bhartṛhari acknowledges the other two views as independent notions of time, and not as subordinate to his own. The connecting link placed at the head of the Kārikā: 'Now he sums up different views regarding the Reality, time,' also supports my contention. Besides, we find the echo of the view that Kāla is a devatā (a deity) in the Purāṇas. The Kūrma Purāṇa, as quoted by the Vācaspatya (p. 1986), reads: Anādireṣa bhagavān kālo'nanto'jaraḥ paraḥ. Sarvagatvāt svatantratvāt sarvātmavān maheśvaraḥ. Helārāja, too notes - 'anye tu vighrahavātīm mahāprabhāvaṁ devatām Kālatvena pratipannāḥ.' Nilakaṇṭha, commenting on M. Bh. XII. 320. 109, alludes to the view that Kāla is jīva :

Kālovidyākhyāḥ ṣoḍaśaguṇa uktāḥ. tadupādhir jīvaḥ Kālasamjñāḥ.

² Adhyāhitakālāṁ yasya Kālaśaktimupāśritāḥ |

Janmādayo vikārāḥ ṣaḍ bhāvabhedasya yonayaḥ ||

³ Kālākhyena hi svātantryeṇa sarvāḥ paratantrā janmavatyāḥ śaktayaḥ samaviṣṭāḥ kālaśaktivṛttimanupatanti.

⁴ Utpattau ca sthitau cāpi vināśe cāpi tadvatām |

Nimittam kālamevāhur vibhaktenātmanā sthitam || 3 ||

Tamasya lokayantrasya sūtradhāraṁ pracakṣate |

Pratibandhābhyānujñābhyāṁ tena viśvaṁ vibhajyate || 4 ||

Yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratibaddham ca notsṛjēt |

Avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvāparyavināktāḥ || 5 ||

Tasyātmā bahudhā bhinnā bhedair dharmāntarāśrayaiḥ |

Nahi bhinnamabbhinnaṁ vā vastu kiṁcana vidyate || 6 ||

Naiko na cāpyanekosti na śuklo nāpi cāsitāḥ |

Dravyātmā sa tu saṁsargādevaṁ rūpaḥ prakāśate || 7 ||

Saṁsargiṇāṁ tu ye bhedā viśeṣāstasya te matāḥ |

Sa bhinnastair vyavasthānāṁ kālo bhedāya kalpate || 8 ||

(Upādhis) and then diversifies the things in conjunction with it. Hence (being the instrumental cause), Kāla is the string-puller in the dumb show of this world. It is because of the powers of *pratibandha* and *abhyanuṣṭhā* that this world comes to possess succession in action. What is the meaning of *pratibandha* and *abhyanuṣṭhā*? Bhartṛhari credits Kāla with these two effective powers. The first means the preventive power and the second, the permissive power. What leads him to imagine that these two powers must belong to Kāla? If there were no *pratibandha*, so argues he, there would be no order in this universe, no progression or regression; there would result perfect chaos, all action being simultaneous. Thus a seed, a sprout, a stem and a stalk—all would emerge and exist together. Therefore all objects having origination, though having peculiar causes, must have Kāla as an additional contributory cause for ordered progress.

These two powers, namely, *pratibandha* and *abhyanuṣṭhā* correspond more or less to the two powers, 'vikṣepa' and 'āvaraṇa' ascribed to avidyā or māyā by the later writers on Advaita.

SECTION II

EARLIER INTERPRETATION REFUTED

Helārāja refers to some earlier commentators who take Śakti in Kārikā 62 referred to above to mean the generating cause which they say is itself time. Their case may be briefly stated as follows:—

The power called seed, while it permits the appearance of the sprout, prevents the synchronous growth of the stalk. Similarly the power called sprout permits the production of the next effect, while restraining the production of the subsequent effects. Hence the generating cause is itself time.

This is a wrong interpretation and Helārāja convincingly refutes it. He points out that all this is tantamount to saying that particular effects proceed from particular causes, wherever they (causes) are present, and not otherwise. But since those effects take place at a particular time and not at any time, even when the generating causes are there, the additional regulating cause, namely, time, must be acknowledged. The various phases of

existence proceeding from a series of causes have a succession ; and this succession is a power of Kāla, the condition of all being.

To Bhartṛhari, Kāla is *one*, it is unitary. It is because of its relation to motions such as of the sun, that Kāla becomes many. The great thinker emphatically declares that things are in themselves neither diverse nor uniform. Time is one (indivisible), yet it appears to have so many divisions. How? The essential nature of a substance is, it has to be admitted, not the object of our parlance ; it is inexpressible.¹ When we conceive unity to inhere in it, we say it is one, when we conceive the white or the dark colour to inhere in it, we say it is white or dark ; and when we conceive the universal 'cowness' to inhere in it, we say it is a cow ; similarly time comes to have the appellations such as the time of origination, the time of persistence, the time of destruction etc., on account of its conjunction with the action of origination etc. The movements of the sun, the planets and the stars which are in conjunction with the time give it the appearance of divisibility ; thus the time determined by the sunrise and the sunset is the day, so on and so forth.

If Kāla is one, how do we account for the various time-divisions such as the days, months, seasons and years? This question has been raised and discussed at a number of places in the Vākya-pāṇīya. The author gives an answer to it in Kārikā III. 9.32. The answer is that they are there on account of the diversity of action (kriyā-bheda), in external things. These divisions are superimposed upon time and are not integral to it. They do not affect it at all, they make no change to it. Just as a man becomes a carpenter for the time he is chiselling a piece of wood, and a smith when he is forging a piece of iron, but does not cease to be man or get divided into two men, similarly, time is called spring when there appear symptoms like flowers, a kind of humidity in the atmosphere and the charming cooing of the cuckoo. When there appear other symptoms like the falling off of the leaves of the trees, a kind of forbidding chillness in the atmosphere, a change in the

¹ Paropakāratattvānām svātantryeṇābhidyakāḥ ।

Śabdaḥ sarvapadārthānām svadbarmād viprakṛṣyate ॥

Vākya-pāṇīya, III. 11. 7.

direction of the sun, we say it is autumn. The spring and autumn are no part of the substance, time. It is a case of an *adhyāsa* (superimposition).¹

And, if time is eternal and unchangeable, how is it that we hear of such judgments as: It is good time, it is bad time, the *Kṛtayuga* is good and auspicious, the *Kali* is bad and inauspicious? We cannot change time and import external goodness or badness into it. Both goodness and badness are extrinsic to time, they are transferred to it. They originally belong to actions. When good actions are performed, we say it is good time, when bad, we say it is bad time. Time knows no change.²

To *Bhartṛhari*, time, though itself unchangeable is the cause of all change, motion and order. Every object is governed by the power of *Kāla*. Why the sun rises and sets at regular hours, why the moon shines for the night and not for the day, why the sun moves for six months along the southern path (*dakṣiṇāyana*) and for another six months along the northern path (*uttarāyana*), why the planets and stars move in a particular order—all these can only be explained as being due to the all-pervasive and all-powerful nature of *Kāla*. The coming into existence and passing out of existence, the appearance and disappearance of all objects is caused by time alone.³

Other differentiations of time are also unreal: they are merely superimposed. A thing *is not*, before it actually comes into being; *it is*, when it has been created. The mind, however, conceives it as *one* positive existence. When we set about putting together the competent means to the fulfilment of an act, we say it is, *Commencement time*. When the means thus put together start operating, we say it is *Performance time*. And when a thing desired to be effected has been accomplished, we say it is *closing time*.

¹ *Kriyābhedād yathaikasminstakṣādyākhyā pravartate |*
Kriyābhedāt tathaikasminnṛtvādyākhyopapadyate ||

² *Kartṛbhedāt tadartheṣu pracayāpacayau gataḥ |*
Samatvaṁ viśamatvaṁ vā tadekaḥ pratipadyate ||

³ *Ārambhaśca kriyā caiva niṣṭhā cetyabhidhīyate |*
Dharmāntarāṇāmadyāsabhedāt sadasadātmanaḥ ||

Vākyapadīya, III, 9. 33.

But time remains unaltered by these ideal divisions. Says the great thinker; the commencement-time, etc. in the case of a 'dvyanuka' (dvad) is exactly the same as that of the Himālayan range. The nature of a thing can neither be altered nor augmented.¹ The meaning is that objects are essentially indivisible (svarupeṇa niraṁśa) wholes, they would indeed be divisible if they were no more than a conglomeration of parts; hence the commencement-time, etc. does not differ. The component parts are quite different from the whole they make. A jar is verily different from the sherds which go to form it. Even the magnitude, a property, is different from the whole. With the difference therefore in magnitude, things need not differ, suffer augmentation or reduction. Hence all produce substances, all wholes being non-distinguishable, it is not because of them that the commencement-time etc. of objects of small magnitude or great differs, but because of properties other than, or additional to, the whole.²

How does the commencement-time etc. differ then? The question is answered by Bhartṛhari in the next Kārikā (9.35).³ It is the parts (different from the wholes) which, if many, account for the greatness of the magnitude of the wholes, if a few, the smallness of the magnitude of them. Accordingly a whole made up of many parts is accomplished slowly, and one made up of lesser parts quickly. Hence in either case, the commencement-time etc. is recognized as different. Since the parts lose their identity in the whole, the whole is designated after the properties of the parts, and not that the time of whole does differ, as a matter of fact.

It is further explained in Kārikā (9.36).⁴ An object does not exist before origination as already observed. Hence, previous to origination, it being non-existent, it could have no

¹ Yāvāṁśca dvyāṇukādīnāṃ tāvān himavatopyasau |
Nahyātmā kasyacid bhettum pracetum vāpi śakyate ||
Vākyapadiya, III. 9. 34.

² All this is true only, if we share the view of the Vaiśeṣika that the wholes are distinct from their parts.

³ Anyaistu bhāvairanyeṣāṃ pracayaḥ parikalpyate |
Śanairidam idaṃ kṣipramiti tena pratiyate ||

⁴ Asataśca kramo nāsti sa hi bhettum na śakyate |
Satopi cātmatattvaṃ yat tat tathaivāvatiṣṭhate ||

10 [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

succession, there being no division into prior and posterior. And even when it has been produced and does exist, it cannot be differentiated, its nature persists; hence there is no succession. Succession, as explained by Helārāja, is based on difference, and difference cannot be there in each separate mode of an object which essentially consists of two modes, existent and non-existent while yet in the process of production. The two modes are pieced together by the intellect and differentiated as prior and posterior. There is first an idea of the non-existent and then of the existent, the succession is otherwise ideal. Hence even the sequence in the produced things is hypothetical; much more so the sequence in time, which is based upon that assumption.

Bhartrhari repeats the idea at a number of places that Kāla is *Svātantrya Śakti*, as for example in Kārikā 14. He explains how Kāla which is *vibhu* is significantly so called, since it urges all Kālas (Śaktis) by its cycles such as the spring, which are comparable to the revolution of the water-wheel.

The question arises: is this Kāla Śakti identical with Brahman or different from it. The answer is that to the Advaitin (as Hari undoubtedly is), the Śakti and the possessor of Śakti is one entity, not two. The difference is only apparent. The properties (dharma) are held to be non-distinct from the substance (dharmin). This Hari himself says in so many words in the *Brahma Kāṇḍa*.¹ The Kashmirian philosopher, Abhinavaguptācārya also subscribes to this view. In his *Bodhapañcadaśikā*, he remarks that Śakti does not want to be differentiated from the Śaktimat (the possessor of Śakti). They are eternally one, like fire and its consuming power.² To be precise, the Kāla Śakti can only be said to be *anirukta* (undefined).

The conception of the one ultimate reality, be it Śabdabrahman, ātmabrahman, sattā Brahman, or vijñāna brahman led the exponents of advaita philosophy to ascribe to it a power called *māyā*, *ajñāna*, *avidyā* or *Kāla Śakti*, which is unique in its nature and which is capable of projecting this phenomenal world, the *bāhya-*

¹ Aprthakte'pi śaktibhyah prthaktvene'va vartate (I. 2)

² Śaktiśca śaktimadrūpād vyatirekaṁ na vāñchati |
Tādātmayamanayor nityaṁ vahnidāhaka'yoriva ||

Bodhapañcadaśikā (3)

prapañca. Bhartṛhari calls this power by the term Kāla Śakti and avidyā. And like all other Śaktis, the Kāla Śakti too is *anirukta*. This is set forth by Hari himself in his inimitable way in his Vṛtti on 1.4. Says he: 'of the one Brahman that must be assumed to possess Saktis which can neither be said to be identical with Brahman nor distinct from it, neither existent nor non-existent, which are free from mutual conflict (in so far as they subsist simultaneously in the one substratum) - of the Brahman which is only apparently partite, are the various unreal modifications such as the enjoyer, the thing enjoyed, the act of enjoyment - all of which do not exist externally like the person in a dream-vision'.¹

SECTION III

DOES TIME REALLY EXIST ?

How do we know that there exists something that is called Kāla (time)? There must be some evidence for it, mere belief in the tradition or scripture would not do. In Kārikā III. 9.46, Hari observes: "This universe which is really devoid of sequence (or succession)² seems to have one is indeed due to the working of time". The all-pervasive time operating with its two powers *pratibandha* and *abhyanuṣṭhā* is responsible for this notion. But for Kāla, all this Krama would not be explainable. Then the notion of quickness and slowness too are explainable only on the admission that time exists. Just as this distance is long, this is short, is determined by the pace of the person walking and has nothing to do with the space walked over; for what is far for a slow-moving person is near for another of nimble foot. Similarly though time never varies yet by virtue of an action which has a greater continuity, it comes to be called slow (*cira*) while another with a lesser continuity gives it the qualification 'kṣipra' (quick). The idea is that the notions 'cira' and 'kṣipra' must have an *adhikaraṇa* in which they could reside and that *adhikaraṇa* is Kāla.³

¹ Ekasya hi Brahmanastattvānyaivābhyāṁ sattvāsattvābhyāṁ cānirukta-virodhisākyupagrāhyasyāsatyarūpapravibhāgasya svapūāvijñāna puruṣavada-bahistattvāḥ paraspāravilakṣaṇā bhoktṛbhoktavyabhogagrāntaḥyo vivartante.

² Nirbhāsaopagamo yo'yaṁ kramavāniva lakṣyate |

Akramasyāpi viśvasya tat kālasya vidoṣṭitam ||

³ Dūrāntikavyavasthānāmadhvādhikaraṇaṁ yathā |

Cirākṣipravavyavasthānāṁ kālobhikaraṇaṁ tathā ||

III. 9. 47.

There is yet another evidence. The question how an action which is over (past) and therefore non-existent could give the appellation *bhūta* (past) to *Kāla* is beautifully answered by Hari in III. 9.39.¹ In plain English, the *Kārikā* means: Things effected by action are called *atīta* (past), losing their identity (*svarūpa*). Whatever notion the mind forms of them in the present, they deposit in their stable receptacle, time, and they vanish, since after being perceived, they become objects of recollection, with their *Śaktis* transferred to the past stage (*vyavahāraṁ svāttamanupatanti*). The principle of time is cognizable only through the 'upādhis' of the various objects, and they when being recollected transfer their own qualification (pastness) to time. Hence we say there was a jar. This indeed is the logical ground for the existence of *Kāla*, for if it did not exist, there would be no such usage.

Not only that. In the next *Kārikā* (9.40) Hari seeks to clarify the use of *bhaviṣyat* (future) with regard to things. The external form (*dr̥ṣyarūpa*) of things which are yet to be, viz. things whose 'becoming' is expected when the competent causes of them are present and the image of that external form formed in the mind (*vikalpyarūpa*) are brought together and unified in the stable receptacle of time whereon futurity is superimposed by the transference of *Śaktis*. It is because of this qualified time that things are called future or ensuing. But for time, it would not be possible to explain satisfactorily the use of future with regard to things. This is beautifully brought out by a simile: just as it is only after an image has been seen in a spotless mirror, that one becomes sure of the form outside, similarly we see through *Kāla* the real form of things.²

That time is an independent entity can also be inferred from the fact of dripping of water from a hole in a jar. This dripping is emphatically declared by Bharṭṛhari (vide *Kārikā* III. 9. 70³)

¹ Kāle nidhāya svaṁ rūpaṁ prajñāyā yannigṛhyate |
Bhāvāstato nivartante tatra saṁkrāntaśaktayaḥ ||

² Bhāvānāṁ caiva yadrūpaṁ tasya ca pratibimbakam |
Sunirmrṣṭa ivādarśe kāla evopapadyate ||

³ Pratibandhābhyānujñābhyāṁ nālikāvivarāśrite |
Yadambhasi prakṣaraṇaṁ tat kālasyaiva ceṣṭitam ||

to be due to the working of time, and hence constitutes the logical ground for its existence. Helārāja's comments on this Kārikā are elucidating and bear reproduction. 'We observe that only a part of the quantity of water contained in a jar drips at a time from a hole in it and the remaining part does not drip simultaneously with it. What could this be due to.' It is certainly due to the preventive and permissive forces that time possess; for if it were otherwise, the whole, here the water, which permeates all its component parts, must drip all at once, under its one weight. Since there is graduation in the act of dripping, time, a separate entity must be admitted to be at work here and that dripping itself is time must be ruled out. The dripping is only a determination of time. This dripping, itself determined by such acts as winking, movement of the vital airs, the continuous flow of the moments, serves to determine the time which is other than it. Winking, etc., too, is determined by Kāla in its subtle form of succession; hence the power Kāla, known as Krama (succession) is to be found interwoven with all things in a subtle way and cannot be denied.

There is yet another equally cogent reason to believe that time is. How can two actions having a beginning and an end in common, and inhering in two different substrata be differentiated one as quick, the other as slow, unless there be an entity in relation to both the actions at the same time? Now all action is a collection of moments. Since the moments do not exist simultaneously all action is *Sakrama*, possessed of succession, and this cannot but be due to the power of time. Succession is indeed a property of time. It is time that has a succession, and it is because of relation with time that actions appear to have it. Although action is one, yet it is here said to be two because of the two substrata. Hence the notion of *cira* (slow), *kṣipra* (quick) is not because of the unity of action. Because even when the substrata differ, we have the same notion of the one as of the other; for we say: "The jar is formed late, the cloth is fashioned late". It should not have been possible, for there were

¹ Kriyārapavargiṇyōr nānārtha samavetayoḥ |
Sambandhinā vinaikena paricchedaḥ katham bhavet ||

III. 9. 27.

two actions inhering in two different substrata, the jar and the cloth. Nor can it be due to the produced things (jar and cloth), for they, being different cannot be the cause of the common notion. Nor again can it be due to the agent, for that too differs with different things. Hence that something to which the notion is due is Kāla. This Kāla has to be *one*, in order that it may produce the common notion even when actions and things differ.

Granted that time being one, could well determine two different actions and give us the common notion: the jar is produced late, the cloth is produced late, but how could it, being one, give us two distinct notions such as: it is done soon, it is done late? To this Bhartṛhari's reply is recorded in Kārikā III. 9.28.¹ This he explains on the analogy of a balance. As a balance, though one, determines the varying weights of gold, silver, etc., similarly time, though one, comes to have manifoldness by virtue of the powers inherent in it and determines uninterrupted action diversified by such distinct operations as winking. Or time, the absolute time, determines action as soon, or late, quick or slow, just as the hand of the practised adepts determines a particular weight. As the hand is competent to weigh by reason of the skill born of practice, time is capable of measuring the difference in actions by virtue of its own inherent power.

The Vaiśeṣika has his own way of inferring the existence of time. This is set forth in a number of Kārikās (III. 9. 16-22). The Kārikā 22 says that as objects depend upon causes, material, instrumental and others for their production, so do they depend upon a cause for their existence. The meaning is that an object which is produced, is artificial, is from its very nature perishable and would perish as soon as it is produced, if it is not sustained by a cause. And that sustaining cause is time. This argument of the Vaiśeṣika becomes clearly understandable when we keep in view the fact that to the Vaiśeṣika the whole is different from the parts of which it is composed. So it cannot be urged that a piece of cloth (the whole) is sustained by the hundreds of threads of which it is made.

¹ Anityasya yathotpāde pāratantryam tathā sthitau |
Vināśāyaiva tat sṛṣṭamasvādhina sthitim viduḥ ||

A MANUSCRIPT OF MAHEŚVARA'S
MARATHI COMMENTARY ON THE GĪTAGOVINDA
OF JAYADEVA DATED ŚAKA 1739 (A. D. 1817)

By

P. K. GODE

Aufrecht in his *Catalogus Catalogorum* makes the following entries about an author Maheśvara and his commentary on the *Amarakośa* :—

CCI, p. 445 — महेश्वर

— अमरकोशविवेक

CCI, p. 27 — अमरकोशविवेक by महेश्वर

— L 3045

— B. 3-36

— Oudh XVII, 8

The MSS of *Amarakośaviveka* recorded by Aufrecht are not available to me for examination. However, an edition of this commentary and the text is available, not in the Bombay Sanskrit Series but as a work outside the Series published by the Govt. of Bombay. The 6th edition of this work published in 1907 is a revised, enlarged and improved edition from Chintamani Shastri Thatte's edition of 1882. The author of this 1907 edition is Vāmanācārya Jhalkikar. We learn from the title-page of this edition that it contains "the commentary of Maheśvara enlarged by Raghunatha Shastri Talekar." In the colophons of the commentary for the three Kāṇḍas of the *Amarakośa* Maheśvara is stated to be the author of this commentary called *Amaraviveka* ("अमरविवेके महेश्वरेण रचिते"). No further information about Maheśvara is found in the commentary as we find it in this edition. It is difficult to know from this edition the exact text of Maheśvara's commentary as it is revised and enlarged by three different editors, Thatte, Talekar and Jhalkikar.

In the *Madhyayugina Caritrakośa* by S. Chitray Shastri, Poona, 1937, p. 620, there is an article on *Maheśvarabhaṭṭa Ramacandra-bhaṭṭa Sukthankar* (A. D. 1718-1816) in which we find the following information about this author and his works :—

- (1) Maheśvarabhāṭṭa (= M) was a learned Brahmin of Sārasvata Caste.
- (2) M hailed from the village *Mahatāḷa* in Gomāntaka (Goa).
- (3) M was a *R̥gvedi* Brahmin of the *Āśvalāyana Śakha* and *Kauśika* gotra.
- (4) His mother's name was Jānakibāī.
- (5) His works are as follows :—
 - (i) A supplement (पुरणिक्का) to Śrīdhara's commentary on the *Bhagavata*.
 - (ii) A commentary called स्वात्मदीयिका on स्वात्मनिस्त्वण, a work on Vedānta.
 - (iii) Marathi commentaries on अद्वैतमकरन्द, भगवद्गीता, वाक्यसुधा, सिद्धांतचन्द्रिका etc.
 - (iv) A *Samasloki* commentary on वाक्यसुधा called पानपात्र.
 - (v) A metrical rendering of the गीतगोविंद.
 - (vi) A Sanskrit commentary called संतोषिणी on the मन्त्रभागवत (in Marathi) by the Marathi poet Moropant (A. D. 1729-1794).
 - (vii) भातुशतककाव्य, गद्यसुधांशु, मांगिरीशाष्टक with commentary.
 - (viii) Commentaries on works on dharmaśāstra like त्रिशतश्लोकी, चतुर्दशश्लोकी and पद्यपञ्चक about सापिण्ड्य-कन्यकाभिर्णय in the निर्णयसिंधु (A. D. 1612).
 - (ix) A commentary called सौंदर्यचोधिनी on the मुहूर्तमाला.

The above information is taken by Shri Chitrav Shastri from सारस्वतरत्नमाला (pp. 10-22). I have no means of verifying the above information in the absence of the MSS of the works, the authorship of which is ascribed to Maheśvara Sukthankar. I find no mention of अमरविवेक in the above list of Maheśvara's works. Aufrecht records many authors of the name महेश्वर and the works composed by them. It is, therefore, difficult to identify our महेश्वर the author of the अमरविवेक with any of the namesakes of महेश्वर mentioned by Aufrecht.

As Maheśvara composed Marathi commentaries I thought it advisable to consult my friend Prof. A. K. Priyolkar, the Director of the Marathi Samshodhan Mandal, Bombay, about Maheśvara and his works. I am very thankful to Prof. Priyolkar for his letter of 23-9-1955, the contents of which are noted below :—

“Received your letter of 15-9-1955. I had seen a MS of the Marathi commentary on the *Gitagovinda* by Maheśvara Shastri Sukthankar at Goa about 15/20 years ago. I don't exactly remember if this commentary was in prose or verse. The late Shri Vāman Rāmacandra Shastri Karande had published an article in a magazine published at Goa called “स्वयंसेवक.” An extract from this article is enclosed herewith. It appears from this extract that this commentary was in prose..... The MS of this commentary procured by you is, very probably the MS of the commentary by Meheśvara Shastri Sukthankar.”

The contents of the extract from स्वयंसेवक (Goa) sent by Prof. Priyolkar are noted below :—

“Maheśvara Babā (Sukthankar) composed a delightful commentary in Marathi on Jayadeva's *Gitagovinda* for the benefit of Marathi readers. Its language appears to be old as compared with modern Marathi.”

— article on *unpublished works worthy of publication* by V. R. Karande in स्वयंसेवक (Goa) No. 7, Vol. IV, p. 175.

Prof. Priyolkar has sent to me another extract about Maheśvarabhāṭṭa Sukthankar from a book called “गेहपा पावशतकांतील गोमंतक” (Goa, 1938).

In this book Shri Subaraya Ramakrishna Samant has written an article on “गोमंतकीयाची साहित्यसेवा” in which we get the following remarks :—

“No prose literature produced in Goa before about 150 years ago is available with the exception of the prose writings of the erudite scholar Shri Maheśvarabhāṭṭa Sukthankar composed about A. D. 1750. This great Sanskrit Pandit composed about this time a *Marathi Commentary on the Amarakośa* and a Sanskrit Commentary on Moropanta's मन्त्रभागवत but his great literary achievement is the Marathi Commentary on the celebrated beautiful Sanskrit poem *Gitagovinda*” (pp. 121-122).

The account of the works of Maheśvarabhāṭṭa Sukthankar given by different authors needs to be verified by an actual examination of the extant MSS of his works. Unfortunately these MSS are not available to me with the exception of a MS of the Marathi commentary on *Gitagovinda* by Maheśvara presented to the Institute by

Shri M. D. Bakre.¹ This is written on paper. It consists of 71 folios (Size :- $8\frac{1}{2}$ inches \times 6 inches), each folio containing about 12 lines to a page, and each line containing about 34 letters. The MS is complete and neatly written. It begins as follows :—

“ श्रीगणेशाय नमः । श्रीमहालसायै नमः । श्रीदत्तात्रेयाय नमः ।

श्रीवज्रेश्वर्यै नमः । ॐ

श्रीगोविंदमहं नत्वा गीतगोविंददिपणं ।

सुगमं बालबोधार्थं कुर्वे प्राकृतभाषया ॥ १ ॥

श्रीजयदेव कवी जो तो गीतगोविंदनामक ग्रंथारंभाचे ठायीं निर्विघ्नग्रंथसमाप्ति ह्वावीं ह्मणून संगलचरणातें आचरित होत्ताता ग्रंथप्रतिपाद्य राधामाधवसुरतक्रीडेचा उत्कर्ष जो त्यातें स्मरतो । श्लोक—

मेघैर्मंदुरमंबरं वनभुवः श्यामास्तमालद्रुमैः

नक्तं भीरुरयं त्वमेव तदिमं राधे गृहं प्रापय ।

इत्थं नंदनिदेशतश्चलितयोः प्रत्यध्वकुंजद्रुमं

राधामाधवयोर्ययंति यमुनाकूले रहः केलयः ॥ १ ॥

टीका — राधे अंबरं मेघैः मंदुरं हे राधिके आकाश जें तें अभेकरून दाट वर्तलें असें अणखी वनभुवः वनभूमिका ज्या त्या तमालद्रुमैः श्यामाः तमाल-वृक्षाचे दाटीकरून श्यामरूप वर्तताहेत अणखी नक्तं अयं भीरुः रात्रीचे ठायीं हा कृष्ण जो तो भेजुड आहे etc. ”

The colophons of the eleven chapters do not supply any information about the commentator or his works. The colophon of the last (12th) chapter reads as follows :—

Folio 71 — “ टीकेंत.....काचे

अलंकृती छंद रसादिकांचे ।

त्या त्या स्थलीं दाखवुं ये प्रभेद

बोलूनियां लक्षण.....द ॥ १ ॥

परंत वाढेल महान्प्रबंध

घडेल ही बालमतीस बंध ।

म्हणून तो त्याज्यप्रसंग केला

शास्त्रांत पाहा जरि तू भुकेला ॥ २ ॥

1. Shri M. D. Bakre presented this MS on 15-9-1955. He now resides at Bukoba (T. T. — Africa) where he is serving as a teacher in Indian Public School.

श्री कुंभकर्ण...तहिते विशेष
आहेत रागादिकही अशेष ।
भावार्थही विस्तृत तेथें केला
पाहा बरें तथें जरी भुकेला ॥ ३ ॥
टीकेंत हे प्राकृतशब्दहाकिं
परंतु अर्थें दुरितासिहा किं
पाहूचये येथें हि तोविलास
विश्वास अर्थी जरी ठेविलास ॥ ४ ॥

टीका हे प्रायशः केली संस्कृतान्वयपूर्वक ।
ग्रंथाधिक्यभयें कोठें त्यागिला संस्कृतान्वय ॥ ५ ॥

श्रीगीतगोविंदमिमं विचार्य
महेश्वरः कौंकणभाषयेत्थं ।
टीकावधान्मंगलदीपिकाख्यां

देवोऽनया तुष्यतु वासुदेवः ॥ ६ ॥

श्रीहरे रंगदीप्त्या तु राधाणिक्यदीपिका ।

बभौ पन्नगदीप्तयेयं भातु मंगलदीपिका ॥ ७ ॥

आर्या — यद्यपि टीका बहवः सन्ति तथा प्रियमभाग्यवती ।

यस्यादस्यामंवा प्रीतिं वितनोति बालभाषायां ॥ ८ ॥

इति श्रीगीतगोविंदे प्राकृतटीकायां मंगलदीपिकायां द्वादशः सर्गः समाप्तः ॥
॥ ६ ॥ शके १७३९ ईश्वराब्दे श्रावणकृष्णत्रयोदश्यां भौमवासरे दं पुस्तकं समाप्तं ।
श्रीमहालसाप्रसन्न (ज्ञ) ॥ ॥ तल्लेकरोपनामकं लक्ष्मभट्टात्मज रामचंद्रेण
लिखिलं । शुभं भवतु ॥ ६ ॥ ”

The foregoing extracts give us the following information :—

(1) The name of this commentary on the *Gitagovinda* of Jayadeva is मंगलदीपिका. It is in *Prakṛta* or Marathi of the 18th century.

(2) The MS was copied in Śaka 1739 (= A. D. 1817).

(3) The name of the copyist is *Ramacandra*, son of *Lakṣmanabhaṭṭa* of the Surname *Talekar*.

(4) In verse 1 at the beginning of the commentary the author calls this commentary as “ गीतगोविंदटिप्पण. ”

(5) The name of the commentator is महेश्वर as stated in verse 6 at the end of the MS. This verse also states that the commentary was written in कौंकणभाषा i.e. Marathi.

(6) In verse 3 at the end of the MS Maheśvara refers to King *Kumbhakarna*, who is obviously the author of the commentary *Rasikapriya* on the *Gitagovinda*. This King ruled at Udaipur from A. D. 1433 to 1468.

(7) In verse 8 at the end of the commentary Maheśvara states that there are many commentaries on the *Gitagovinda* but unfortunately he does not specifically refer to the authors of these commentaries except King *Kumbhakarna* mentioned in verse 3 at the end of Maheśvara's commentary.

(8) According to Shri Chitrava Shastri Maheśvara lived between A. D. 1718 and 1816. If these dates are correct the date of the present MS viz. 1817 clearly shows that this copy of Maheśvara's commentary is practically a contemporary copy.

(9) The Marathi language of the commentary belongs to the Peshwa period as I found from the perusal of the commentary. On the whole the commentary looks like a paraphrase of the Sanskrit text.

(10) Maheśvara does not refer to any earlier authors or their works in his commentary.

(11) Maheśvara's commentary on the *Amarakośa* (*Amara-viveka*) was enlarged by *Raghunātha Śāstri Talekar*. The MS of Maheśvara's commentary on *Gitagovinda* before us was copied in A. D. 1817 by one *Rāmacandra Lakṣmaṇa Talekar*. We have to investigate the relation of *Rāmacandra Talekar* (A. D. 1817) with *Raghunātha Shastri Talekar*. If these two persons are genealogically connected and in case there are any descendants of *Raghunātha Śāstri* to-day it is possible to trace some MSS of Maheśvara's works with these descendants.

For a correct account of the works ascribed to Maheśvara Sukthankar we must examine all the extant MSS of these works. Literary history not based on the study of MSS of the works of an author is unreliable and at times misleading. I hope my examination of at least one dated MS of Maheśvara's work viz. his Marathi prose commentary on the *Gitagovinda* of Jayadeva will help other scholars to trace the MSS of Maheśvara's other works in Sanskrit or Marathi. It is also necessary to construct a dependable biographical account of this author on the basis of a study of these MSS and other information available from his descendants if any.

UŚANAS-SMṚTI

BY

SURES CHANDRA BANERJI

That Uśanas was admittedly one of the traditional writers on Dharmaśāstra is borne out by the well-known list of Dharmaśāstra-kāras contained in the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti* (I. 1. 4-5). At present, we know of three works attributed to Uśanas. One of them is written in the style in which the Dharmasūtras of Gautama, Baudhāyana, etc. are composed. In it we find prose passages interspersed with verses.¹ The other two are metrical compositions.² Of the two metrical works of Uśanas, one³ appears to be a truncated version from the opening verse which reads as *atahparaṁ pravakṣyāmi* clearly hinting at a lost portion of the work preceding it. The other metrical work is longer and much wider in scope. For the present purpose, we are concerned with the Dharmasūtra of Uśanas.

In the form, now available, it is a brief work consisting of seven chapters. It appears to be incomplete from the facts that it begins abruptly, and that the first folio of the MS. is wanting. The second chapter deals with impurities of man, animals and various things and the means of purifying them.

¹ Cf. (1) MS. No. 191 of A 1881-82 of B. O. R. I., Poona.

(2) MS. No. 644 of Viśrāmbāga (1) of B. O. R. I., Poona.

It is fragmentary containing as it does only two folios.

² Vide *Auśanassmṛti*, pp. 46-48 of the *Smṛtīnām Samuccaya* (Ānandāśrama series, No. 48). The same text occurs in verses 1-55, pp. 497-501, of *Dharmaśāstra-saṁgraha* (Jivānanda). The latter work contains also a metrical composition called *Auśanassmṛti* (pp. 501-554), which is identical with the *Uśanaḥ-Saṁhitā* contained in the *Īnavimśati-Saṁhitā*, Vaṅgavāsī ed., Calcutta, 1316 B. S. It is interesting to note that the last-mentioned work contains, in the last chapter, a prose passage which does not occur in the Dharmasūtra of Uśanas.

³ Viz., (1) *Smṛtīnām Samuccaya*, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-48 (2) *Dharmaśāstra-saṁgraha*, pp. 497-501.

Chapter III treats of the different castes of which the Brāhmaṇa has been declared foremost. In this connexion, the various mixed castes are also described. They are Rathakāra, Ambastha, Sūta, Ugra, Magadha, Vena, Pulkasa, Kukkuta, Vaidebaka, Caṇḍāla, Śvapāka, Pāraśava or Niśāda and Āyogava. The noticeable feature is that the superior castes are said to be those who are born from union of males and females in the regular order (*anuloma*), while those born as a result of their union in the reverse order (*pratiloma*) are said to be inferior. In *anuloma* marriage again, one born of the union of a male with a female of the next inferior caste has been given higher status than one born of union of a male with a female of the caste still lower.¹

The fourth chapter opens with the prohibition of killing a Brāhmaṇa and of causing bloodshed to him, on pain of severe penances and hideous consequences in the life beyond. A Brahmin holding deadly weapons, with a criminal intent, can, however, be killed with impunity.² Punishment has been ordained for killing innocent men of the Kṣatriya and Vaiśya castes too.³ The murderer of a Śūdra can be absolved by performing a six-month long penance and the gift of eleven oxen. One, having committed adultery with the preceptor's wife, is to die an extremely painful death.⁴ Penalty is prescribed for expiating the sin accruing from the smelling of wine (*surā*).⁵ The portion of the MS. is woefully corrupt from this point. All that we can gather is that herein the author prescribes means of purification from the sin arising from taking inadvertently the excretions of certain animals, sexual intercourse with another man's wife (*paradāra-gamane*), theft of vegetables, etc. A wife, committing adultery (*vyabhicāriṇī*), is

¹ Cf., for example, तत्र सवर्णासवर्णब्राह्मणेन क्षत्रियायां जातो ब्राह्मण एव सः । वैश्यायाम्बुधुः । शूद्रायां पारशव निषाद इत्येके ।

² This appears to contradict the general rule that a Brāhmaṇa can be killed under no circumstances (see f. n. 2, p. 89).

³ This portion of the MS. is corrupt.

⁴ Cf. गुरुतल्पगः सवृषणं शिश्रमुत्कृत्य etc.

⁵ Which kind of wine is meant is not clear. Generally, the following three kinds of *surā* are mentioned in Smṛti works—Gauḍī (fermented from molasses), Mādhvī (from honey) and Paṣṭī (from rice).

also subjected to very hard expiatory rites like Cāndrāyana and Prijāpatya. It should be observed here that, while mentioning the above sins and the corresponding purificatory rites, the author does not expressly mention any particular caste.

In the next place, it has been said that a Brāhmaṇa may have a wife of any of the four castes.

Here again the MS. continues to be corrupt up to a certain length. We can, however, gather the following. The sin arising out of a Brahmin's sexual enjoyment in the mouth of his lawfully wedded wife (*dharma-patnī*) has to be atoned for.

In this portion are also mentioned the sins, with corresponding modes of expiation, accruing from the killing of petty animals (*kṣudra-jantu*), certain beasts and birds. It is interesting to note that the killing of even such domestic animals as cat, rat, pigeon, some of which are positively mischievous, has been condemned on pain of punishment. It deserves notice that the monkey, whose killing is a taboo even to-day among the Hindus, has been listed by Uśanas as one of those animals which render the killer liable to a not very light punishment. The eating of *priyaṅgu* (long pepper?), *laśuna* (garlic), and *palāṇḍu* (onion), has been vehemently condemned. A stealer of gold, belonging to a Brāhmaṇa, has to go to the king with a mace (*musala*). The king may either strike him to death with that mace or let him off.

The fifth chapter opens with rules regarding Śrāddha. A very important part of Śrāddha is the invitation, by the performer of it, on the previous day, of Brahmins possessing the requisite qualifications of Vedic learning, unimpeachable character, etc. Next are given certain procedural rules many of which are illegible owing to the corrupt nature of the MSS. The manes are said to derive varying degrees of satisfaction from the offering of paddy, barley, *māṣa*, fish, the flesh of deer (particularly, spotted antelope), birds, boar, goat, sheep, buffalo and *vādhriṇasa*.¹

¹ This word has several meanings for which see *Skt.-Eng. Dict.* by Monier Williams. It may mean rhinoceros or a kind of bird or some other animal. In view of the following word *Khaḍga*, meaning rhinoceros, the word here appears to mean the bird so called.

The flesh of a rhinoceros has been said to give the greatest satisfaction to them. In the verses following we have a code of ethics to be scrupulously observed by the performer of Śrāddha and the invitees thereto. Then we have a very corrupt portion of the manuscript from which we can gather a list of the persons disqualified for invitation to Śrāddha. The list includes, *inter alia*, persons with physical deformities like deafness, blindness, etc., persons suffering from some maladies like leprosy, men of evil character and of reprehensible means of livelihood as usury, medical profession, trade and commerce, attendance upon an idol and subsistence on the offerings made to it (*devalaka*), manual art or craft (*śilpa*), a degraded man (*patita*), and son of a remarried widow. The invitees being Brahmins, we may, by implication, learn that the above means of livelihood were condemned for them alone.

The next chapter, a brief one, gives a list of commodities the sale of which renders a Brahmin liable to expiation. The prohibited articles may be classified as follows :—

- A. Agricultural products - sesamum, rice.
- B. Vegetables - roots and pot-herbs.
- C. Milk and milk - products like condensed milk, ghee.
- D. Miscellaneous - molasses, honey, salt, lac-dye, black or crude iron, conch-shells, pearl-oyster, poison, husk, *kutapa*,¹ water, *soma* creeper, dyed cloth, silk cloth, leather, liquor.

The latter part of this chapter enumerates certain articles of food-stuff prohibited for Brahmins. These may be classified as follows² :—

- A. Fish and other aquatic animals—*ceṭa*, *makara*, *śiśumāra*, etc.
- B. Beasts—*Ichneumon*.
- C. Vegetables—*kusumbha*, *nalikā*, *vṛntāka*, *pautika*.

¹ This may mean either *kuśa* grass or a blanket made of the wool of the mountain-goat.

² The relevant portion of the MS. is too corrupt to enable one to read all that is intended by the author.

The sins arising out of the violation of these rules regarding prohibited food are said to be atoned for by the muttering of *Gāyatrī* for ten thousand times. In conclusion, the author prescribes *Prājāpatya* for the expiation of all other sins for which no purificatory rites are specifically mentioned.

The concluding chapter is full of corrupt readings so that a complete analysis of its contents is not feasible. We state here only as much as can be made out. For the commission of certain very grave sins like adultery with preceptor's wife, killing of a *Brāhmaṇa*, etc., members of all the castes, excepting a *Brāhmaṇa*, shall have death-penalty.¹ A *Brāhmaṇa*, committing any kind of sin, cannot be killed.² The concluding verse of the work makes it incumbent upon a Brahmin, desirous of merit, to read this work with the same care as is necessary for Vedic studies.

We shall now examine the relationship this work bears with the metrical works attributed to *Uśanas*. A close comparison of this work with the shorter metrical composition reveals that they differ from each other chiefly on the following points :--

(1) While the *Sūtra* work deals with a number of topics, the versified *Smṛti* treats merely of the castes and mixed castes.³

(2) Some of the mixed castes, mentioned in the metrical work, are wanting in the other one, e. g., *Matsyabandhaka*, *Kaṭakāra*, *Śūlika*, *Takṣaka*, *Maṇikāra*, to mention only a few.

(3) None of the verses, occurring in the metrical work, is found in the other one.

On these evidences, it can be inferred that the above two works could not have been by the same hand, nor could the one be a version of the other.

¹ Cf. अपरेषां तु वर्णानां दण्डः प्राणान्तिको भवेत् ।

² Cf. न तावद् ब्राह्मणं हिंस्यात् सर्वपापेष्ववस्थितम् ।

This rule is hard to reconcile with the statement, made in chapter four of the work, to the effect that a *Brāhmaṇa*, with criminal intent, may be killed with impunity (Vide f. n. 2, p. 86).

³ Cf. अतःपरं प्रवक्ष्यामि जातिवृत्तिविधानकम् ।

अनुलोमविधानं च प्रतिलोमविधिं तथा ॥

Dharmaśāstra-saṅgraha, p. 487, v. 1.

The same inference can be drawn by a comparison of the *Sūtra* work with the longer metrical text. Neither are the verses of the one found in the other nor do the scopes of the two works agree with each other.

In the *Sūtra* work, at least in the portion of it that can be read, the following authors are mentioned :—

Manu, Vasiṣṭha, Śaunaka, Gautama, Vaivasvata and Hārīta.

The extant *Manu-Smṛti* is believed by scholars to have been composed sometime between the 2nd century B. C. and the 2nd century A. D.¹ Several verses, contained in the *Uśanas-Smṛti*, can be traced in the present work of Manu. This fact tends to prove that the former was composed after the final redaction of the latter sometime in the above period. It must be borne in mind, however, that the possibility of the extant *Manu-Smṛti* borrowing these verses from the *Uśanas-Smṛti* cannot also be ruled out.

Vasiṣṭha is placed between 300 and 100 B. C.

Śaunaka's date is not yet known.

The probable age of Gautama is between 600 and 400 B. C.

Of the work of Vaivasvata, who may or may not be identical with Manu, and his time, we do not know anything as yet.

The mention of Hārīta presents some difficulty. At present, we have both a *Sūtra* work and a metrical work ascribed to Hārīta.²

The latter has been proved to be much later than the former. *Uśanas*, however, appears to have referred to the *Sūtra* work.³ Unfortunately, the date of the *Sūtra* work of Hārīta has not yet been settled even within wide limits so that no conclusion is possible from this evidence.

From the internal evidences, recorded above, we may conclude that the *Uśanas-Smṛti* is perhaps later than the *Manu-Smṛti* in its present form, so that the former may have been composed some

¹ For the dates of the authors on *Dharma-sūtra* and *Dharma-śāstra*, we have taken P. V. Kane as the authority. See his *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I.

² See P. V. Kane : *History of Dharma-śāstra*, Vol. I, pp. 70 ff. and 244 ff.

³ See chap. IV.

time after the 2nd century A. D., the lower limit of the period of the final redaction of the latter.

The existence of a Sūtra work on politics by Uśanas is inferred from certain literary references, but the work has not been discovered.¹

In commentaries on some Smṛti works, as well as in some Smṛti Nibandhas, prose passages from Uśanas are quoted.² Some of these passages are traceable in the present work of Uśanas, while others are not; this seems to point to the incomplete nature of the Sūtra work that we now have.

Uśanas-Smṛti

The prose work of Uśanas exists in the following manuscripts preserved at B. O. R. I., Poona.

(1) No. 644 of Viśrāmbāga (i).

(2) No. $\frac{191}{\text{of A 1881-82}}$.

The former is fragmentary, and contains two folios only. It has, therefore, been rejected for the present purpose. The text, presented here, is based upon the latter. Written in Devanāgarī characters, the MS. is full of lacunae and corrupt readings. It consists of eight folios of which the first one is completely blank. In an attempt to reconstruct the text, the corrupt portions are indicated by dotted lines instead of hazarding readings for the entire lines. Here and there, a word or syllable has been suggested in brackets, and doubtful portions have been indicated by query marks. The verses have been, wherever possible, traced to their original sources, with the variants, if any. Quotations from the text in authoritative Smṛti digests and commentaries have been indicated in these footnotes. These quotations have been carefully collated with the text which has been improved upon with the help of the same.

¹ See P. V. Kane, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

² For some such quotations, see P. V. Kane, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.

उशनस्स्मृतिः

[Edited for the first time]

तत्र जन्ममरणयोः काले देशान्तरयोः

शौचं दशरात्रं मातापितृभ्यः सूतकं मातुरित्येके उपस्पृश्य

मनुराह —

बाले देशान्तरस्थे..... ।

5

.....ऽग्निप्रवेशे युद्धहते च सयः ॥

.....नष्टपतिताभिः शस्तानिन्दिताचारैर्न सह संवसेत् । कृतलक्षणैर्दर्शनस्पर्श-
नसंभाषणानि वर्जयेत् । दर्शने ज्योतिर्दर्शनम् । स्पर्शने हृदयालम्बनम् । संभाषणे
ब्राह्मणसंभाषणं पुनरुपस्पर्शनं च ।

10

आपः शुद्धा भूमिगता यत्र [गौर्वा तृषी ?] भवेत् ।

अव्याप्ताश्चेदमेध्येन गन्धवर्णरसान्मिकाः ॥

रहःसु स्त्रीमुखं शुचि । शुचयः फलपातने पक्षिणः ।

प्रसवे वत्सः । शृङ्गग्रहणे..... नाभेः पुरुषः । पुरस्तादजः । स्त्रियः सर्वतः ।
हृदयमासामशुचि । तत्र मनुः —

... ..

15

काष्ठानां परिलिखनम् । मूलफलपुष्पभूमितृणदारु... ।

रज्जुवेण... .. चर्मकार्पासिकक्षौमदुकूल पट्टकौशेयोर्णकानाम-
द्भिरेव प्रक्षालनम् । सुवर्णरजतताम्रलोहत्रपुसीसकांस्यान(माद्भिरेव भस्मसंयु-

4-5 Manu, V. 78, however, reads as follows :—

बाले देशान्तरस्थे च पृथक्पिण्डे च संस्थिते ।

सवासा जलमापुन्य सय एव विशुध्यति ॥

6 The portion नष्ट ... संवसेत्, with लोक added bet. °शस्त and निन्दित, has been quoted in Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, II, p. 339.

6-8 The Ms. omits स्पर्शनं before संभाषणानि. The portion कृत ... वर्जयेत् has been quoted in Śūlapāṇi's *Prāyaścitta-Viveka*, p. 147. The portion दर्शने...च has been quoted in the same work, p. 158.

9-10 Manu, V. 128, reads the lines as follows :—

आपः शुद्धा भूमिगता वैतृण्यं यासु गोर्भवेत् ।

अव्याप्ताश्चेदमेध्येन गन्धवर्णरसान्विताः ॥

16 सुवर्ण ... संयुताभिः— this portion is quoted in *Aparārka's* comm. on the *Yājñavalkya-smṛti* (Ānandāśrama ed., p. 255), which omits लोह.

ताभिः । मणिमयानां मृद्भिरे । घृताक्ताभिः । तैजसानां चोच्छिष्टानां भस्मना त्रिः
प्रक्षालनम् । फलमूलानां गोबाल..... वैणवानां गौरसर्पकल्केन । मृद्भिरद्भि-
श्वान्येषां (?) वाससामनादिष्टानां मूत्रपुरीषरेतोस्कोपहतानामत्यन्तोत्सर्गः । यज्ञ-
पात्राणां चोच्छिष्टानामत्यन्तोपहतानां चोत्सर्गः । न सोमेनोच्छिष्टा भवन्तीति
5 श्रुतिः । पुनर्दाहनं मृन्मयानां पाके ।

कारुहस्तः शुचिर्नित्यं पण्यं यच्च प्रसारितम् ।
आगारात् सोमपानाच्च वाचा यस्य प्रशस्यते ॥
पञ्चैव दोषास्तु.....तपस्विनां नित्यमुपानतानाम् ।
प्राणाभिधातादनृतं च दानं प्रतिग्रहो... ..तथैव ॥ इति ॥
इत्यौशनसे धर्मशास्त्रे द्वितीयोऽध्यायः ॥

अत ऊर्ध्वं वर्णविवेकं व्याख्यास्यामः । ब्राह्मणाः क्षत्रिया वैश्याः शूद्रा इति
चत्वारो वर्णा मुखबाहूरुपादप्रसवाः । तेषां ब्राह्मणः श्रेष्ठी वर्णः । तत्रोपकर्षापक-
र्षाद् वर्णा विद्यन्ते । रथकाराम्बष्ठसूतोग्रमागधवेनपुलकस.....कुक्कुटवैदेहक-
चाण्डालः श्वपाकव्रात्यप्रभृतयः । तत्र सवर्णसिवर्णब्राह्मणेन क्षत्रियायां जातो
15 ब्राह्मण एव सः । वैश्यायामम्बष्ठः । शूद्रायां पारशवो निषाद इत्येके । क्षत्रियेण
वैश्यायां क्षत्रियः । शूद्रायामुग्रः । वैश्येन शूद्रायां वैश्यः । शूद्रेण वैश्यायामा-
योगवः । क्षत्रियायां क्षत्ता । ब्राह्मण्यां वैदेहकः । क्षत्रियेण ब्राह्मण्यां सूतः ।
तत्राम्बष्ठसंयोगानुलोमः । क्षत्रवैदेहकयोरुग्रेण जातः क्षत्रियायां श्वपाकः
निषादेन शूद्रायां पुलकसः । शूद्रेण निषादायां(?) कुक्कुटः ।

वर्णसंकरात् समुत्पन्नाच्चात्यानाहुरिति ।
इत्यौशनसे तृतीयोऽध्यायः ॥

न ब्राह्मणस्यापदं कुर्यान्न रुधिरं जनयेत् । यावन्तो रुधिरेण पुता
भवन्ति तावन्ति वर्षसहस्राणि दारुणयातना नरके... .. भवति । तिर्यग्योनिषु
च पच्यन्ते । गृहीतशस्त्रमाततायिनं हत्वा न दोषः स्यात् । अथोदासीनं ब्राह्मणं
25 हत्वा गवामयनाश्वमेधावभृत्यौ... .. पूतो भवति । बहिर्वा कुटीं कृत्वा... ..
भस्मशायी केशश्मश्रु [नख ?] रोमधारी स्वकर्मानुकीर्तयेत् । सप्तागाराणि ...
भैक्षं चरेद् द्वादशवर्षाणि च । ब्राह्मणपरित्राणाद् वा पूतो भवति । अथोदासीनं
क्षत्रियं हत्वा गोसर्वोपस्तोमाभ्यामिष्ट्वा(?) पूतो भवति । गोसहस्रं वृषाधिकं दत्त्वा
पूतो भवति । अथोदासीनं शूद्रं हत्वा षणमासांश्चरेद् वृषभैकादशं दत्त्वा पूतो भवति ।

1-2 तैजसानां ... प्रक्षालनम् — quoted by Aparārka.

6 Manu, V, 129, and Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra, I. 9.1, reads this line as follows :—

नित्यं शुद्धः कारुहस्तः पण्यं (Manu, पण्ये) यच्च प्रसारितम् ।

- खङ्ग गुरुतल्पगः सवृषणं शिश्नमुत्कृत्य नैकतीं दिशमञ्जलिमादाय
 व्रजेत् । शरीरनिपातात् पूतो भवति । ... गन्धमाघ्राय त्रिराचम्य घृतं प्राश्य
 पूतो भवति । श्वविद्धराहगृध्रश्येनकुक्कुट भासकाककङ्कवुकशू-
 गालानामुष्णं घृतं [पायात् ?] वायुभक्षो भवेत् । त्र्यहम् । छत्राकलशुनिविद्ध-
 5 राह पुरीष... .. प्राशने चातप्तकृच्छ्रेण (?) ।

त्र्यहमुष्णं पिवेदम्भस्त्र्यहमुष्णं पयः पिवेत् ।

त्र्यहमुष्णं..... ॥

- सरेतसानां भक्षे तप्तकृच्छ्रेण शुद्धिः । त्रिभिर्वर्षैः पूतो भवति ।
 परदारगमने..... वर्षद्वयं धान्यपुष्पफलं शाकचौर्येषु संवत्सरम् । व्याभिचारिणीं
 10 भार्यां कुचेलपिण्डप्रावृतां निवृत्तविकारां चान्द्रायणं प्राजापत्यं वा व्रतं चारयेत् ।
 न विधीयते । पतितो वृषलीपतिरित्याचक्षते । निपततीत्येके ।
 ब्राह्मणस्य कल्पविहिताश्चतस्रोऽनुपूर्वेण भार्या भवन्तीति वासिष्ठ आह । पतति न
 पततीति संशयः । हारितः । जननात् पततीति शौनकः । तदपत्यं पततीति
 गौतमः । यस्तु (?) पुनर्ब्राह्मणो धर्मपत्नीमुखेन मैथुनं सेवेत स दुष्यतीति वैवस्वतः ।
 15 प्राजापत्येन शुध्यतीति हारितः ।

..... भुक्त्वा तिस्रो रात्रीर्नाश्रीयात् ।

तद्वत् प्रातस्त्र्यहं नक्तं त्र्यहं भुञ्जेदयाचितम् ।

परं त्र्यहमुपवसेत् प्राजापत्याविधिः स्मृतः ॥

... ..

रात्रौ जले स्थितो व्युष्टः प्राजापत्येन तत् समम् ॥

- 20 गायत्र्यष्टशतं जप्यं कृत्वा [स्नानं ?] दिने रवौ ।

मुच्यते सर्वपापेभ्यो यदि न ब्रह्महा भवेत् ॥

... ..

- क्षुद्रजन्तुवेषेषु चैकरात्रद्विरात्रात्रिरात्रोपवासी यथाकामी... .. अघमर्ष-
 णजप्यपरः शुध्यति । मण्डूकनकुल जलगोधिकावकवलाकागोधामा-
 जारमूषिकं हत्वा शूद्रवधप्रायश्चित्तम् । शुकसारसा [न ?] हत्वा दत्त्वा
 25 पूतो भवति । वानरमयूर हत्वा त्र्यहमुपवसेद् गां च दत्त्वा पूतो भवति ।
 पारावततिक्तिरियुगवधे तिलद्रोणं घृतकुम्भं कृष्णायसं दण्डं दद्याच्छुद्ध्यर्थम् ।
 अनस्थिवधाद् शूद्रवधप्रायश्चित्तम् । दद्याच्छुद्ध्यर्थम् ।
 शरणागतबालवृद्धगोमित्र लभ्यते । प्रियङ्गुलशुनपलाण्डुप्राशने लुप्तव्रतो

17-18 These lines resemble Manu, XI. 211, which reads as follows:—

त्र्यहं प्रातस्त्र्यहं सायं त्र्यहमयादयाचितम् ।

त्र्यहं परं च नाश्रीयात् प्राजापत्यं चरन् द्विजः ॥

भवति । दंष्ट्रिवधे प्राजापत्यम् । दंष्ट्रिदृष्टे गायत्र्यष्टशतं प्राणायामशतं चेति ।
ब्राह्मणसुवर्णस्तेयं कृत्वा मुसलमादाय मुक्तकेशो राज । अनेन
मां घातयतु भवानिति । तं राजासकृदधिहनेन्मोक्षात् दधाद् वा पूतो भवति ।
यद्वा कुर्युः चतुर्दशविद्यास्थानानि पुनः —

- 5 षडङ्गाश्चत्वारो वेदा मीमांसा न्याय एव च ।
धर्मशास्त्रपुराणं च विद्या ह्येताश्चतुर्दश ॥
इत्यौशनसे चतुर्थोऽध्यायः ॥

- अतःपरं श्राद्धकल्पं व्याख्यास्यामः । तत्रादित एव पात्रपरीक्षा कार्या ।
पात्रमिति शोभनस्याख्या भवति । तत्र ब्राह्मणो वेदविद्याव्रतस्नातकः । पञ्चपुरुष
10 यदि विखण्डितचारित्रमर्यादस्त्रिणाचिकेतस्त्रिसुपर्णः षडङ्गवित् ज्येष्ठ-
सामगः । ऋतुकालाभिगामी छन्दसा शुद्धदशपुरुषस्नातक इति
पंक्तिपावनाः । तत्र गोमयोदकैर्मूमिभाजनभाण्डशौचं कुर्यात् । श्वः कर्ता
ब्राह्मणान् निमन्त्रयेत् । वायुभूताः पितरो मन्त्रयमाणा उपतिष्ठन्ति ।
कुप्तश्मश्रुनखरोमः शुचौ देशे प्राङ्मुखा वैश्वदेविकाः माल्यवस्त्रा-
15 भरणादिभिरभ्यर्चयित्वा कृताग्निकार्यो(?)नुज्ञातः कुशकुतपपवित्रसंनिहितं तिलो-
दकं दद्यात् । भवति चात्र श्लोकः —

कुशा दर्भाः समाख्याताः कुतपा अमृताः स्मृताः ।
दुहितयोस्तु(?)ये पुत्रा दौहित्रास्ते प्रकीर्तिताः ॥
अथैतान् श्रावयेदिदं पितृभ्यो निर्वपेदनु ॥

- 20 पृथिवी ते पात्रं यौरपिधानं ब्राह्मणस्य मुखे अमृतं जुहोमि स्वाहा ।
भवति चात्र श्लोकः —

अनङ्गुष्ठेन यद्दत्तं यच्च नो परिगृह्यते ।
तन्नश्येदामपात्रेण यथा(?)न्यस्तं यथा तथा ॥

1 The portion from दंष्ट्रि to the end, with दंष्ट्रिणां for दंष्ट्रि, is quoted in Śūlapāṇi's *Prāyāścitta-viveka*, p. 232.

1 The portion from दंष्ट्रि ... च is quoted in Śūlapāṇi's *Prāyāścitta-viveka*, p. 450. The Ms. reads वधे for दृष्टे. But, in view of the immediately preceding rule ordaining *Prāyāścitta* for दंष्ट्रिवध, दृष्टे seems to be the correct reading here.

9 The portion तत्र ... स्नातकः, with the omission of ब्राह्मणी, has been quoted in Caṇḍeśvara's *Gṛhastharatnākara*, p. 495, and in Lakṣmīdhara's *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, II, p. 289.

... ..

- श्राविह्वराहमार्जारकुक्कुटनकुलशूद्रजस्वलाशूद्रीभर्तारश्च दूरमनपायितव्याः
[अपनेतव्याः ?] । न त्वरां न क्रोधं न कुर्वीत । अपि चोदाहरन्ति—यावदु.....
यावदश्रन्ति पितरो यावन्नोक्ता हविर्गुणाः । तृप्ताः स्थ मे प्रभूतमित्युक्तवन्तः.....
तिलमिश्रितोदकेनासिच्य.....कीर्तयेत् । दर्भास्तीर्णमूमौ पिण्डान्निवेदयेत् । ततः
5 स्वर्घां वाचयेत्, पिण्डान् च.....तोयेन.....प्रतिषिच्योदकभाजनान्युत्सृजेत् ।
तैरनुज्ञातः शेषमिष्टेभ्यो दद्यात् स्वयं वा भुञ्जीत । तत्र ब्रीहियवमाषैरपि... मांसं
पितरस्तृप्ता भवन्ति । मांसद्वयं, मत्स्येन, मांसत्रयं हरिणमुगमांसेन, चतुरः कृष्ण-
सारङ्गेण, [पञ्च?] शाकुनेन, षट् छागेन, सप्त पार्षतेन, अष्टौ वाराहेण, नव मेषेण,
दश माहिषेण, एकादश शाकुनेन, पायसेन पयसा गव्येन संवत्सरम् । वाघ्रीण-
10 समांसेन तृप्तिर्द्वादशवार्षिकी खड्गमांसेनात्यन्तम् । अपि चोदाहरति --

... ..

- निमन्त्रितस्तु यः श्राद्धे मैथुनं सेवते द्विजः ।
पितरस्तस्य तं मांसं रुदन्ति स्वेद(?) भोजनाः ॥
निमन्त्रितस्तु यः श्राद्धे अध्वानं सं(?) प्रपद्यते ।
पितरस्तस्य तं मांसं भवन्ति पांसुभोजनाः ॥
15 नियुक्तश्चैव यः श्राद्धे यत् किञ्चित् पारिवर्जयेत् ।
पितरस्तस्य तं मांसं नैराश्यं प्रतिपेदिरे ॥
श्राद्धदाता च भोक्ता च मैथुनं योऽधिगच्छति ।
पुरीषे तस्य तं मांसं पितरः शेरते वशाः(?) ॥
.....तद् यथा-जडबधिरान्धश्चित्रिकुष्ठीकुनखीश्यावदन्तवार्द्धषिक-
20 देवलकवणिक्षट्.....चिकित्सकपौनर्भवकाणशिल्पोपजीविपतित.....कैतव-
धूर्त(?) दाम्भिकपरपरिभाषितप्रभृतयः । भवति चात्र श्लोकः —
.....पतितान् मनुरब्रवीत् ।
वेदविक्रयिणो ह्येते.....भोजयेत् ॥
यत् कुर्वन्ति यदश्रन्ति(?).....च यत् ।
25 विधिवत्तेन पापेन..... ।
अभोजनीयास्ते सद्भिस्ते चाभोज्यास्तथा स्मृताः ।
तेभ्यो दाता च भोक्ता च महादोषानवाप्नुयात् ॥
स्वकर्मकुलशुद्धानां सत्यस्थानां महात्मनाम् ।
सदा.....स्त्रीशुद्रकृतानिश्चयाः ॥

2 The 'न' bet. क्रोधं and कुर्वीत appears to be redundant.

4 The portion दधी ... निवेदयेत् is quoted in Devanabhaṭṭa's *Smṛti-candrikā* (Śrāddha-kāṇḍa), p. 367, with the following variants:— दर्भास्तीर्णाय for द ... र्ण, दद्यात् for निवेदयेत्.

6 The portion तैरनुज्ञात ... भुञ्जीत is quoted in the same book, p. 363.

असमानयाजकाश्च श्रुतविक्रयिणश्च ये ।
अस्य पूर्वं प्रजातानां पातितान् मनुरब्रवीत् ॥
असंस्कृताध्याया(?)श्च ये तमो विशन्ति ते घोरम् ॥
इति वैवस्वतोऽब्रवीत् ।

5 ब्रह्मविक्रयिके(?) विष्टा भैषजे पूयशोणितम् ।
नष्टदेवलके दत्तमप्रातिष्ठं वार्द्धुषिके ॥
यत्तु वाणिजके दत्तं नेह नामुत्र तद्भवेत् ।
भस्मनीव हुतं हव्यं दत्तं पौनर्भवे भवेत् ॥
अवधूतमवज्ञातं सरोषं विस्मयान्वितम् ।
10 गुरोरपि न भोक्तव्यमन्नं संस्कारवर्जितम् ॥
इत्यौशनसे पञ्चमोऽध्यायः ॥

अथ विक्रयाध्यायं व्याख्यास्यामः । तत्राविक्रेयाणि ब्राह्मणे भवन्ति—
तिलतण्डुलक्षीरघृतगुडमधुलवणमांसलाक्षारसकृष्णायसशङ्खशुक्तिविषतुषकुतपस-
लिलसोमगन्धक्षौमरक्तवस्त्रकौशेयचर्मकम्बलप्रभृतीनि । मये मद(य?)मपेयमनि-
15 प्राह्यं तद् यथा । तत्र फाणित.....मूलशाकादीन्यविक्रेयाणि । चेढो मत्-
स्यानामभक्ष्यः । तथा मकरशिशुमारशृङ्गिमद्गुक्रव्यादनकुल.....
.....भोजनेष्वतिकृच्छ्रः । भवति चात्र श्लोकः —

कुसुम्भनलिकाशाकं वृन्ताकं पौतिकं तथा ।
भक्षणात् पतते (ति?) क्षिप्रमपि वेदान्तगो द्विजः ॥
20 सर्वेषामेव पापानां संकरे समुपस्थिते ।
दशसाहस्रमभ्यासो गायत्र्या शोधनं परम् ॥
यदुक्तं यच्च नोक्तं.....महापातकनाशनम् ।
प्राजापत्येन कृच्छ्रेण शुध्यते नात्र संशयः ॥
इत्यौशनसे षष्ठोऽध्यायः ॥

25 ब्राह्मणस्यापराधेषु चतुर्युगे विधीयते ।
गुरुतल्पे सुरापाने स्तेन्यब्राह्मणहिंसयोः ॥
गुरुतल्पे भगः कार्यः..... सुराध्वजः ।
स्तेये च..... ॥
अपरेषां तु वर्णानां दण्डः प्राणान्तिको भवेत् ।
30 न तावद् ब्राह्मणं हिंस्यात् सर्वपापेष्ववस्थितम् ॥

7-8 Same as Manu, III, 181, with तथा for दत्तं (1. 8), द्विजे for भवेत् ।

13-14 The portion श्रुति ... प्रभृतीनि has been quoted in the *Kṛtya-kalpataru*, II, p. 203.

27-28 Manu, IX, 237, appears to read the same verse as follows :—

गुरुतल्पे भगः कार्यः सुरापाने सुराध्वजः । स्तेये च श्वपदं कार्यं ब्रह्महृण्यशिराः पुमान् ॥

13 [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

- दश स्थानानि दण्डस्य[तन्मनो(?)]रनुशासनम् ।
 त्रिषु वर्णेषु सामान्यं ब्राह्मणस्त्वक्षतो भवेत् ॥
 येन येन हि.....हिंस्याच्छ्रेयांसमन्त्यजः ।
 तदेव तस्य छेत्तव्यं निर्विषहो(?) भवेत् ॥
 5 चक्षुर्नासा च कर्णौ च हस्तपादौ च पञ्चमम् ।
 जिह्वोदरं तथा मेढ्रं नवमं..... ॥
 पूतमाप(?)स्तथा स्थानं पत्रपुष्पफलानि च ।
 लोकोपचीर्णान्यातिष्ठेत् प्राजापत्येन कर्मणा ॥
 नयः कूपतडागस्तु सरांसि सरितस्तथा ।
 10 असंपृक्तान्यदोषाणि मनुः स्वायंभुवोऽब्रवीत् ॥
 ।
 पाक.....तन्मनुरब्रवीत् ॥
 सायं प्रातस्तु यः सन्ध्यामस्कन्दं पर्युपासते ।
 जपेत् पावनीं देवीं गायत्रीं वेदमातरम् ॥
 तिलोदकं मूलफलमन्नमभ्युदितं च यत् ।
 15 सर्वतस्तु परिग्राह्यं यच्च गोमयदक्षिणम्(?) ॥
 ।
 स्त्रीमुखे च सुरागन्धमदोषं मनुरब्रवीत् ॥
 सायंप्रातस्तु यः सन्ध्यामस्कन्दं पर्युपासते ।
 जपेत् पावनीं देवीं गायत्रीं वेदमातरम् ॥
 गवां श्वरथयानानां प्रसंस्तारेण(?).....सदा ।
 20 अप्रशस्ता.....श्वविरासभवाससाम् ॥
 अग्निशाकोदके काष्ठे पुष्पमूले फले तृणे ।
 अदत्त्वा(?)हरणे चैषां न दोषो मनुरब्रवीत् ॥
 ।
 यस्य पुत्रः शुचिर्दक्षः पूर्वं वयासि धार्मिकः ।
 नियन्ता स दोषाणां स तारयति बान्धवम् ॥
 25 यथा हि वेदाध्ययनं धर्मशास्त्रमिदं तथा ।
 अध्येतव्यं ब्राह्मणेन.....पुण्यमभीप्सता ॥
 इत्यौशनसे धर्मशास्त्रे सप्तमोऽध्यायः । समाप्तं चेदमौशनसस्मृति-
 धर्मशास्त्रम् ॥

1 Manu, VIII, 124, reads the last line of last page and this line as
 दश स्थानानि दण्डस्य मनुः स्वायंभुवोऽब्रवीत् । त्रिषु वर्णेषु यानि स्युरक्षतो ब्राह्मणो व्रजेत् ॥

3-4 Manu, VIII. 279, appears to read the same verse as follows :—

येन केनचिदङ्गेन हिंस्याच्चेच्छ्रेष्ठमन्त्यजः । छेत्तव्यं तत्तदेवास्य तन्मनोरनुशासनम् ॥

12-13 Exactly these lines are repeated in lines 17-18 below.

17-18 Exactly these lines occur as lines 12-13 above.

INDEX OF VERSES IN THE UŚANAS-SMṚTI

[*Pratika* of each foot of the verses is given.

Verses have been identified, wherever possible].

Pratika	Chapter	Pratika	Chapter
अग्निशाकोदके काष्ठे	VII	गुरुतल्पे भगः कार्यः	VII
अथैतान् श्रावयेदिदं	V	[Same as Manu, IX. 237.]	
अदत्त्वा हरणे	VII	गुरोरपि न भोक्तव्यं	V
अद्येतव्यं ब्राह्मणेन	VII	चक्षुर्नासा च	VII
अनङ्गुष्ठेन यद्दत्तं	V	जपेत पावर्नी देवी (Repeated once in the same chapter.)	VII
अपरेषां तु वर्णानां	VII	जिह्वोदरं तथा	VII
अप्रशस्ता... (illegible)	VII	तदेव तस्य छत्तव्यं	VII
अभोजनीयास्ते सद्भिः	V	तद्वत् प्रातस्वहं	IV
अवधूतमवज्ञातं	V	[Same as Manu, XI. 211, with variations.]	
अव्याप्ताश्चेदमेधेन	II	तन्नश्येदामपात्रेण	V
[Same as Manu, V. 128, with slight variations.]		तिलोदकं मूलफलं	VII
असंस्कृताद्यायाश्च (?)	V	तेभ्यो दाता च	V
असंपृक्तान्यदोषाणि	VII	त्रिषु वर्णेषु सामान्यं	VII
असमानयाजकाश्च	V	उग्रहसृष्टेः पिबेत्	IV
अस्य पूर्वं प्रजातानां	V	[Initial portion of two verses.]	
आगारात् सोमपानाच्च	II	दशसाहस्रमभ्यासो	VI
आपः शुद्धा भूमिगताः	II	दश स्थानानि दण्डस्य	VII
[Same as Manu, V. 128, with variations.]		[Same as Manu, VIII. 124, with variations.]	
कारुहस्तः शुचिर्नित्यं	II	दुहितयोस्तु (?)	V
[Same as Manu, V. 129, and <i>Baudhāyana-dharmasūtra</i> , I. 9. 1, with variations.]		धर्मशास्त्रपुराणं च	IV
कुशा दर्भाः समारूपाताः	V	न तावद् ब्राह्मणं	VII
कुसुममलिकाशाकं	VI	नयः कूपतडागास्तु	„
गवां श्वरथयानानां	VII	नष्टदेवलके दत्तं	V
गायत्र्यष्टशतं जप्यं	IV	निमन्त्रितस्तु यः	V
गरुतल्पे सुरापाने	VII	[Initial portion of two verses.]	
		नियन्ता स दोषाणां	VII
		निपुक्तश्चैव यः श्राद्धे	V

Pratika	Chapter	Pratika	Chapter
पञ्चैव दोषास्तु	II	यथा हि वेदाध्ययनं	VII
परं इयं	IV	यदुक्तं यच्च नोक्तं	VI
[Same as Manu, XI. 211, with variations.]		यस्य पुत्रः शुचिः	VII
पाक... (illegible)	VII	येन येन हि	VII
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[Initial portion of three verses.]		रात्रौ जले स्थितो	IV
पुरीषे तस्य तं	V	लोकोपचीर्णान्यातिष्ठेत्	VII
पूतमाप(?)स्तथा	VII	विधिवत्तेन पापेन	V
प्राजापत्येन कृच्छ्रेण	VI	वेदविक्रयिणो ह्येते	V
प्राणाभिघातात्	II	श्राद्धदाता च भोक्ता च	V
बाले देशान्तरस्थे	II	षडङ्गाश्वत्वारो वेदाः	IV
[Same as Manu, V. 78, with variations.]		सद्य..... (corrupt)	V
ब्रह्मविक्रयिके विष्टा	V	सर्वतस्तु परिग्राह्यं	VII
ब्राह्मणस्यापराधेषु	VII	[Repeated once.]	
भक्षणात् पतते(ति?)	VI	सर्वेषामेव पापानां	VI
भस्मनीव हुतं	V	सायं प्रातस्तु	VII
मृच्यते सर्वपापेभ्यः	IV	[Initial portion of two verses.]	
यत् कुर्वन्ति यदश्नन्ति	V	स्तेये च (illegible)	VII
यत्तु वाणिजके दत्तं	V	स्त्रीमुखे च सुरागन्धं	VII
[Same as Manu, III. 181, with variations.]		स्वकर्मकुलशुद्धानां	V

REWA STONE-SLAB INSCRIPTION OF
VIJAYASIMHA KALACURI

(dated K. E. 96x — A. D. 1208 to 1212)

BY

S. K. DIKSHIT

When first noticed in 1936, this inscription was found by Dr. N. P. Chakravarti "deposited in the guard-hall of the old palace of Rewa".¹ The record is inscribed in 19 lines, most of which are found broken off at the end, since the left side (proper) of the stone appears to have been destroyed by some accident: Thus, one is often required to restore conjecturally one or more letters at the end of each of these lines, with the aid of other inscriptions of this period.

The *language* of the record is Sanskrit, and the *characters*, Devanāgarī. From the beginning to the end, it runs in prose, and probably without many *punctuation* marks, possibly because most of it consisted of only one sentence. As to the *orthographical* peculiarities due mostly to the local pronunciation, it is common to find in the records of this period the change of *ś* into *s*, except in *Śrī*, which is, however, written mostly correctly. The present inscription is no exception to this rule. But special attention may be drawn to the word "Keśava", which is written as "Kasava" in this inscription as well as in the Lāl Pahār Rock Inscription of Narasimhadeva Kalacuri. This, therefore, can be taken to have been the local pronunciation of the word "Keśava" in those days. We find the word "Lakṣmaṇa" also written inaccurately as "Lakhaṇa",² which, indeed, is the pronunciation or the form of that word in the Braja-bhāṣā, the Bundelkhāṇḍī and the Baghelkhāṇḍī, even today.

¹ Mirashi, Vol. I, p. 365.

² This is often written as "Lashaṇa," though pronounced as "Lakhaṇa".

The record belongs to king Vijayasimha of Tripuri—evidently of the Kalacuri dynasty—mentioned as “meditating upon the feet of Vāmadeva” (Vāmadevapādānudhyāta”)¹. The latter expression occurs also in the records of other dynasties, though it is mainly used in the case of Karna, Yaśaḥkarna, Narasimha and Jayasimha of the Kalacuri dynasty, before king Vijayasimha used it. It is also found, peculiarly enough in the Dhureti Copper-plate Inscription of Trailokyamalladeva Candella in the case of that king,—and obviously, this was in imitation of the practice of the Kalacuris, although it was never followed previously by any of his predecessors. Nay, such an imitation is to be found also in the case of the feudatory Kumārapāla of Karkaredi.² But by no means was any of these an instance of blind copying. At any rate, when it is done twice and in the case of entirely unconnected persons, the probability of doing it “blindly” becomes attenuated. Mm. V. V. Mirashi, who suggests it, has, however, interpreted this phrase as alluding to a remote ancestor of the Kalacuris: If so, this was quite a strange practice, not paralleled anywhere else indeed, in the ancient records. And on the basis of these titles, he has claimed for that very early hypothetical ancestor quite an important place in ancient Indian history.³ Curiously enough, even according to this savant, that king is not known to have left any contemporary records, to support these claims made on his behalf. The truth is, that it was a common practice for a ruling king to meditate on the

¹ For the meaning of this phrase, see “Dhureti Copper-plate Inscription of Trailokyamalla-deva Candella (dated K. E 963)” which is being republished by us elsewhere.

The attempt on the part of Mm. V. V. Mirashi to read the letters “Vāgharājadeva” as “Vāmarājadeva,” in the Saugor Stone Inscription of Śaṅkara-gaṇa Kalacuri, is, we feel, not quite justifiable; for the letter “ma” in that record clearly differs from the “gha” found here (Mirashi, Vol. I, p. 175; also Intro., p. lxviii.) We are, therefore, inclined to endorse the reading of Rai Bahadur Hiralal, who was the first to point out that “Vāgharājadeva” was an early member of this dynasty. His correct name should be “Vyāghrarāja-deva” in Sanskrit.

² Ind. Ant., XVII, p. 203f.

³ Mirashi Vol. I, pp. lxvii-lxix and their footnotes. Also see Mm. Mirashi's article “Vāmadeva: An Early Kalacuri King”. (Volume of Eastern and Indian Studies” presented to Dr. F. W. Thomas, p. 152f.).

feet of his father, and this father used to meditate his own, and so on and so forth, when more than one meditations are mentioned. Such meditation may thus be mentioned for generations, but never with the omission of generations. It should, moreover, be remembered that in none of these records, where "Vāmadeva" is mentioned, do we find the father of the ruling king mentioned. Further, the titles "Paramabhaṭṭāraka-Mahārājādhirāja-Parameśvara", found used in the case of most of these "Vāmadevas" of the Kalacuri dynasty, are the actual titles used by their respective fathers, when they were themselves ruling; and it is similar titles that are found used in the records of other dynasties—where these titles are used in the case of the meditated predecessor, even as he himself used them in his life-time. It was, perhaps, not felt quite appropriate in this locality to mention the name of the father, out of respect towards him or following the injunction in a famous couplet.¹

As to the date of this record, we can only quote the observations of Mm. V. V. Mirashi:— "The inscription bears in line 17 a date in three digits, the first two of which are probably 9 and 6. The third digit is completely effaced. But as the Dhureti inscription of Trailokyamalla shows that the Candellas occupied the territory round Rewa in K. 963, the third digit of the date must have been 0, 1, or 2. The date must evidently be referred to the Kalacuri era. The corresponding Christian date will, therefore, range from 1208-9 to 1210-11 A. C."²

King Vijayasimha himself assumes here the same sovereign titles—after his father, according to our interpretation—and some others, which are also found in his Rewa Copper-plate Inscription, dated Vikrama Samvat 1253 (= A. D. 1195).³ These titles lay claims to his overlordship of "Trikaṇṇa", a country which is distinguished from the country of Kalinga proper, and is juxtaposed with Veṅgi in some passages, as is already shown by some scholars.⁴

¹ Cf. "आत्मनाम गुरोर्नाम नामानि कृपणस्य च । श्रेयस्कामो न गृहीयाज्ज्येष्ठपत्य-
कलत्रयोः ॥"

² Mirashi, Vol. I, p. 366. It is just possible that the third digit here could even be 3: but this is not probable.

³ Mirashi, Vol. I, p. 361.

⁴ Mirashi, Vol. I, Intro, p. c. fn. 6.

Further, we come across a somewhat enigmatic title, "Nija-bhujopārjīṭ-āśvapati-gajapati-narapati-rāja(jya)-trayādhīpati", which lays claim to his having himself conquered the three kingdoms of Āśvapati, Gajapati and Narapati.¹ Evidently this title was borrowed by him from his predecessor, as shown below. We know that the imperial Gurjara-Pratihāras of Kanauj called themselves *Hayapatis*, which is the same as *Āśvapatis*. The Arab chronicles, dealing with the Muslim conquest of Sind and the Punjab, often speak of the excellent cavalry of the Jurz or Gurjara-Pratihāra king of northern India. A Khajuraha inscription (in Lakṣmaṇa or Vaikunṭha Temple) refers to the large

¹ Mm. Mirashi is inclined to read this after correction as "nija ... rāja-trayādhīpatya," which would refer to the three kings, and not the three kingdoms as here. If we take in account the question as to what the holder of this title is supposed to have actually obtained (upārjita) by the strength of his own arms, then we may probably have to answer this question with reference to "ādhīpatya" and not "rājya-traya." In this sense, the interpretation put on the phrase, and the correction thereof given, by Mm. Mirashi, are unassailable. None the less, it is not very difficult to imagine that this mistake would have not been so consistently copied and recopied, just blindly, if there had not been a really more fundamental reason. One of the most important mistakes of the Indian epigraphists has been, indeed, to ignore the significance of what are loosely termed as the "orthographical mistakes." In reality, many of these which are found consistently even in very learned inscriptional poems, etc., are due to the then current pronunciation of that locality. We feel that here, too, this phenomenon was not inconsequentially responsible for this consistent mistake. To explain, all these copyists of the inscriptions, in which this mistake is found, had copied the mistake, only since they understood it in a more simple manner, by making the ruler the "lord" (adhīpati) of the three kingdoms that were acquired by the ruler. In this, they were aided by the current pronunciation of those days, by which the latter "Jya" could very likely be missed for the Sanskrit "Ja" in this region near Marathi area, where another "Ja" (pronounced like "Tz") was probably already in vogue; and from this Sanskrit "Ja," these people could not distinguish the Sanskrit "Jya." Hence, instead of "Rājya-trayādhīpati," they wrote "Rāja-trayādhīpati." Thus, we feel, Prof. Kielhorn's emendation is more acceptable in this connection, than Prin. Mirashi's. It must, perhaps be pointed out here that some later inscriptions, including the Bhadavaṇa Grant of Govindachandra of Kanauj, found at Kamauli, appear to split up the compound *Gajapati-Narapati-rājya-trayādhīpati*, perhaps being aware of the grammatical error in the earlier grant. It, of course, belongs to the North. (E, I. XIX, p. 293).

cavalry of a Gurjara-Pratihāra king, whose descendant is mentioned as *Hayapati*.¹ We know that the Orissa Copper-plate Inscription of Puruṣottamadeva characterises that ruler as "Gajapati"² and "Gauḍeśvara", and that the Kharod Stone Inscription of Ratnadeva (dated K. E. 933) calls the king of Kalinga-deśa a *Gajādhīśa*.³ Victory over a *Gajapati* is also claimed in Kṛṣṇadevarāya's Śrīraṅgam Copper-plate Inscription of S. E. 1436, for his father Narasa.⁴ Prin. Mm. V. V. Mirashi draws our attention to the fact that the king of the populous East (Prācyah) had received, according to the Hsüan Ch'uang, the title of the "Lord of men".⁵

The title of having become the lord of these three kingdoms appears to have been used by numerous rulers, including those of the Kalacuri dynasty of Tripuri, the Gāhaḍavāla dynasty of Kanauj, and even one Candella ruler. Among the Kalacuris, Karṇa (Lakṣmi-karṇa) appears to have been the first to assume this title: He did it first, for whatever reason, a little earlier than K. E. 810 (A. D. 1058), when the Sarnath Stone-slab Inscription was issued; and it appears to have been continued by his successors Yaśaḥkarṇa, Gayakarṇa, Narasimha, Jayasimha, and Vijayasimha. With his conquest of portions of the empire of the Gurjara-Pratihāras and the kings of Vaṅga and Kalinga, as evidenced by inscriptional references, Karṇa Kalacuri could, perhaps, legitimately claim this title. Karṇa had extended his dominions to, and issued some grants from, the Banaras-Sarnath region: And, no doubt, the Gāhaḍavāla rulers like Candradeva and Govindacandra, who called themselves "Lord of Kānyakubja (Kanauj)", etc., but who issued most of their charters from Candrāvati, Vārāṇasī (Banaras), and other places in Banaras district, copied some portions of the grants of their predecessor in

¹ Cf. Khajuraha Vaikuṇṭha (or Lakṣmaṇa) Temple Inscription:—

"... साहिस्त्रस्मादवाप पृथुतुरगबलेनानु हेरम्बपाल ।

तत्सूतोर्देवपालात्तमथ हयपतेः प्राप्य निन्ये प्रतिष्ठा ... ॥"

² Int. Ant., I, p. 354:— "वीरश्रीगजपतिगण्डेश्वरं-नवकोटि-कर्नाटक-लवंगेश्वर-श्री-पुरुषोत्तमदेवमहाराजाङ्कुर ।"

³ Mirashi, II, p. 537.

⁴ E. I., XVIII, p. 161.

⁵ Mirashi, Vol. I, Intro., p. ci.

14 [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

that region (viz., Karna). Thus we find a whole verse originally composed in praise of the Kalacuri kings, taken over and slightly altered, with the substitution of "Candra" for "Karna", in the Candrāvati Copper-plate Inscription of the Gāhaḍavāla ruler Candradeva.¹ It is not for nothing that in the Basahi Copper-plate Inscription of Govindacandradeva dated V. S. 1161 (- A. D. 1104), king Candradeva is said to have been chosen by the earth as her husband after the demise of Bhoja and Karna. The assumption of the title of the overlord of Aśvapati, Gajapati and Narapati was only a logical sequel to such imitation, and need not be actually taken literally; and similar was the case, one may confidently assert, also with the descendants of Karna, who, too, merely imitate the "Indian Napoleon" in assuming the grandiloquent titles, without probably validating that claim by conquest of arms: In most cases this title begins with "Nija-bhuj-opārjita", which, thus, becomes in the real sense meaningless in the case of all these imitators. This is so, not only in the case of Yaśaḥkarna, Gayakarna, Narasiṃha, and Jayasiṃha, but also in that of Vijaya-siṃha of the present record.

A careful comparison of the readings of many of the names and titles, given by us below, and those given by Mm. V. V. Mirashi will show that they differ in many cases. This is mainly due to the fact that the learned author reads mainly from the estampages, supplied to him by the Department of Archaeology, and not from the stone itself. Thus, the name of the "Mahā-Pratihāra" as read by us from the record on the stone proper, is "Bhīma-siṃha", which is, indeed, fairly clear there (Line 9th). The reading of this portion, therefore, as given by Mm. V. V. Mirashi, cannot be accepted; and this has a somewhat serious bearing on certain problems, that would otherwise arise in respect of the relative positions of Haripāla and Malayasiṃha, as found in this record and in the Dhureti Copper-plate Inscription. Malayasiṃha had at the time of this record the designation of only a "Mahā-Māṇḍalika", whereas in the other record, he enjoys a much higher designation and importance.

¹ Ibid., p. ci, fn. 11.

Further, the name of the Mahā-Pradhāna has no less than five syllables ending in "Simha", as far as can be made out from the letters still visible on the stone (Line 7th). Mm. Mirashi has here conjecturally restored, on the analogy of the Kumbhi Copper-plate record of Vijayasimha (dated K. E. 932) only two syllables "Kiki", without taking into account the fact that the Kumbhi plates are removed from the present one by about thirty years or so.¹ The letters following "artha-lekhi"—which apparently signifies the "Samāhartā" of the Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra—may possibly have included "Thakkura", as conjectured by Prin. V. V. Mirashi, since the Kumbhi Copper-plate Inscription, which offers a fairly close parallel to the present record, in some respects does. The Arthalekhi was apparently an officer of high rank, and is mentioned not only in this, but also in the Jabalpur Copper-plate Inscription of Jayasimha (dated K. E. 918) and the Kumbhi record, before the (Mahā-)Sāndhivigrahika and the (Mahā-)Pratihāra. The names of these two officials are given here as 'Kasava' and 'Lakhana', which, as shown above, are apparently local forms of Keśava and Lakṣmaṇa, respectively.

The next important official mentioned in the record is the "Mahā-Māṇḍalika". On a comparison with the earlier Kalacuri records, like the Goharwa Copper-plates of Karna (dated in the 7th regnal years), the Khairhā Copper-plates of Yaśaḥ-karna (dated in K. E. 823), and the Jabalpur Copper-plates Inscription of Jayasimha (dated 918),² it would appear that the word Mahā-Māṇḍalika", found in the present record and in the Dhureti Copper-plate Inscription of Trailokyamalladeva Candella (dated K. E. 963), replaces the word Mahā-Sāmanta" of the earlier inscriptions. The next officer, whose designation is discernible in the record, is probably a (Koṭṭa-)pāla, as Prin. Mirashi has probably correctly guessed. The record then purports to give his name as "Rāṇaka", which is somewhat strange, if, indeed, the author of it has not forgotten to give it immediately after that word. During this period, we find the words "Rāṇaka"

¹ Mirashi, Vol. II p. 645.

² Ibid., Vol. I, p. 252, 289, 299f.

and "Mahā-Rāṇaka" being used to signify Kṣatriya dignitaries; and there can be little doubt that these words are to be derived from "Rājanyaka" of more ancient literature.¹

The present inscription mentions, in addition, one Vimalaśiva, as being a Rājaguru (Royal Preceptor) at this time. Evidently, he is to be identified with Vimalaśiva II of the Mattamayūra-vaṁśa of Gorgi (Golaki-maṭha), who was a contemporary and Rājaguru of king Jayasimha of the Kalacuri dynasty of Tripurī and king Trilokya-malla-deva Candella: Thus he lived through three regimes, and was recognized as a royal preceptor by each successive king, in whose dominions Gorgi fell in successive periods. From other records we know that he mastered the Vedas, performed *yātrās* (or pilgrimage) to Prabhāsa (near Somanātha-paṭṭana) in the extreme West, Gokarṇa (= Gokarṇa-Mahābalīśvara) in the extreme South, Gayā and other places, and erected maṭhas, satras, etc., for the convenience of the *Yātrikas* (pilgrims) like himself, and also temples like Kīrtiśvara, in memory of his preceptor (guru) named Kīrtiśiva.²

In the end we come to the names of the taxes, from which the land, granted to the donee, was exempted; and last of all we have the pious wish that this grant should last as long as do the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth. We find the last totally missed by Mm. Mirashi because of the faulty or imperfect estampage.

¹ Possibly in the Meghadūta, the word occurs in the sense of a "Kṣatriya dignitary" rather than an ordinary "Kṣatriya" in the following verse:—

"राजन्यानां सितशरशतैर्यत्र गाण्डीवधन्वा धारासरैस्त्वमिव कमलान्यभ्यवर्षन्मुखानि ॥"

² Mirashi, Vol. I, Intro., p. clviii.

REWA STONE-SLAB INSCRIPTION OF

VIJAYASIMHA KALACURI

(DATED K. E. 96x = A. D. 1208-1212)

- १ सिद्धिः[।*] स्वस्ति[।*] श्रीमात्रि(त्वि)पुरीतः परमभट्टारकम[हाराजा*]-
- २ धिराजपरमे[स्व] (श्व)र-श्रीवामदेव-पादानुध्या[तपरम*]-
- ३ भट्टारक-महाराजाधिराज[प] र[मेस्व] (श्व) र [परममाहेस्व*] (श्व-)
- ४ र-त्रिकलिंगाधिपतिनिजभु[जोपार्जितास्व(श्व)पतिगज*]-
- ५ पति-नरपति-राज(ज्य) त्रयाधिपतिश्रीमाद्वि[जयसिंह*]-
- ६ देव-चरणा[।*] अयेह श्रीम[न्महाराज्ञी] श्रीमहा[कुमार-श्रीम*]
- ७ हा-प्रधान-ठ[कु*]र[कमल*]सिंह-अर्थलेखि-[ठक्कुर*]
- ८ क(के)स (श)व-सांधिविग्रहिक(।) श्रीलख(क्षम)ण[महाप्रती-]
- ९ हार-श्रीभीमसिंह[- - - श्रीमहा-]
- १० मं(मां)डलीक श्रीमलयसी(सिंह)[महा- - -]
- ११ - - - - - [? कोट्ट*]
- १२ पाल-राणक-श्रीमद्राजगुरु-श्रीविमल[सि(शि)व*]
- १३ - - रेवा-पत्तलायां धोट्टवाट्ट - -
- १४ - - - - जक स - - कृषि-साध्रम-
- १५ धूक-[स*]गोप्र[चार*] तृणोद्धिदादि-सक[ल*]
- १६ भाग-काम[त*]-वाड-प्रवाणि-कर-सर्वा[दाय]-सह(हि)[तः]
- १७ -सिन त[च]प्रदत्ते(त्त इ)ति ॥ संव[त](त्)९६x
- १८ जा(या)वत[त्] चंद्रार्क(र्क)-म[हि](ही)- - -

BUDDHISM — RECAST (A Philosophical analysis)

BY

H. VEDANTASASTRI

Born in the Sixth Century B. C., Lord Buddha promulgated a new faith, which, for a long period, exercised tremendous influence in several matters, social, political, religious and philosophical, not only in India but in the whole of the continent of Asia. The Buddha refused to accept the Vedas as *infallible*; on the contrary, he drew his inspiration mainly from the philosophy of Kapila, the ancient Sāṃkhya system, which went a long way off from India and attracted the philosophical thinkers of Greece.

In course of time, the philosophical doctrine of Buddhism underwent four stages of development ; and the advocates for the stages became known as Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācārin alias Vijñānavādin and Mādhyamika alias Śūnyavādin respectively.

The Yogācārins held that the only truth is *Vijñāna* ; it is the *Paramārtha* ; it is also known as Alaya-Vijñāna ; whereas another kind of *Vijñāna* is called *Samvṛti-Vijñāna*, which is also called Citta and of which the source is the aforesaid Alaya-Vijñāna. The objective world is *Citta-dṛśya* that is what is seen of Mind itself in many places. The Yogavāsistha Rāmāyaṇa, the probable date of the composition of which is, according to Dr. B. L. ATREYA, the Sixth Century A. D., couches up the idea in the following way :—

“ चित्तं कारणमर्थानां तस्मिन् सति जगत्त्रयम् ।

तस्मिन् क्षणे जगत् क्षीणं तत् चिकित्स्यं प्रयत्नतः ॥ ”

The doctrine of the *Mādhyamikas Sect* is known as Śūnyavāda alias Asatkhyātivāda, in as much, they hold that the objective world is nothing but emptiness. Persons and things are characterized with six forms of emptiness, such as Lakṣaṇa-Śūnyatā, Bhāva-Svabhāva-Śūnyatā, Apracarita-Śūnyatā, Prakrarita-Śūnyatā, Nirabhilāpya-Śūnyatā and Itaretara-Śūnyatā, whereas Alaya-Vijñāna is the Great emptiness, Mahā-Śūnyatā or Paramārtha-Aryya-Jñāna-Mahāśūnyatā and it is thus the ultimate reality ; as it is this, which appears as the world—which is by all means

unreal. As regards the un-reality of the *material* world, the Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha affirms the following:—

“ न किञ्चिदपि दृश्येऽस्मिन् सत्यं तेन हतात्मना ।
चित्रं दग्धशरीरेण जनता विप्रलम्ब्यते । ”

And as regards the un-reality of the Ego, it says the following:—

“ प्रमार्जितेहमित्यस्मिन् पदे स्वयमपि द्रुतम् ।
प्रमार्जिता भवन्त्येते सर्व एव दुराधयः ॥ ”

As regards Śūnya, being the ultimate reality, it *avere* as such:—

“ अशून्यमिव यच्छून्यम् यस्मिन् शून्ये जगत् स्थितं ।
सगौघेसति यच्छून्यम् तद्रूपम् परमात्मनः ॥ ”

Notice here, how the Doctrine of the two sections, namely Yogacārin and the Mādhyamikas of the *Mahāyāna* Sect has been taken *Verbatim* in the Yogavāsiṣṭha; but still there is noticeable an attempt at compromise, as it is evident from the last sentence namely “ तद्रूपं परमात्मनः ”. The Bhagavadgītā, which is, to quote Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, a *canonical* work of the Ekānti Vaiṣṇavas, declares (ch. 15 śloka 17) this Paramātmā as the *uttama* Puruṣa, higher than the un-conscious and the conscious and it is the sustainer of the world, the Lord; and Yogavāsiṣṭha calls Śūnya as the true nature of this Paramātmā, a fact, which clearly brings home the idea that herein is to be found an attempt at compromise between the Negative philosophy of Buddhism and the Positive philosophy of the orthodox. Again, the Bhāgavata, which is just like the Gītā a work-nay the most authoritative work of the Ekānti Vaiṣṇavas, declares that Non-dualistic knowledge is the ultimate reality; and it is which is called by three names, Brahma, Paramātmā and Bhagavan (1.2.11). Thus according to Bhāgavata, these three are interchangeable terms. The “*Sarva-Vedānta-siddhānta-Sarva-Saṁgraha*”, a work, the authorship of which is ascribed to Śaṅkarācāryya declares that “यत् शून्यवादिनां शून्यं, ब्रह्म ब्रह्मविदां च यत्”, i. e. “what the *Śūnya-vādins* called Brahma, we, (the *Māyā-vādins*, the followers of the School of Śaṅkara, call Brabma)”. Here is noticed a very clear attempt at bringing about a compromise between the Śūnya of the Mādhyamikas and the Brahma, as understood by the school of Ācāryya Śaṅkara.

The Ācāryya was born in 788 A. D. in the Malayalam region and is accredited with a ceaseless campaign against the predominance of Buddhism, which he said was non-Vedic. Ultimately, his efforts succeeded in crying a halt to the advance of Buddhism. He was a disciple of Govinda Yogi from whose pen, no book has yet reached us. Govinda Yogi was a disciple of Ācāryya Gaudapāda, the author of *Māṇḍukya Kārikā* and perhaps also of a commentary on the Sāṅkhya Kārikā of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa who was, as it is affirmed by Padmapāda, a disciple of Śaṅkara born in Bengal. Evidently Gaudapāda flourished in the eighth century, when Buddhism was the prevailing faith in Bengal and, be it said here to the credit of the faith, it succeeded in rescuing the country from Matsyanyāya into which it was thrown after the death of the last ruler of the Candra dynasty, by supplying inspiration for the election of Gopāla, a Buddhist, as the King of Bengal. Gaudapāda was under the spell of Buddhism and faithfully adopted its philosophical tenets in his *Māṇḍukya Kārikā*, simply with a view to confer upon the same Vedic affiliation. Thus Gaudapāda has borrowed the terms Vijñāna and Citta and the principle underlying in the eight Vijñānas of the Buddhists has been strictly adhered to by him in the fourth Prakaraṇa, namely the *Alatasantiprakaṛaṇa* of his Kārikā; and the two forms of ego-less-ness (Nairātmya), that is, ego-less-ness of things as well as of persons has been stated by him in several Kārikās and discussed throughout the aforesaid Prakaraṇa. He has also accepted the Sūnyatā versus Aśūnyatā theory of Buddhism; and as he has done so, he has been supposed to have been himself a Buddhist by Dr. S. N. Das Gupta.

Ācāryya Śaṅkara did imbibe the spirit of Gaudapāda, his grand preceptor, and took upon himself the burden of leading the doctrine of Gaudapāda to its culmination.

All religious-cum-philosophical sects of India are guided by three Prasthānas the Śruti Prasthāna, i. e. the upaniṣads, or rather the eleven old and principal upaniṣads, the Nyāya-prasthāna, i. e. the Brahmasūtras, as well as the Smṛti-prasthāna, i. e. the Bhagavat Gītā. Gaudapāda couched up his views i. e. the Buddhistic tenets in a Kārikā, attached to the *Māṇḍukya upaniṣad*. No other Kārikā on any other upaniṣad was composed by him;

neither he has quoted any authority of the orthodox school; on the other hand he has referred to the Buddha by way of authority in several places of his work (vide *Kārikā*, 4, 19; 4, 88). Śāṅkara, in his part, transplanted the same in aforesaid three *prasthānas* and with a view to do so, he has *interpreted* the aforesaid works of the *Prasthānas* in the light, he has imbibed from his *Parama-guru*, as he has himself admitted it in his introduction to the *Brahmasūtras*; and it is interesting to note that he has quoted no other earlier authority to *buttress* his doctrine, save and except *Gauḍapāda* whom he refers to as "*Sampradāya-Vid*". Hence the *Sampradāya*, the chief aim of which was to incorporate the Buddhistic doctrine into the philosophy of the *upaniṣads* originated with *Gauḍapāda* and reached its culmination at the hands of his grand disciple, *Ācāryya Śāṅkara*. But the conception of *Māyā* as advocated by the *Ācāryya* does not stand in the good grace of the *Brahmasūtras*; indeed, therein the term has been used only once, and that, too, with reference to dream-creation, on the other hand, the conception of the *Māyā*, as found in the *Viveka-cūḍamāṇi* of the *Ācāryya*, tallies well with the conception of the same, as found in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* an authoritative work of the Buddhists; and the same may be said of the un-reality of the world as based on his doctrine of *Vivarta*. It is an exact echo of the theory as found in the *Bhramapāda* (Vide śloka 279 and 170). The *Brahmasūtras*, on the other hand, speak of no *Vivarta*, but *Parināma*, couched up in the *Sūtra* "अव्यक्तेः परिणामात्".

Thus the *monism* of Śāṅkara is but the Buddhistic doctrine, transplanted in the orthodox philosophy, said to be Vedic; and it is for this reason that *Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara*, a commentator on the *Brahma Sūtras*, himself posterior to Śāṅkara but *anterior* to *Rāmānuja* and all other principal commentators, has openly declared that the *Māyāvāda* of *Ācāryya Śāṅkara* is *identical* with the *Māyāvāda* of the *Mahājñāna* school of Buddhism. Suit has been followed by *Madhvācārya* in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, in the thirteenth century, by *Vijñāna*, *Bhikṣu* in his *Sāṃkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya* in the sixteenth century, by *Śrī Jīva Gosvāmi* of the same century in his *Paramātma Sandarbha* and by *Kṛṣṇadāsa Kavirāja* of the seventeenth century,

in his immortal work, *Caitanya-Caritāmṛta*. Some of them have not failed to accuse Śaṅkara, on the authority of *Padma-purāṇa* as *Prachana Bauddha*, i. e., a Buddhist in the guise of follower of the Vedas; and recently Dr. Asutosh Sastri has declared in his *Advaita-Vāda-Vedāntadarśana*, that there is no material difference between Buddhism and Śaṅkara-cult.

Dr. Tarachand has tried to show in his "The influence of Islam Indian Culture", that the monism of Śaṅkara has come from Islam; but the above discussion of ours has completely disproved it.

Now, a question arises; it is this!—"Was Gauḍapāda the first man to attempt at incorporating Buddhism in the orthodox philosophy? We have seen that the *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* is a work of this school and if the assertion of Dr. Atreya be correct, namely that it was composed in the sixth century A. D.; then, we are to say, at least, in the present state of our knowledge, that it was the compiler of this work, who took the field for the first time. But one thing, this work has got some *Paurāṇika* touch, the listener being *Rāma-candra* and the speaker, *Vālmiki*. The composition of this work is more or less on the *Paurāṇika* method, stories, being incorporated therein. Hence, though Gauḍa was not the first one to take the field, yet he was certainly the first one to attempt at incorporation of Buddhism in the very body of the doctrine of the *upaniṣads*.

And there was perhaps some justification behind this attempt, since Kumārila, who was an elder (senior) contemporary of Śaṅkara has affirmed (vide his *Vārtika* or the *Śabarabhāṣya* on *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* 1. 3. 1.) that the doctrines like *Vijñāna-vāda* owe their origin to the *upaniṣads*. Their chief business was to dissuade the people from their too much fondness for the world. Recently, Mr. Ram Swaroop has also written in support of this. Thus he writes:—

"The Buddha, his spiritual experiences, and teachings formed part of a Hindu tradition. He belonged to the *upaniṣadic* heritage. He cannot be understood in any other sense. The attempt to understand him in isolation divorced from that tradition which he confirmed, enriched and represented, has only led up to misunderstanding and distortion of his teaching".

(*Organism*, July 28, 1958)

MISCELLANEA

CARRYING OF MESSAGES IN ANCIENT INDIA

By

S. V. SOHONI

In examining the Cloud Messenger, an elementary point may be considered first viz. the material on which the message was ordinarily recorded during Gupta period, before analysing the contents of the message itself or the route which was advised.

In ancient India, paper was not in common use. White cotton cloth was usually used for writing by administrators or commercial circles; and there is evidence to suggest that when an important message or communication had to be transmitted over long distances, it was written on a piece of cloth, duly sealed and made over to messengers who put it inside their blue turbans to ensure utmost safety. In fact, a piece of white hand woven cloth was found inside a Nalanda seal. Over 500 years after its invention in China, I-tsing had to send for paper from China 671 A. D. for copying Sanskrit mss. in India.

This long distance transmission of a message generally meant that a piece of white cloth on which letters were written in black ink was rolled inside a blue turban which was securely tied over his head by the messenger. This turban was usually made of deep indigo blue cloth.

There are two descriptions of such a messenger given by that minute observer of contemporary life, Bāṇabhaṭṭa, in his biography of Harṣa --

(i) When Mekhalaka brought a message from Kṛṣṇa, a cousin of Harṣa, according to Bāṇabhaṭṭa, the message was tied inside the blue *cirika* cloth whose two ends were kept loose after the last knot.¹

(ii) When Kuraṅgaka brought a message to Harṣa convey-

¹ "कार्दमिकचेलचिरिका नियमितोच्चण्डचण्डातकम् पृष्ठप्रेङ्खलचक्रकर्षटघटितगलित-
ग्रन्थिम्, अतिनिबिडसूत्रबन्धनिम्नितान्तरालरुतव्यवच्छेदया लेखमालिकया परिकलित-
मूर्धानम्"- H. C. II

ing news of his father's illness, the very type of the blue *cirika* cloth was referred to by Bāṇabhaṭṭa.¹

Kālidāsa had in mind this practice when he observed—

“ जीमूतेन स्वकुशलमयीं हारयिष्यन्प्रवृत्तिम् ” ।

— M. I. 4

Mallinātha pertinently remarked that “Jimūta” also meant a piece of a “cloth of water”, जीवनस्य मूतः पटवन्धः । ‘Pravṛtti’ was equivalent to news.

Thus it was clearly intended to show that this Yakṣa wanted to use as his agency for carrying his message to distant Alakā, a cloud, blue in appearance, (as several times described subsequently) and not differing in shape from a blue turban with two ends of its cloth floating in air. That is why eagerness or *autsukya* of Yakṣa to send his message was emphasised. Kālidāsa also added that a person compelled by passion was unable to distinguish between animate and inanimate objects. A message could be carried only by a messenger, who can retain it in his memory or at least follow the route without being misled.

A reference was again made to this blue cloth, in a remarkably pretty stanza which also refers to surprise overtaking a cultivator were he to find on his shoulder, instead of his plough share, such a piece of blue cloth. That is how the distinguishing feature of one profession would lead to a sense of puzzle or wonder in a member of another profession, if detected as having settled upon him, without his knowledge.

This stanza is as follows —

“ उत्पश्यामि त्वयि तटगते स्निग्धभिन्नाञ्जनाभे
सद्यः कृतद्विदशनच्छेदगौरस्य तस्य ।
शोभामद्रेः स्तिमितनयनप्रेक्षणीयां भवित्री-
मंसन्यस्ते सति हलभृतो मेचके वाससीव ॥ ”

— MI. 59

It was translated by Arthur Ryder as follows—

Like powder black and soft I seem to see
Thine outline on the mountain slope as bright
As new-sawn tusks of stainless ivory ;

¹ “ दूरादेव लेखगर्भया नीलीगामेचकरुचा चीरचीरिकया रचितमुण्डमालकम् — ”

No eye could wink before as fair a sight
As dark-blue robes upon the Ploughman's
shoulder white.

But this element of humour needs to be brought out more clearly —

(i) Taking plough bearer to be Balarāma, Kālidāsa had in view Balarāma's well known tendency to booze which made his eyes roll from time to time.

Varāha Mihira has laid down how to make an image of Balarāma —

“ बलदेवो हलपाणिर्मदविभ्रमलोचनश्च कर्तव्यः ।

विभ्रत् कुण्डलमेकं शिखेन्दुघृणालगौरतनुः ॥ ”

— B. S. Chapter 58 śloka 36.

Thus Balarāma was of extremely fair looking in complexion, carrying a plough share in his hand ; and had eyes which kept on rolling due to his imbibing liquor.

(ii) The Snow Mountain was also white ; and when the dark blue cloud approached its slope, it could be compared to the appearance of a fair complexioned Balarāma, with his dark eyes filled with collyrium-provided, those eyes could remain steady for time. This steadiness was derived from his finding that instead of his familiar plough share, there was a light piece of blue cloth.

(iii) It was this sight which was worth being gazed at.

Thus three attractive situations have been indicated : first, a dark blue cloud touching a wholly white Snow Mountain, a little below its top ; second ; Balarāma staring at his shoulder ; and third, a spectator gazing at this rare view with wonder. Kālidāsa loved turning out such parallel phenomena.

His description of Kailāsa as mountain which looked like freshly cut tusk of an elephant, is confirmed by actual observation and was, obviously, based on reliable accounts from travellers. In almost similar terms, a great mountaineer, Mallory, described his first view of Everest in our century : “ It was a prodigious white fang excrescent from the jaw of the world ”

Cutting of elephant tusks every year was a regular activity of royal stables in India ; and Varāha Mihira has given elaborate hints about it.

UDBHATA AND THE RASAVĀDA

BY

LALA RAMAYADUPALA SIMHA

Udbhata was a contemporary of Vāmana. He was the President of the *Sabhā* of King Jayāpīḍa of Kashmir (A. D. 779-813) and used to get one lac *dināras* daily, as his remuneration.¹ Vāmana, according to Kalhaṇa was a minister of the same King. Udbhata's *Kāvyaḷaṃkārasaṃgraha* is the only work published. Pratiharendurāja, the first commentator on this work, refers to his another work the *Bhāmahavivaraṇa*² a manuscript of which was known to Dr. J. Nobel.³ Its citations are, however, scattered in various *Alaṃkāra* works.⁴ A third work is also attributed to the same pen. The commentary of Abhinavagupta on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*,⁵ the *Vakroktiḥivita*⁶ and the *Samgītaratnākara*⁷ clearly refer to a commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* by Udbhata. The reference in the *Samgītaratnākara* is very conclusive:

व्याख्यातारो भारतीये लालटोद्भटशङ्कुकाः ।⁸

He, therefore, was not only in the know of the view of Bhāmaha as regards Rasa but also that of Bharata, the Rasavādin. To Bhāmaha, the Rasa was the element which enlivens the poetry⁹

¹ विद्वान् दीनारलक्षेण प्रत्यहं कृतवेतनः ।

भट्टोद्भट्टस्तस्य भूमिभर्तुः सभापतिः ॥ Kalhaṇa's *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* (IV. 495).

² विशेषोक्तिरक्षणे च मामहविवरणे भट्टोद्भट्टेनैकदेशशब्द एवं व्याख्यातो यथेहास्माभिर्निरूपितः । KASLV. (p. 15).

³ Foundations of Indian Poetry. (p. 21).

⁴ *LOCANA* pp. 32 and 120 ; KAV. pp. 132 & 20 ; KASS. p. 89.

⁵ AB. Vol. II. pp. 70, 441 and 451.

⁶ VJ. Chapter III. (Baroda MS. p. 126 as referred to by K. S. R. Sastri in BP).

⁷ & ⁸ S. R., 1-19.

⁹ KA., Pari. V. 3 p. 32.

and to Bharata it was the element in the absence of which others become useless.¹ So his views regarding the Rasa had to be quite in conformity with theirs.

We are not surprised, therefore, to find the following statement in his *Kāvya-lamkārasaṅgraha* which gives ample weight to our hypothesis :

रसायधिष्ठितं काव्यं जीवद्रूपतया यतः ।

कथ्यते तद्रसादीनां काव्यात्मत्वं व्यवस्थितम् ॥ २

(As the *kāvya*, which embodies *Rasādi*, is taken to be a living form, the *Rasa* is, therefore, called the soul of poetry).

"But", according to MM. Dr. P. V. Kane, "several circumstances militate against this view".

1 "The verse in question is introduced by *Pratīharendurāja* with the words '*tadāhuḥ*' (p. 77) and therefore it is merely a quotation from some other writer that preceded *Pratīharendurāja*.

2 'Besides that verse would break the usual order followed by *Udbhaṭa*. That verse occurs in the comment on *Kāvya-līṅga*. After defining *Kāvya-līṅga* we, naturally, expect an illustration of it which is the verse '*Chāyeyan tava śeṣāṅgakānteḥ kiṁcidanuḥjvalā. Vibhūṣūghaṭanādeśandarśayanti dunoti mām*', while if Col Jacob be followed, the verse '*Rasādyadhiṣṭhitam kāvyam*' would be abruptly thrust between the definition of *Kāvya-līṅga* and its example".

3 "Moreover the view that *Udbhaṭa* approved of *Rasa* as the soul of poetry would be opposed to his own definition of *Rasavad* and the opinion of the *Alamkārasarvasva* (p. 5) '*Udbhaṭādibhistu guṇālamkāraṇām prāyaśaḥ sām्यameva sūcitam tadevamalamkāra eva kāvye pradhānamiti prācyānām matam*'".²

No one can doubt the fact that this *kārikā* does not form part of the actual text of the "*Alamkārasūtra-saṅgraha*" as is evident from the text published in the *Gaekavad Oriental Series* (No. LV) with the *Vivṛti* of *Rājānaka Tilaka*. All that I am concerned with is whether this is a statement of *Udbhaṭa*, or not.

¹ न हि रसादहे कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते । — NS. VI. p. 92.

² KASLV. p. 90.

³ Introduction to the *Sāhityadarpaṇa* pp. XLIV and XLV ; HSP. pp. 128-9.

But, in fact, no argument advanced by the Mahāmahopādhyāya is convincing and unfallacious Col. Jacob has printed the text of Udbhata's Alamkārasāra-saṁgraha, the manuscript of which he found in the Bühler's collection. It is the text alone, without the commentary of Pratihārendurāja.¹ Therefore, the question of authenticity on the grounds of 'tadāhuḥ' found in the commentary does not arise. The arguments will, however, be met on the basis of the very Nirṇaya-āgāra Edition containing the Laghuvṛtti of Pratihārendurāja.

1 The subject of 'āhuḥ' in the sentence in question may be any respectable authority preceding Pratihārendurāja. There is nothing to militate against the inclusion of 'Udbhatabhaṭṭaḥ'. Moreover, the respect suggested by the number of the verb makes it all the more certain that the authority referred to must be Udbhata himself; for a commentator holds his own author in the highest esteem. There are ample instances of Udbhata's *ikārikās* introduced and referred to by Pratihārendurāja with "tadāha", "tadāhuḥ" and "taduktam".

(i) तदाह :-

“ दर्शितेन निमित्तेन निमित्तादर्शनेन च ।

तस्या बन्धो द्विधा लक्ष्ये दृश्यते ललितात्मकः ॥ ”²

(ii) तदाहुः :-

“ इवादेरप्रतीतापि शब्दसंस्कारतः क्वचित् ।

उपमा लक्ष्यतेऽन्यत्र केवलार्थनिबन्धना ॥ ”³

(iii) तदुक्तम् :-

तथोपमानादाचारे क्यच्प्रत्ययबलोक्तिः । ”⁴

(iv) तदुक्तम् :-

“ उपमाने कर्माणि वा कर्तरि वा यो णमुलकषादिगत-

स्तदाच्यासा ” इति ।⁵

(v) तदुक्तम् :-

कल्पप्रभृतिभिरन्यैश्च तद्धितैः सा निबध्यते कविभिः । ”⁶

(vi) तदाहुः :-

“कर्तुराचारे क्यङा सा” इति, “तथे”ति, “उपमानादाचार” इति ।⁷

¹ JRAS. 1897 p. 829.

² KASLV. p. 68.

³ KASLV. p. 32.

⁴ KASLV. p. 26.

⁵ KASLV. p. 28.

⁶ KASLV. p. 29.

⁷ KASLV. p. 27.

Out of these, first two *kārikās* have been illustrated by the author himself and others happen to be portions of the *kārikās* composed to bring home the conception and forms of *upamā*, they do form part of Udbhaṭa's work. Thus the introductory remarks "*tadāhuḥ*" found in the commentary of Pratibārendurāja before the *kārikā* in question can neither prove nor disprove its authorship.

2 It does not break the usual order followed by Udbhaṭa. In fact there is no such 'usual order' as conceived of by the Mahāmahopādhyāya. He does not usually define the figure of speech in one *kārikā* and then illustrate it. Not less than twelve alamkāras, out of the forty alamkāras defined and illustrated in this work, have been defined and explained in more than one *kārikās*. They are *anuprāsa*,¹ *rūpaka*,² *upamā*,³ *prativastūpamā*,⁴ *ākṣepa*,⁵ *atiśayokti*,⁶ *utprekṣā*,⁷ *rasavat*,⁸ *śliṣṭa*,⁹ *viśeṣokti*,¹⁰ *bhāvika*,¹¹ and *kāvyaḥetu*.¹² In these alamkāras we find the definition, its exposition and then a classification which, of course, is as a rule followed by illustrations (or an illustration as the case may be). The aim of the author was to make the concept of an alamkāra quite clear to his readers. If he thought that a simple definition would suffice he did not go further. But if he found it insufficient he either brought it home by adding some other words or gave a full-fledged classification and illustrated them all (as in *upamā*, *rūpaka*, etc.).

It is, therefore, wrong to expect an illustration of *kāvyaṅga* after its definition which is quite insufficient to make its import explicit. If we think a little deeply over the definition of it we are bound to take it like that :

श्रुतमेकं यदन्यत्र स्मृतेरनुभवस्य वा ।

हेतुतां प्रतिपद्येत काव्यलिङ्गं तदुच्यते ॥¹³

(If anything heard becomes the cause of another recollection or experience in a composition, there *kāvyaṅga* is said to exist).

¹ KASLV. pp. 5-7.

⁴ KASLV. pp. 50-53.

⁷ KASLV. pp. 11-16.

¹⁰ KASLV. pp. 57-59.

¹³ KASLV. p. 87.

¹⁶ [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

² KASLV. pp. 18-31.

⁵ KASLV. pp. 63-67.

⁸ KASLV. pp. 31-33.

¹¹ KASLV. pp. 67-69.

³ KASLV. pp. 33-37.

⁶ KASLV. pp. 85-87.

⁹ KASLV. pp. 46-49.

¹² KASLV. pp. 87-91.

If this definition is to be held as sufficient, even the cases of *svārthānumāna*, if described, will become illustrations of the *kāvya-līṅga*. If one is described to hear of smoke and recollect thereby the *vyūpti* “*Yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatrāgniriyathā hi mahānase*” arrived at previously by him, it is bound to become a glaring illustration of *kāvya-līṅga*. It was a desideratum to differentiate the prosaic logic of the above case from the poetic reason leading to the *ālaṃkāra*.

It is the *līṅga* alone which has been defined in the above *kārikā*; so he was duty-bound to define *kāvya* also, and that the author does in the *kārikā* the authenticity of which has been challenged by Dr. Kane. If it happens to be spurious or to belong to some other authority Udbhata's definition is bound to be held as incomplete, too wide, and absurd.

As a matter of fact this *kārikā* has not been “abruptly thrust between the definition of *kāvya-līṅga* and its example”, but it supplements the definition attempted in the *kārikā* beginning from ‘*śrutamekam*’; it brings home the concept of *kāvya-līṅga*; it makes the definition complete, logical and unfallacious. It is thus inseparable from the definition of the figure and cannot be held as belonging to some *ālaṃkārika* other than Udbhata. We may, however, take it to be implicit as done by Rājānaka Tilaka,¹ or even a quotation from another work of Udbhata.

3 As regards the question raised by the *Mahāmahopādhyāya* in the first half of this objection, it will be better to quote the answer of *Pratīharendurāja*:

यत्तु रसादीनां पूर्वमलंकारत्वमुक्तं तदेवंविधभेदाविवक्षया ।
तदेवं गुणसंस्कृतशब्दार्थशरीरत्वात् सरसमेव काव्यम् ॥²

The author does not want to establish any distinction between the *ālaṃkāratā* of *Rasa* and the *kāvya-ātmatā* of it. *Rasa* happens to be the beauty and the beautifier both. The beauty underlying a poetry is nothing but *Rasa*; and *Rasa* happens to be the beautifying element in poetry also. It is the charm of poetry and it also adds to its charm.

¹ KASSV. p. 51.

² KASLV. p. 90.

Ruyyaka, who happens to be "a staunch advocate of the *dhvani* school"¹ according to MM. Dr. P. V. Kane, defines Rasavad in the same manner as is done by Udbhaṭa. He says:

रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशमानान्निबन्धनेन रसवत्प्रेयऊर्जस्विसमाहितानि ।²

And in the *Vṛtti*:

रसो वियते यत्र निबन्धने व्यापारात्मानि तद्रसवत् ।³

So far as the soul of poetry is concerned he says in the *Vṛtti*-*"Rasādayastu jīvitabhūtaḥ"*.⁴ Under such circumstances if the approval of Rasa as the soul of poetry by Ruyyaka is not opposed to his own definition of Rasavad why should it be held to be so, so far as Udbhaṭa is concerned when there is no difference in the content of their definitions? For comparison:

रसवद् दर्शितस्पष्टशृङ्गारादिरसोदयम् ।

स्वशब्दस्थायिसंचारिविभावाभिनयास्पदम् ।⁵

As regards the opinion of the *Alaṃkārasarvasva* quoted by the *Mahāmahopādhyāya* to support his view, its inaccuracy has been shown in the discussion on *Bhāmaha*. The *Mahāmahopādhyāya* himself does not accept it to be true when he holds that "*Vāmana* boldly asserts that *rīti* is the soul of poetry"⁶ because *Alaṃkārasarvasva* does not pass this remark on Udbhaṭa alone but on *Bhāmaha*, (*Daṇḍin*) *Rudraṭa*, and *Vāmana* also.⁷ It is at the end of the analysis of the views of all of them that this remark is put including each of them under the term '*prācyā*'.

One more argument has been advanced by Dr. Kane to prove his hypothesis:

"The printed edition (on p. 42) puts the verse "*taddviguṇaṁ triguṇaṁ vā*" in bold type, as if it were a *kārikā* of Udbhaṭa; but it is really a verse of *Rudraṭa*".⁸ The mistake on the part of an editor, printer or publisher cannot discredit the author and prove or disprove such important propositions.

Moreover, the text of the *Alaṃkāra-sāra-saṃgraha* of Udbhaṭa published by Col. Jacob, who happens to be the real target of

¹ HSP. p. 264.

² AS. p. 233.

³ KASLV. p. 57.

⁷ AS. pp. 3-9.

² AS. p. 232.

⁴ AS. p. 14.

⁶ HSP. p. 363.

⁸ HSP. p. 129.

Dr. Kane's criticism, does not contain this *kārikā* at all. So we may say with enough certainty that the arguments given by Dr. P. V. Kane to prove his own hypothesis are not convincing and the *kārikā* declaring Rasa to be the soul of poetry remains a product of the pen of Udbhaṭa. It, however, is a quotation of Udbhaṭa's *Bhāmahavivarapa* or the commentary on the *Nāṭya-śāstra*. Because it does not appear in the text printed by K. S. Ramaswami Sastri Siromani with the *Vivṛti* of *Rājānaka Tilaka*.¹ It, however, does not form part of the work entitled "*Ālāmkāra-sāra-saṁgraha*" of Udbhaṭācārya. Like "*चतुरूपा भावाः*" and "*पञ्चरूपा रसाः*", it is also a quotation from another work of his.

Besides, there are some other facts also, which confirm our view as regards *Rasavāda* of Udbhaṭa. There are some *kārikās* and statements regarding Rasa which not only confirm our hypothesis but also show his original contribution to the theory of Rasa. He says :

रसोल्लासी कवेरात्मा स्वच्छे शब्दार्थदर्पणे ।
माधुर्यौजोयुतप्रौढे प्रतिविन्य प्रकाशते ।
संपीतस्वच्छशब्दार्थद्राविताभ्यन्तरस्ततः ।
श्रोता तत्साम्यतः पुष्टिं चतुर्वर्गे परां व्रजेत् ।²

One may compare "*Rasollāsi Kaverātma*" in the above *kārikās* with the famous statement of Bhaṭṭa Tauta :

नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुस्समानोऽनुभवस्ततः ।

Udbhaṭa is the first writer to recognise *Śānta* as the ninth Rasa not only in poetries but in dramaturgy also :

शृङ्गारहास्यकरुणरौद्रवीरभयानकाः ।
बीभत्साद्भुतशान्ताश्च नव नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः ।³

Not only that. He also points out that there are four types of *Bhāvas* and five types of *Rasas* :

यदुक्तं भट्टोज्जटेन चतुरूपा भावा इति ।⁴

यदुक्तं भट्टोज्जटेन पञ्चरूपा रसा इति ।⁵

So far as the definitions of the *Preyasvat*, *Ūrjasvin* and *Samāhita* are concerned, Udbhaṭa does not follow any of the *ālāmkārikas* preceding him—not even *Bhāmaha*, but lays down the

¹ KASSV. p. 51.

² KASLV. p. 87.

³ KASLV. p. 57.

⁴ KASLV. p. 56.

⁵ KASLV. p. 57.

foundation of a new schools of rhetorics to be followed by the later Rasavādins some of whom gave a new colour to them. Bhāmaha, simply exemplifies these alamkāras leaving their nature quite obscure.¹ Daṇḍin defines each of them, but there is nothing common to both. Daṇḍin defines *Preyas* as "*priyatarākhyāna*", *Ūrjjasvin* as "*ruḍhāhamkāra*", and *samāhita* in the following manner :

किञ्चिदारभमाणस्य कार्यं देववशात् पुनः ।

तत्साधनसमापत्तिर्या तदाहुस्समाहितम् ॥²

If we probe a little into the illustrations given by Bhāmaha on the lines of Daṇḍin, they will be found following those definitions quite faithfully and accurately. To Bhāmaha they were too clear to be defined; Daṇḍin, however, left no room for obscurity and gave an aphoristic tongue to those floating notions of rhetoric. Vāmana included *Rasavad*, *Preyas*, and *Ūrjjasvin* under various *gunas*. He has defined the *samāhita* alone :

यत्सादृश्यं तत्संपत्तिस्समाहितम् ।³

Whereas, the definitions given by Udbhaṭa are as follows :

रत्यादिकानां भावानामनुभावादिस्त्वचनैः ।

यत्काव्यं बध्यते सद्भिस्तत्प्रेयस्वदुदाहृतम् ॥⁴

अनौचित्यप्रवृत्तानां कामक्रोधादिकारणात् ।

भावानां च रसानां च बन्ध ऊर्जस्वि कथ्यते ।⁵

रसभावतदाभासवृत्तैः प्रशमबन्धनम् ।

अन्यानुभावनिश्शून्यरूपं यत्तत्समाहितम् ॥⁶

The "*Alamkārasarvasva*" and the "*Kuvalayānanda*", which happen to be recognised works of the Rasa school, slavishly follow these definitions; the former says:

रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशमानान्निबन्धनेन रसवत्प्रेय ऊर्जस्विसमाहितानि ।

and the latter :

रसभावतदाभासभावशान्तिनिबन्धनाः ।

चत्वारो रसवत्प्रेय ऊर्जस्वि च समाहितम् ॥⁷

¹ KA ; Pari. III- 5, 7 and 10 pp. 19-20.

² K. AD., Pari. II-275 and 298 pp. 245-263.

³ KASV. p. 147.

⁴ KASLV. p. 54.

⁵ KASLV. p. 59.

⁶ KASLV. p. 60.

⁷ CAKA. p. 182.

There are Rasavādins headed by Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa who, however, make it their case that at the first instance they all come under '*Itarāṅga-guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya*'; if, however, one is inclined to define and illustrate them, these are to be defined as follows :

रसभावौ तदाभासौ भावस्य प्रशमस्तथा ।

गुणीभूतत्वमायान्ति यदालंक्रितयस्तदा ।

रसवत्प्रेय ऊर्जस्वि समाहितमिति क्रमात् ॥ ¹

Thus, in all respects, Udbhata is to be regarded as one of the great pioneers of Rasavāda holding Rasa to be the soul of poetry in the most unequivocal, unambiguous and unfeigned terminology. He being a commentator on the works like the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharata and the Kāvyaśāstra of Bhāmaha, it was but expected of him. He has got his own views regarding the types of Rasa and Blāva; and he propounds a new theory as regards the Preyasvat, Ūrjjasvin and Samāhita alaṅkāras fully recognised and accepted by many Rasavādins and with an amendment by the others. The only difference between his Rasavāda and the Rasavāda of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Mammāṭa is that he had no faith in *Vyañjanāvyāpāra* which was so universally recognised by the latter.

¹ SD. X, 124 p. 693.

ASOKA AND THE TAXILĀ INSCRIPTION

BY

RADHAKRISHNA CHOUDHARY

Since the discovery of the Taxilā Inscription by Marshall in 1915 and its publication by Harzfeld,¹ there has been a number of conjectures in the scholarly world. The difficulty with this inscription is that it is not dated and does not expressly bear the name of the ruling monarch, though there are some indications in this respect. The inscription is in the Armaic (Kharoṣṭhī) script and on palaeographical grounds, it has been assigned to the third century B. C. Practically no importance has been attached to this record by such eminent scholars as K. A. Nilakanthasastri, B. M. Barua, H. C. Raichoudhary, D. R. Bhandarkar and R. K. Mookherji² and others. While studying Aśoka, these scholars probably did not think it necessary to take into account this inscription in their studies on the subject. Recently an eminent Soviet Indologist, Mr. G. M. Bongard-Levin has published a critical study of Aśoka's "*Taxilā Inscription*" in the "*Sovietskoye Vostokovedenie*" (1956, No. 1, Moscow). The main findings of the learned scholar are:—

- (a) "Prydr" may be connected with Aśoka (Priyadarśi)—a theory already enunciated by Herzfeld and Andreas.
- (b) Definition of the date of the Inscription depends upon the correct interpretation of the term Priyadarśi.
- (c) Priyadarśi was the personal name of Aśoka and not his Buddhist denomination (as V. A. Smith thinks), or the usual title of the Indian rulers.
- (d) Priyadarśi was used only in application to Aśoka.
- (e) The date of the Inscription may be placed approximately before 272 B. C., when Aśoka ascended the throne of Magadha after serving as Viceroy at Taxilā, and later at Ujjain.
- (f) The name Priyadarśi as connected with king Aśoka is well in keeping with historical dates.

¹ EI-XIX. 251—"Taxilā Fragmentary Armaic Inscription of a Mauryan King" edited by Herzfeld.

² K. A. N. Sastri (Ed.)—*Age of the Nandas and the Mauryas*; H. C. Raichoudhary, *Political History of Ancient India*; B. M. Barua—*Aśoka and his Inscription*; D. R. Bhandarkar—*Aśoka*; R. K. Mookherji—*Aśoka*; V. A. Smith—*Aśoka*.

(g) The Taxilā discovery is the only Armaic Inscription found in India.

The point, raised by the Soviet Indologist, deserves careful consideration at our hands. His main contention is that "Priyadarśī was the real name of Aśoka". Herzfeld assigns the right half of an Armaic inscription of Taxilā to Aśoka, though Barnett and Cowley placed it in the 4th century B. C. Barua holds that many of the scribes, employed by Aśoka, to engrave his records were persons who hailed from Uttarāpatha and with whom the habitual form of writing was Kharoṣṭhī.¹ Levin places the record in the third century B. C. (272), when Aśoka ascended the throne. The *Divyāvadāna*² says that Aśoka was deputed once to Taxilā to suppress a revolt. This is supported by a *Separate Rock Edict* of Aśoka wherein the possibility of his having been appointed or deputed as a royal military governor is indicated.³ The same record speaks of the three Kumāra-Viceroyes stationed at Ujeni, Taxilā and Toshālī.

How and when this record came to be inscribed is a matter of controversy and there is enough grounds even now for further study in the subject. Taxilā was on the main route and lay on the great highway frequented by the travellers from the east and the west. It was the main city of the hinter-Indus territory of the Gāndhāras.⁴ Aśoka had been to that place to suppress a revolt. The *Sre-1* is clear on the point that the Kumāras were regular Viceroyes having unlimited powers. They could send on tours⁵ Mahāmātras of their own every three years and make inspection and so on. It appears that the governor of Taxilā was sufficiently powerful to have his own Mahāmātras. It seems natural, too, as the distant provinces could not be directly controlled by the rulers at Pāṭaliputra. The people of Taxilā must have felt the strength of Aśoka during his regime there, when he had been there to suppress the revolt.

¹ Barua-Aśoka and his Inscriptions- Pt. II-P. 9.

² *Divyāvadāna* (PTS)-P. 371 ff.

³ D. C. Sircar-*Select Inscriptions*- P. 44 (SRE-1)- हेमेव तस्र [सि]लातेपि

⁴ *Mahābhārata* XII-207. 43; *Rāmāyaṇa*-VII. 114. 11; *Vāyupurāṇa*-88. 189-90.

⁵ D. C. Sircar-*Op. Cit.*- P. 44-Line 25—

ते महामता निस्समिसन्ति अनुसयानं तदा अहापयितु अतने कंमं एतं पि जानिसन्ति ।

From the epithet, used in the Taxilā inscription, it is crystal clear that the record was incised when Aśoka had ascended the throne. The title "*Prydr*" was probably not used by him when he was a prince. If the record be ascribed to the period of his Viceroyalty, the vexed question of his real name would come up for consideration. The Buddhist legends are definite on the point that the title Priyadarśi was conferred on Aśoka after a particular period. The record, under review, involves the question of date and the name of the ruling Emperor as well. According to the *Dipavaṃśa*,¹ Aśoka was consecrated under the title of Priyadarśin in 265-4 B. C. when Mahendra was twenty years old. The same source² states that Aśoka was annointed again as *Piyadas* six years after the first consecration. Dr. Barua holds that this was probably a title conferred on Aśoka by the Buddhist fraternity of Pāṭaliputra.³

Levin holds that Priyadarśin was the real name of Aśoka. He has based his arguments on this inscription and the Buddhist legends. While *Devānāmpīya* is a very common title amongst the kings of ancient India, the word "Priyadarśi" is applied only in so far as Aśoka is concerned. *Devānāmpīya* is undoubtedly an honorific title used by the kings, but that is not the case with Priyadarśi. Dr. D. C. Sircar holds that as Candragupta Maurya is also called "*Priyadarśana*", the present record may, therefore, belong to him.⁴ In spite of his assertion, he is not definite on the point and asserts in the same vein — "But if the reference is to be found to the Buddhist '*Ayiro Atthangoko Maggo*', the possibility of the record being one of Aśoka is greater".⁵ Herzfeld is of opinion that the word "*Hu*" in line 5 of the inscription refers to moral sphere of ideas, *i. e.* "*good thoughts, words and deeds*", but he believes them to be borrowed from Zoroastrianism. These moral ideas are the cardinal points of Buddhism and there is no sense in importing the Zoroastrian ideas in this record of

¹ *Dipavaṃśa*-VI-24; For various names etc, Cf.-*Ibid*-VI. 1; 21; Buddhaghosh-*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*-II-613; *Divyāvadāna*-P. 370. Here we have to remember that these legends were primarily meant for the religious edifications of the faithful. Cf. K. A. N. Sastri (Ed.)-*Age of the Nandas and Mauryas*-P. 203.

² *Dipavaṃśa*-VI. 24.

⁴ Sircar-*Op. Cit.*-Pp. 81-82 fn.

³ Barua-*Op. Cit.*-P. 17 fn.

⁵ *Ibid*.

Taxilā where at least the name Priyadarśī distinctly stands for some Indian ruler. Perhaps the Armaic character of the script weighed strongly with Mr. Herzfeld in his judgement. Such factors were responsible for mystifying the contents of the inscription. The contents of the inscription perhaps leave no ground for any doubt that it belongs to the reign of Aśoka. The only question is whether 'Priyadarśī' was the real name of Aśoka or not? From the text of the inscription, the following points are clear:—

- (a) *Mran Prydr*¹— "Mārāna Priyadar" (-shī)—Our Lord Priyadarśī.
- (b) Herzfeld takes the title to refer to Aśoka Maurya.
- (c) Line 10 refers to his "queens" or less probably his kingdom.²
- (d) Line 11 means his "son".³
- (e) Line 12 means "To Our Lord Priyadarśī".⁴

According to lines 11 and 12, the record can not be said to belong to any other person except Aśoka.⁵ Read along with lines 5, 11, 12, we may say that the moral teachings were of the time of Aśoka, whose son Kunāla was associated with Taxilā. From all the traditional sources, viz, the *Divyāvadāna*, the *Rājataranginī*, Tārānātha's *Tibetan History*, one can collect name of just four sons of whom Kunāla Tivala was deputed as Viceroy of Taxilā.⁶ These accounts are no doubt confused, but this fact stands supported by Fahien, who says⁷— "This is the place, which Dharmavardhana, the son of Aśoka, governed. Even if there be some doubt this way, we can not preclude the possibility of the record being of the time of Aśoka or of one whose name was "*Frydr*". As Aśoka had been once to Taxilā he must have realised the importance of the area and probably got this record created after he became the king. The Armaic character speaks of his liberality because the people of those areas were Kharoṣṭhī speaking. *Prydr* here stands for Aśoka.

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ If 'Priyadarśana' be applied to Candragupta Maurya, how can it be ascribed to Aśoka in any way, as he was the grandson of Candragupta.

⁶ *Divyāvadāna*—P. 407ff.

⁷ *Beal-Buddhist Records*—I, XXXI.

Was it his real name? From a study of his own inscriptions, spread throughout the length and breadth of the country, it appears that his name was "*Prydr*". It has been shown above that *Devānāmpriya* was an honorific title and hence it had no connection with the actual name of the king. But that is not the case with the famous epithet, "*Priyadarśi*", which has been definitely used for *Aśoka* and none else. A gloss over the Buddhist records will convince us of the fact that *Priyadarśi* indicated *Aśoka* and none else. It was not a title conferred on *Aśoka* as is supposed by Barua.¹

"*Piyadassana*" occurs repeatedly in the *Dīpavaṃśa* as equivalent of *Aśoka*, probably in the same sense as is applied by *Vālmiki* to *Rāma*.² In none of the various versions of the *Minor Rock Edicts*, the epithet "*Priyadarśi Rājā*" is employed.³ His name appears only once in the *Māskī* record.⁴ Rock and Pillar Edicts, engraved between 12th and 26th year of coronation, contain '*Devānāmpriye Piyadasi*' and the same epithet appears in the *Barābar Cave hill Inscriptions*. *Priyadarśi* has been written in various forms and spellings in different Rock Edicts as will be seen below. *Piyadasina*, *Piyadasino*, *Piyadasi*,⁵ *Pryadrā*⁶ (*śidaraja*), *Pr̥ya(dra)si*,⁷ *Pryadrasi*,⁸ *Pryadraśisa*.⁹

As has been pointed out above, we have no definite information about the meaning and significance of the term "*Prydr*". The word *Aśoka* occurs only once in the whole range of his epigraphical materials, while the name '*Priyadarśika*' is more frequent than *Aśoka*, it is likely that it may be his real name. *Aśoka* means a man free from all anxieties. To me it seems that when after the *Kaliṅga* war, *Aśoka* became free from all worldly and trifling anxieties, he called himself "*Aśoka*", and that his real name was something else. It is really very astonishing that the word '*Aśoka*' occurs only once. Why did he not mention his

¹ *OP. Cit.* P. 17 fn.

² *Rāmāyaṇa*-I. 1. 3.

³ Barua-*OP. Cit.*- Pp. 16-7.

⁴ देवानां प्रियस असोकस.

⁵ *R. E.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14. *Piyasā* occurs in queen's *Pillar Edict*, while we have *Piyadasaka* in the *Bairāt Inscriptions*.

⁶ *R. E.* 5.

⁷ *Ibid*-7.

⁸ *Ibid*-9, 12.

⁹ *Ibid*-13.

name frequently (?) is a pertinent question. We are greatly indebted to the Russian scholar who has tried to answer this pertinent question. We find that Priyadarśika is common to almost all the inscriptions except a few ones.¹ Since this name is more common than Aśoka, it is likely that it may be his real name. Probably Priyadarśika Aśoka was his full name and not Priyadarśika only as the great Russian Savant thinks. Even the philological approach to the study of the Taxilā inscription would lead us to that conclusion. "Prydr" of Taxilā record corresponds closely, rather word for word, with 'Prydra' (R. E. 5), Prydra (R. E. 9-12), Prydra (R. E. 12-13). The use of the same type of word, with slight linguist variations on account of two different characters for Priyadarśika, is indicative of the fact that Aśoka's name was Priyadarśika Aśoka. Since Priyadarśi is a pleasant word carrying good and auspicious meaning, the Emperor frequently used this in his epigraphs so much so that he actually forgot to mention Aśoka anywhere except once. Buddhist tradition helps us in ascertaining that he was 'Piyadassan Aśoka'.² "Piyadasi Lājā Māgadhe" indicated Aśoka and none else. According to Buddhaghosh, the prince Piyadasa will be annointed Aśoka 218 years after the Buddha's demise.³ Regarding the date, no last word can be said on the basis of the fragmentary Taxilā Inscription. Levin puts it at 272 B. C. but it is not desirable in the present state of our knowledge to arrive at any conclusion on this issue. Further evidence may throw some light on this vexed question.

¹ There is no such mention in *Kausāmbi Pillar Inscription* (Allahabad), *Sāñci Pillar Inscription*, and *Sarnātha Pillar Edict*.

² For a different view, see, Barua-*Op. Cit.*, P. 18, where he holds that Aśoka assumed the title of priyadarśin in his inscriptions dating from the 12th year of Abhiṣeka.

³ *Sumaṅgala-Vilāsini*-II-613ff.—The recent discovery of a bilingual inscription of Aśoka on a hill at Kandhāra is suggestive of the fact that his empire extended upto that area. The use of *armaic* and *Greek* characters in this record shows that the Taxilā record is no exception. A comparative study of both the inscriptions will reveal to us many more interesting details. In the Kandhāra inscription, the term "Piyadasi" in Armaic and "Piyadosso" in Greek shows that Aśoka was well-known by this title and not by his actual name. To me it seems that Kandhāra inscription will strengthen my findings of this paper.

ON HORSE STABLES IN VEDIC TIMES

BY

VITTORE PISANI

In his learned paper on *Instructions regarding the construction and maintenance of the horse stables* etc. (Centenary Volume of the 'Journal of the Madras University') Dr. Gode thinks (p. 105) that "if the cavalry as an organized force was a development of the post-Vedic period, the construction of the royal stable must be presumed to have developed during the post-Vedic period". But if "cavalry as an organized force may be traced to the post-Vedic period", anyhow, in Dr. Gode's own words, "there are references to horses and war-chariots drawn by horses in the *Rgveda*". Indeed cavalry has been introduced at first in Assyria in the XII century B. C.; war chariots seem to be as old as at least the Hyksos invasion of Egypt, that is as the XVIII century B. C. And if war chariots, of course drawn by horses, were existing in Vedic times, then should horse stables have been in existence too at that time.

But we have good reasons for assuming that horse training and therefore horse stables were well known to Vedic Indians. It is well known, that among the Mitanni are found persons with Indian names; now a Mitanni man, Kikkuli by name, whose mother language was Hurrite, has written for the Hittite kings a booklet on horse training that has been found among the Hittite texts from Boghazk y and was published by Joh. Alban Potratz: *Der Pferdetext aus dem Keilschriftarchiv von Boghazköy*, Rostock 1938. In this booklet, which may have been written after the second half of the XIV century B. C. according to Miss Kammenhuber on p. 50 of her paper on Kikkuli's text,¹ we find such words as *aikawarlanna*, *terawarlanna*, *panzawarlanna*,

¹ Annelies Kammenhuber, *Philologische Untersuchungen zu den Pferdetexten von Boghazköy*, in 'Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft' Vol. II, 1957 (revidierter Neudruck; 1st ed. 1952), p. 47-120.

sattawartanna, *nāwartanna*, which are surely Indian terms of the horse sport: *ekavartanam*, and so *tri-*, *pañca-*, *sapta-* and *nava-vartanam*: this means that Vedic Indians at that time not only practised horse training but had a developed horse sport whose technical terms were borrowed by other peoples: this forces us to admit the presence of horse stables already in Vedic times. To this may be added that in 1957 a paper by Prof. H. Kronasser has appeared in the 'Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes' Vol. LIII, p. 181 ff. under the heading *Indisches in den Nuzi Texten*. The learned author starts from the statement by Wolfram von Soden of the presence of Indian horse terms in the Accadian text of the Nuzi documents, and tries to demonstrate the righteousness of this statement at least for some words: the interpretation of this text is not easy, anyhow I think that it is possible that in some adjectives used to describe horses, *babrunnu/paprunnu*, *b/pinkarannu* and *zirramannu/zirranu* we must recognise the Sanskrit words *babhru-*, *piṅgala-* and *jīra-*.

A NOTE ON JAIN ŚAURASENĪ

BY

V. P. JOHARAPURKAR

Jain Śaurasenī is a Prakrit dialect, of which very few texts have been edited. Ācārya Kundakunda is one of the earliest writers of this dialect. In this note, I venture to show that his dialect shares one peculiarity with Pāli, i. e. the use of 𑀧 (ङ) and one with Jain Mahārāṣṭrī, i. e. the use of initial n (न).

The use of 𑀧 is found only in one edition of Rayaṇasāra¹. Editions of other works do not show this peculiarity. Mss however give different result. I had an opportunity to examine two Mss of Pañcāstikāya at the Karanja (Dist. Akola) collections. One of these contain the commentary of Bāḷacandra while the other contains the commentary of Jayasena. The first Ms spells the word puggala uniformly as poggala and the word Khalu as Khaḷu. Both of these contain the following words²— tikkāḷiya (6) Kāḷo (23), Kālā (25), Maḷa (28), Phaḷa (38), Kevaḷāni (41), Sayaḷa (81), Jaḷa (83), Aṇaḷa (119), Thaḷa (125). Similar words containing 𑀧 are found in the said edition of Rayaṇasāra also. Commentaries of Bāḷacandra on Samayasāra and Pravacanasāra also contain similar words.

It may be noted that Bāḷacandra is a Kannaḍa commentator and Jayasena's commentary, though in Sanskrit, follows him closely. 𑀧 was common to Kannaḍa, hence it was retained in these Mss, but was changed into l in others.

One more point of interest is that all of the noted words are found in the same form in Marathi.

The use of initial n (न) is found in only one published text, i. e. Ṣaṭprābhṛta with the commentary of Śrutasaḡara³. A Ms of Pañcāstikāya from the same source, dated Sam. 1468, contains the following words—niyameṇa (23), nālī (26) nāṇaṃ (39), nicido (70), niccho (87), nikāyā (128), nijjaraṇa (152), nirodho (158).

It may be noted that initial n is used in Apabhraṃśa also. It is a regular feature of Jain Mahārāṣṭrī and is also found in some Ardhamāgadhi texts. It may have disappeared from the Mss of the works of Kundakunda due to the regularising tendency of the commentators.

¹ Edited by K. B. Nitawe, Kolhapur, with Marathi translation.

² Numbers indicate the gāthā in the longer recension.

³ Published by Manikchand D. Jain Granthmala.

A NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE DEVĪ-CANDRAGUPTA

BY

C. C. DAS GUPTA

The object of this note is to suggest a new interpretation of the fragmentary drama, *Devī Candragupta* not done by any scholar before. It would be necessary to give a brief resume of the subject-matter in order to put the particular matter on discussion. The following is the brief account of the subject-matter contained in it. It is said in it that after the death of *Samudragupta* his son *Rāmagupta* succeeded to the throne left vacant by the death of his father *Samudragupta*. His wife's name was *Dhruvadevī*. One Śaka prince wanted to marry the wife of *Rāmagupta*. He was cowardly in nature and so agreed to this proposal; but when his brother *Candragupta* had heard this news, he objected to this arrangement and proposed to kill the Śaka prince in disguise of *Dhruvadevī*. He went to the palace of the Śaka prince in disguise of *Dhruvadevī* and killed the Śaka prince. On return to the capital he also killed his brother *Rāmagupta* and married his widow *Dhruvadevī*.

Such is, in short, the brief account of the story as given in the drama, *Devī Candragupta*. One thing which seems to be rather extremely unusual is the conduct of the Śaka prince. Though he was of royal descent, he did not consider beneath his dignity to ask the hand of one prince's wife. In the whole course of political history of ancient India before this time we do not find any such example of a prince asking the hand of the wife of a prince, whether of Indian or foreign origin. So there is no doubt that the desire of this prince seems to be rather extremely unusual, viewed from any point of view.

It would be now necessary to account for this unnaturalness on the part of the Śaka prince. In the drama, *Devī Candragupta* as well as in the later records the Śaka prince is called a rogue.

All historians have fully supported the view as given in the *Devī Candragupta* and have called the Śaka prince a rogue "who is bent on having the wife of somebody else"; but there is one expression in an inscription of the Gupta period which throws interesting light on this point and which has not been taken into consideration by any historian. The inscription which is meant here is the Allahabad Stone Pillar Inscription of Samudragupta. In this famous inscription there is the detailed and scientific description of Samudragupta's exact relation with the different groups of rulers and peoples in the different parts of India as well as outside India. Here is an expression which is taken into consideration. The expression is *daivaputrasāhisāhānusāhi-śaka muruṇḍaiḥ Saimhalākādibhiśca sarva-dvīpa-vāsibhirātmanivedana-kanyopāyanadāna-garutmadaṅka-svariṣaya-bhukti-sāsana y a canadyupāya seva-kṛta-vāhu-vīrya-prasara-dharaṇi-vandhasya*.¹ This has been translated by Fleet as follows: "Whose arm was affected by the acts of respectful....., such as offering themselves as sacrifices, bringing presents of maidens, (giving) Garuḍa-tokens, (surrendering) the enjoyment of their own territories, soliciting (his) commands &c., (rendered) by the Daivaputras, shahis, shahanushahis, sakas and Muruṇḍas, and by the people of Sindhala, and all (other) dwellers in islands".²

The term which requires special attention is the term *śaka-muruṇḍaiḥ*. Regarding this term Konow has given a very learned interpretation. He observes, "In the Allahabad posthumous stone pillar inscription of Samudragupta we read in 123 of successes achieved by the Gupta emperor in connection with Daivaputra-sāhi-sāhānusāhi-śaka-muruṇḍaiḥ Saimhalākādibhiśca, where Śaka-muruṇḍaiḥ is evidently a designation of a similar kind as Daivaputrasāhi and sāhānusāhi. Now *murūṇḍa* is almost certainly a Śaka word meaning 'master', 'lord'. It seems to occur in the *muroḍa*, i. e., *murūṇḍa*, as a title of king Kaniṣka in the Zeda inscription; it is found in the compound *hora-muruṇḍaga* in certain Brāhmi inscriptions from Mathura, and Professor Lüders has further compared the word *horamurta* of the

¹ Gupta Inscriptions. By J. F. Fleet, p. 8, 1888.

² Ibid, p. 17, 1888.

18 [Annals, B. O. R. I.]

Manikiala inscription explaining *hora* as the well-known Śaka word for 'gift, donation', and *hora-muruṇḍaga* as corresponding to Sanskrit *dānapati*, so that *murunḍa* must mean 'master, lord'. Professor Lévi has further shown that *murunḍa* is well-known from Indian literature and occurs, in the form *mao-lun*, as a title of Indian rulers in Chinese sources. I have therefore identified Śaka-*murunḍa* with the Chinese *sai-wang*, Śaka-lord, where *wang* is simply a Chinese translation of the Śaka word *murunḍa*, just as the same word was translated into Indian as *svāmin* in the titulature of the Indian Śaka dynasty known as that of the Western Kṣtrapas.

There was accordingly a Śaka tribe known as the Śaka-muruṇḍas, evidently because their chiefs were styled *murunḍas*, while other Śaka tribes used other titles, a state of affairs which is well attested. In the Śaka text from the Khotan country we find royal titles such as *rre* and *shshau*; in the Jain text Kālakācārya-kathānaka the chiefs are *sāhis* and their overlord *sāhānu sāhi*, a title which recurs in the *shāhānu shāhi* of the Allahabad praśasti; and the Kuṣāṇa dynasty of Kanishka uses in coin-legends the title *shaonano shao*, i. e., *shaunānu shau*.

A designation such as Śaka-*murunḍa*, *Sai-wang* is therefore quite natural".¹

Though Fleet has translated the expression *Kanyopāyanadāna* as "bringing presents of maidens", there is no doubt that it means that maidens were presented to Samudragupta in the form of marriage. If the girls were presented for other purposes, then Harishena, the composer of the Allahabad Stone Pillar Inscription would not have certainly mentioned it. Therefore there is no doubt that these maidens were presented to Samudragupta in the form of marriage. Therefore there is no doubt that these Śaka princes were related to Samudragupta by the matrimonial alliance.

This example of the matrimonial alliance is not a new one though it may appear to be rather strange and peculiar. The most ancient example of this kind of matrimonial alliance is that

¹ Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions. By Sten Konow, p. xx, 1929.

between Candragupta, the founder of the Maurya dynasty and Seleucus Nikator. Regarding this point Thomas has observed, "The great military progress of Seleucus, whereby he sought to consolidate the eastern part of his dominions, brought him to the Indus about the year 305. He found Candragupta, now master of all Hindusthan, awaiting him with an immense army. For Seleucus the task proved too great; he crossed the Indus, but either no battle ensued, or an indecisive one. Seleucus was content to secure a safe retirement and a gift of 500 elephants by the surrender of all the Greek dominions as far as the Kabul valley. Upon these terms a matrimonial alliance was arranged".¹

In the next period of ancient Indian history we find the matrimonial alliance between the Sātavāhanas and the Western Kṣatrapa rulers. One Kanheri epigraph describes Vāsīṣṭhīputra Śrī Sātakarṇi as the husband of a daughter of the Mahākṣatrapa Ru(dra). Rapson identifies this Rudra with Rudradāman I.²

According to the Junagadh inscription Rudradāman attended several *svayamvaras* and won the hands of a number of princesses. This matrimonial alliance of the Karddamakas points to the gradual absorption of the Scythians into Indian Society.³

This account, therefore, shows that the marriage-bond between the Indian and the foreign families was current in India from the time of Candragupta, the founder of the Maurya empire.

So there is no doubt that the Śāka princes were related to Samudragupta by the matrimonial bond. Therefore there is no doubt that Rāmagupta, son of Samudragupta is also related to the Śāka princes. In any case it can not be denied that the Śāka princes are in the family-circle of Rāmagupta.

It now remains to be seen whether the *Śāka-muruṇḍaiḥ* means one Śāka prince or more than one. It is very difficult to say finally anything about this point. So far as this point is concerned, we get evidence from inscriptions as well as coins. There

¹ Cambridge History of India, vol. I, p. 472, 1935.

² Political History of Ancient India. By Dr. H. C. Roy Chaudhuri, 5th Edition, p. 496.

³ Age of Imperial Unity. Edited by Dr. R. C. Majumdar, p. 185, 1950.

is not only the mention of the *Śaka-muruṇḍaiḥ* in Allahabad Pillar Inscription but also a veiled reference to the conquest of Mālava which was under the Śaka suzerainty in the Udayagiri Cave-inscription no. 2 of Candragupta II¹ during the reign of the same monarch. Also the silver coins of Candragupta II for Western India are made after the model of the Western Kṣatrapa ruler.² There is practically no doubt that the evidence given by this inscription of Candragupta II as well as the silver-currency of Candragupta II relate to one incident, i. e., the conquest of Mālava and Surāṣṭra from the Western Kṣatrapal family.

The mention of the *Śaka-muruṇḍaiḥ* along with the expression *Daivaputra-shāhi-shāhānushāhi* most probably indicates that the *Śaka-muruṇḍaiḥ* are to be placed along with the *Daivaputra-shāhi-shāhānushāhi*, i. e., somewhere in north-western India. Regarding the place where the assassination took place we find a passage in some manuscripts of the *Harṣa-Carita* which runs thus:—*aripure ca para-kalatra-kāmukaṁ kāmīnī-veśaguptaś = ca Candraguptaḥ śika-patim salāyat*. Some scholars have taken *aripure* as meaning the city of enemy; but in some manuscripts of the *Harṣa-Carita* instead of the reading *aripure* there is the reading of Alipure and Nalinipure. According to the celebrated Chinese pilgrim Hieun Tsang this Nalini-pura was the city called Teng-Kang within the Kuluta-janapada. According to the view of Cunningham this Kuluta-janapada is situated in the Punjab in North-Western India.³ Regarding this point Mirashi has observed, "This Alipura must have been situated somewhere in or near the ancient country of Kuluta. It is also possible that the real name of the capital was Nalinapura, as stated in a Ms. of the *Harṣa-Carita*. The identification of Nalinapura with Hieun Tsang's Teng-Kuang is, therefore, supported by the passage in the *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* as well As Watters has pointed out, one name for the city was Padmapura ('lotus city') which is

¹ Gupta Inscriptions. By J. F. Fleet, pp. 34-36, 1883.

² Catalogue of the coins of the Andhra Dynasty, the Western Kṣatrapas.

³ Cunningham's Ancient Geography of India. Edited by S. N. Majumdar Śāstrī, pp. 162-63, 1924.

only a synonym of Nalinapura". It may, therefore, be concluded that the expression Śaka-murundaiḥ means the Śaka rulers of North Western India and has got no connection with the Śaka Kṣtrapas of Western India. It follows that there was the matrimonial alliance between Samudragupta on one hand and the Śaka prince of North-Western India. It further appears that the Śaka prince referred to in the Devī-Candragupta was also a prince of North-Western India. It, therefore, seems that this Śaka prince mentioned in the Devī-Candragupta belongs to the Śaka family which have been referred to in the Allahabad Pillar Inscription and which entered into a matrimonial alliance with Samudragupta.

It, therefore, appears that the Śaka prince mentioned in the Devī-Candragupta was in the family-circle of the Gupta dynasty and, as such, was known to the family of Dhruvadevī. It may, therefore, be postulated that there might have been a marriage-proposal between this Śaka prince and Dhruvadevī who was married to Rāmagupta, the son and successor of Samudragupta. This is probably the reason of the Śaka prince asking the hand of the married lady, Dhruvadevī; otherwise we can not explain the unprincely behaviour of the Śaka prince. Another previous suitor might have been Candragupta II. For this reason we find the conflict between the Śaka prince, Rāmagupta and Candragupta I for the possession of Dhruvadevī.

INDIA AND A NEW RENAISSANCE IN EUROPE*

BY

SUNITI KUMAR CHATTERJI

Deithide sen-chasa ;	Preserving ancient knowledge ;
Fir cen fuillem,	Truth without addition,
Bretha fira ;	True Judgments ;
Sid do Tuathaib ;	Peace to all Peoples ;
Airmtiu Filed,	Honouring Bards,
Adrad De moir.	Adoring great God.

The above passage, from an Old Irish work of about 850 A. D. (*Instructions of King Cormac Mac Airt*), the present writer has inscribed on a marble tablet in his residence in Calcutta, along with a number of other gréat messages from different cultures in the original languages and scripts. This passage was selected as it gives an expression to some of the ideals of the *Grhastha* or Householder himself; besides, it has been placed in his house as a tribute to the genius of Irish and Celtic culture, with which some acquaintance was obtained by him over 40 years ago, ever since his college days, first in Calcutta and then in London.

The connection between the above Irish quctation and the subject matter of this review, namely, the book by Dr. V. Raghavan as indicated in the footnote, would seem to be rather remote. But in Dr. Raghavan's book, in the very first section, dealing with Indological studies in Eire, I have found some precious bits of information on the basic agreement between the cultural and literary, religious and social backgrounds of these two great branches of the Indo-European speaking people—the Indo-Aryans on the one hand, and the celtic Irish on the other. Dr. Raghavan, in making a very objective statement of the situation in Ireland

* *Sanskrit and Allied Indological Studies in Europe*: by Dr. V. Raghavan, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Sanakrit, Madras University; with Forewords by Dr. A. L. Mudaliar, Sir Ronold Adam, Dr. Ernst Wilhelm Meyer and Prof. Louis Renou. Published by the University of Madras, 1956, Pages 117.

for the subject of his investigation, which made him spend nearly a year in Europe, has given some indication of the significant researches which have been undertaken by the doyen of both Sanskrit and Old Irish studies in Ireland, Dr. Myles Dillon. Prof. Raghavan tells us how a very profound connection between the Indo-Aryan and the Irish words have been established through a comparative study of the Old Irish and Sanskrit literatures by Prof. Dillon. Among other things, Prof. Raghavan refers to the almost similar nature of a *Rṣi* (Rishi) or inspired poet-seer in the Indian tradition with the *Fili*, *Filed* or *Filid*, meaning also an inspired bard with divine powers, in the ancient Irish tradition. In the quotation from the Old Irish text given at the head of this paper, the word *Filed* occurs; and although I made a slight study of Old Irish, in some selections from its great classics and also in its historical grammar, it is from Dr. Raghavan's book that I came to know, evidently on the authority of Prof. Myles Dillon, that the word *Fili* (or *Filid*) etymologically means "one who knows what is best or most desirable", and the Sanskrit cognate of this Old Irish word, which is but a disguised compound, is *Varya-vid*. The Old Irish word as well as its Sanskrit equivalent are both based on an Indo-European word which can be reconstructed as **wolyo-wid*; and this **wolyo-wid* would regularly result in Old Irish *Filid* or *Fili*. This was the first noteworthy bit of information which I found in Dr. Raghavan's book; and there are numerous other similar interesting facts relating to the basic Indo-European heritage of the Sanskrit and the European world, which will be found scattered in Dr. Raghavan's book.

Through our languages, from Assam in the extreme East in India, right up to Ireland and Iceland in the extreme West in Europe, the entire Indo-European-speaking peoples are possessed of a common heritage of social and intellectual background and atmosphere, which is exceedingly wellworth enquiring into. And, as a matter of fact, eminent scholars, who have busied themselves with the linguistic palaeontology of the ancient Indo-European people, beginning, for example, with Otto Schrader and right down to Antoine Meillet and W. Brandenstein, have made notable discoveries. We may mention the two strata in the history of the primitive Indo-Europeans and their culture which

have been established by Brandenstein; and we can also mention the mentality and ideologies behind the primitive Indo-European conception of God and Man which have been elucidated by Meillet.

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Dr. Raghavan took in hand the preparation of a very important work in connection with Indological studies — it is a *New Catalogus Catalogorum* of Sanskrit manuscripts, which is to give a complete and up-to-date inventory of all Sanskrit and allied manuscripts which have been noted in the different collections of not only India but also outside India. The German scholar Theodor Aufrecht prepared such a consolidated catalogue over half a century ago; and since that period, thousands of other manuscripts have come to light, and they have been in some cases catalogued by the different institutions where they are housed, but mostly they were just noted and then neglected. Others are still crying for attention. The vastness of Sanskrit literature is one of the most astonishing things in the domain of the Humanities. No other language, ancient or mediaeval, can show such an extensive literary output. Only a small part of this literary wealth has been published; and in the interest of scholarship, there ought to be available, for all scholars interested in the subject, as complete an inventory as possible of both published and unpublished manuscript material. In some cases, new discoveries from among the manuscript wealth which still survives add significant light to our knowledge of Indian thought and culture, and have in many cases a value for Humanity even outside India. This work of bringing out a comprehensive catalogue has been taken up by Dr. Raghavan; and it presupposes an equipment, both deep and extensive, which only a scholar of the calibre of Dr. Raghavan possesses. The work has been sponsored by the University of Madras. In preparing his work, Dr. Raghavan found that in addition to whatever manuscript wealth was obtainable in India, and which has been already signalled in catalogues or hand-lists, there were also hundreds of other manuscripts — exiles from India — which were waiting for competent scholars to be properly noted and brought within the purview of a wider scholarly world. Catalogues of collections

in Europe have in some cases appeared. But inspite of it, there were evidences for other neglected sources which could profitably be tapped. For this purpose, with the co-operation of the University of Madras, and certain other learned bodies in Europe, Dr. Raghavan was enabled to visit a good many countries in Europe, making London his headquarters; and he has been able to find out and describe in the form of a catalogue some 20,000 hitherto unnoticed Sanskrit and other Indological manuscripts which lie scattered in various collections in the different countries of Europe. This work in itself, it can very well be imagined, is scholarly work of the highest character. On the top of this, Dr. Raghavan has made a detailed study of the situation for Sanskrit and allied studies in the different countries of Europe which he visited. Herein his vast knowledge in Indology in general and of Sanskrit literature in particular, and his fullest understanding and appreciation of what is being done in this field in Europe, have enabled him to give a very detailed objective report of how Indian studies are now proceeding in Europe. A book of this type, it can easily be understood, might become quite dull and dry-as-dust reading. But Dr. Raghavan's enthusiasm for his subject, and his sure eye, which spots out the basic things and things of general human interest, in both thought and culture, have given us a book which not only is crammed with facts but also possesses the warmth of an exposition of the working of the Indian spirit and the Indian mind among the intellectual *élite* of Europe.

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The great fact which is clearly brought out in his book is that a large section of European intellectuals, who have been able to free themselves from the jealously exclusive atmosphere of the Mediterranean tradition, as typified by Greek and Latin literatures and cultures, are feeling more and more attracted to the broader, more spacious and all-inclusive world of Sanskrit literature- True, they lack in Sanskrit literature the trim and well-cultivated background of a well-ordered garden, which we find as something pretty and easily appreciable, on the face of it, in the literatures of Greece and Rome - it being ungrudgingly and

whole-heartedly admitted that in Greek literature there is no lack of wonderful passages which transcend the limits of a small and a restricted cultivated area, and which give us glimpses of "other things that are great and shining" (*ta d' hetera, megala phanera t' ont' aiei*). In a word, familiar with the Alps as they were, they find themselves in the higher altitudes and the vastnesses of the Himālayas, when they turn to Sanskrit literature and the philosophy that is behind it. Scholars who want to delve deep into the mysteries of Being have found in the world of Sanskrit something which has a message for them also. These matters are now studied and observed by the select among the intellectual *élite* of Europe who have sought to add Sanskrit to their intellectual and spiritual heritage, which so long consisted of Greek and Latin, and perhaps also Hebrew. All this is now within the precincts of the Academy very largely; but it does not take long for an Indologist to come out of the closed doors of the Academy, to meet the man in the street and flood his mind with a new spirit of enquiry and new attitude towards the worlds of the seen and the Unseen. There are indications that the Indian spirit is slowly but certainly coming to be known and appreciated, even outside the circles of the elect who are busied with Sanskrit and allied studies. The message has been brought down to the people as a whole, during the last half of a century. And conspicuous among those who have helped to bring a new light and a new way of thinking into Europe and America, nurtured exclusively in the traditions of Hellenism, Romanism and Hebraism, were three Indians - the Prophet who proclaimed to the West the Divinity of Man and also strove for the suffering and down-trodden Humanity in India, the Poet-Seer who sang about Man and the Unseen Reality, glimpses of which he could enable people to catch through his deathless compositions, and the Philosopher and Teacher who by bringing together the accumulated mass of knowledge and experience of Humanity through Eastern Religion and Western Thought - the trio, Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. And along with them, each working in his own special field, were a number of great humanists in the different countries of Europe who made Sanskrit studies their special subject; and they, too,

have been preparing the ground for the ushering in and for an ultimate establishment of a New Renaissance in Europe—a Renaissance which may quite properly be described as an Indian Renaissance.

Dr. Raghavan's book gives us, though in brief form, some precious indications of how this New Renaissance is being achieved through the different University and other Centres of Europe, where European savants have accepted Sanskrit with open arms and are teaching and disseminating the Sanskrit language and the things of universal appeal in the realms of both the intellect and the spirit that are in its literature.

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In the 15th century, during the great days of European Renaissance (Hellenic Renaissance), the peoples of Western Europe felt an urge to discover the way to India and the countries of the Far East. This urge was primarily economic in its nature; and it was because they wanted to share in the very rich trade in commodities from India, South-Eastern Asia and from the Far East (like cotton textiles, steel, spices and silk) which were monopolised by the peoples of the Near East like the Persians, the Arabs, the Turks and the Italians, that they tried to find out a sea-route to India. The result was the discovery by Europe of the New World of America on the one hand, and of Africa, India, South-Eastern Asia and the Islands, and China and Japan, on the other. At first the European peoples were occupied with the exploitation of the material wealth of India and the East, and this was combined with a zeal for proselytisation by the Portuguese. The Portuguese and the Spaniards (the latter left Asia to the other peoples) the English, the Dutch and the French, and some of the other nationalities like the Danes, the Germans and the Swedes, started their rich business connections with India and the neighbouring countries during the 16th-18th centuries. But the intellect of Europe, which was freshly stimulated by the humanism of ancient Greece, could not remain confined merely to the material aspect of their connections with the Eastern countries. There were some among these Europeans trading or sojourning in the East who were actuated by an intellectual curiosity which sometimes went hand in hand with their

desire to propagate the Christian faith among the peoples of the East. This curiosity impelled them to take an interest in the civilisation and the languages of the Indians and other peoples. Already in the 16th century (as Dr. Raghavan informs us in his book), the Italian Filippo Sassetti (1540-1588), who spent 5 years in India, learnt Sanskrit, and he was the first modern European who did so. The German missionary Heinrich Roth who died in Agra in 1668, first sought to introduce a knowledge of Sanskrit to Europeans by writing a grammar of the language, which however still remains unpublished, and it was through him that the Devanāgarī alphabet was first printed and published in Europe in 1667. In the 18th century, when connections with India became closer, there were several persons from the different nations of Europe who discovered for themselves the existence of Sanskrit in India. A French missionary, Père Pons, wrote a Sanskrit grammar in Latin and sent Sanskrit manuscripts from India to Paris, and in 1739 he published from Paris an inventory of Sanskrit literature. The French Jesuit Father Coeurdoux noticed for the first time points of agreement between Sanskrit, Greek and Latin, in 1767. Another Roman Catholic clergyman hailing from Czechoslovakia also noticed this agreement.

But the great fact, of the existence of Sanskrit and its importance was announced formally and with *éclat* by two English scholars, Sir Charles Wilkins and Sir William Jones. They were responsible for the foundation of the Asiatic Society in Calcutta in 1784. Sir Charles Wilkins brought out a translation of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* directly from Sanskrit into English, and Sir William Jones is remembered as having ushered in a new era of scholarship in Europe by presenting his translation of the *Śakuntalā* of Kālidāsa into English in 1789. In 1786 Sir William Jones made this observation, which was epoch-making in its character: *The Sanskrit language, whatever its antiquity, is of a wonderful structure; it is more perfect than the Greek and more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either.* He further observed that the agreement among these three languages were so close and of such a character that one could not but come to the conclusion that all these three were derived from "a common source which is perhaps lost". To this group of

languages with a common origin, Sir William Jones also suggested adding the Celtic and Slav languages, and also the Iranian. The above observations brought in a revolution in the approach which Europe made in the study of language and of human origins. It was veritably the dawn of a new age—a New Renaissance which completed the work of the Hellenic Renaissance of the 15th-16th centuries. The attitude of the scholars towards human origins and linguistic relationships became completely changed. It was a remarkable intellectual re-awakening, the importance of which cannot be too highly emphasised. Sanskrit was received with enthusiastic welcome, and new sciences came to be born, and old sciences rejuvenated—like Comparative Grammar leading to the foundation of Linguistics as a modern science, Anthropology, Sociology, Religiology, and several other allied human sciences. The intellect as well as the emotions of Europe, particularly in Germany, were stirred to their depths. Of course, this was not an intellectual movement which immediately evoked a response among the masses. But it acted as a leaven mainly in the minds of "the Upper Ten," so to say, in the intellectual domain. English scholars learnt Sanskrit in India, and they taught it to French scholars in Paris early in the 19th century; and from Paris the knowledge of Sanskrit passed on to Germany, and to Scandinavia.

At first, after the discovery of Sanskrit, the attempt was to exploit the intellectual wealth of India, as far as they could do it. The material wealth of India and the East was already in the control of the English and other European powers. But the Intellect leads to the Spirit; and quite early, these studies transcended the merely intellectual plane, and in the case of a few ardent spirits it also profoundly influenced their spiritual outlook and aspirations. From an attempt at an intellectual exploitation of Sanskrit literature (and of the other great and original literature of the East, the Chinese), there developed the influence of the Sanskrit spirit on the spirit of Europe. Of course, every Sanskritist in Europe was not fully amenable to the spiritual side of Indian thought and culture. *But adeunt studia in mores.* There were two types of Sanskrit scholars. One type was occupied only with the intellectual side of it—the desire to

extend the bounds of European knowledge in whatever the Indian Man had done, and some of these scholars were not affected by any inner spiritual urge. Although this type of scholars was by far the larger in number, nevertheless their pre-occupations with Sanskrit helped to bring about some sort of familiarity with the Sanskrit world, with all its strangeness and its disconcerting ideologies, to a growing number of people. Then, there were the scholars of the other school, who, inspite of their Greek and Hebraic heritage, were profoundly impressed by the depth and the extent as well as the variety of Indian intellectual achievement and spiritual experience and intuition as presented by Sanskrit literature ; and such people were not insignificant in number either. As far as one can see (and I can speak from personal experience gathered in the course of my three years' stay as a student in London, Paris from 1919 to 1921, and from subsequent visits to different countries of Europe and of America), there is a very widespread leaning towards the philosophy of the Vedānta or towards Buddhism in the minds of the Indologists and scholars of the West who have an interest in the deeper questions of life and the Reality. Some of them, like my old *Guru* in London, the late Professor F. W. Thomas, and several others, were by conviction believers in the Vedānta approach (see Dr. Raghavan's book, p. 70). Others in a general way have developed a profound admiration for Indianism, or the Indian Attitude to Being and Becoming, and are virtually missionaries of it through their writings and their behaviour. Others are there, of course, who retain their faith in the European and Christian ideal and religion, and yet manifest a refreshing liberality of spirit at the same time.

From the intellectual exploitation of Sanskrit throughout the greater part of the 19th century, the emotional and aesthetic side of Indian culture as presented by the art of India came to be added to their cultural empire by the European scholarly world. First in Japan, Fenellosa and other American art-lovers discovered for themselves the greatness of Japanese art, and there were a few in Europe also who were similarly influenced. Then, from the art of Japan they passed on to the great art of China, and finally to that of India ; and a direct approach to Indian art and an

understanding of its value and its appeal were made by the Englishman E. B. Havell, who was responsible for a renaissance of the artistic soul of India by collaborating with Abanindranath Tagore in Calcutta. The spiritual side of India's culture was also now gradually coming to the front, and it is slowly and inevitably becoming a potent factor in the intellectual and spiritual make up of the Modern Civilised Man, not only in Europe but on the other continents also. The pioneer in this direction was Swami Vivekananda, who in 1893 gave to the Western World the message of the Vedānta and announced "the great hospitality of the Hindu, or Indian mind." In the line of this new intellectual-spiritual awakening and attitude which came to Europe and the West, we may mention an eminent personality like Romain Rolland, whose books on Mahatma Gandhi, Ramakrishna Paramahansa and Swami Vivekananda and whose personal contacts with Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore are important factors in the sphere of present-day Indo-European understanding.

The great parade of scholars of Indology in Europe is quite an amazing one, if we are to name the most outstanding personalities in this hierarchy. Leaving aside the other scholars who on their part also made significant contribution to the study of India in Europe, and also some living scholars who are brilliantly carrying on the tradition, we may mention some great names like Charles Wilkins, William Jones, William Colebrooke, Horace Hayman Wilson, G. A. Grierson, Monier Williams, A. A. Macdonell, Ralph T. Griffiths, A. Berriedale Keith and others from Great Britain, including the three present-day masters, Sir Ralph L. Turner and Professors H. W. Bailey and T. Burrow; the great line of linguistic scholars who made their brilliant *début* in Germany and Scandinavia and Italy during the last century, like the Brothers Grimm, Erasmus Rask, Franz Bopp, Karl Verner, F. S. Ascoli, W. Schleicher, and Karl Brugmann and his contemporaries, besides others like Schopenhauer, Deussen, Friedrich Max Müller, Weber, O. Schrader, A. Heinrich Lueders, Hermann Jacobi and other giants of 19th and 20th century German Indology; and Wackernagel and Leumann from Switzerland; and similar scholars from France, like Burnouf, Chézy, Sénart, and Lévi. Prof. Louis Renou

and Prof. Jean Filliozat are maintaining the tradition in France with conspicuous brilliance. The other countries of Europe had also contributed great names in this list, like Hendrik Kern and J. Ph. Vogel, C. Uhlenbeck and W. Speyer as well as Professor J. Gonda of Holland; Westergaard and Andersen in Denmark; Goressio, Kerbaker and Formichi in Italy, followed by G. Tucci, who is equally proficient in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese and is running that great centre of Indological Reserch in Italy—the National Italian Institute for the Middle and the Far East; we are to mention also Sten Konow and Professor Georg Morgenstierne from Norway, and Jarl Charpentier and Professor Helmer Smith from Sweden; and Professor Myles Dillon from Eire. There were also great scholars in the European countries of the Soviet Union like Czechoslovakia (Winternitz and Lesry'), Poland (Kurilowicz and others) and Russia itself (Fortunatov, Minayev, Vasiliev, Stcherbatsky and others). These scholars had inspired Indological studies for the last six generations and their line is not yet extinct—it is still flourishing, as amply indicated in Dr. Raghavan's book.

Dr. Raghavan has given a brief, but exceedingly informative and stimulating account of the position for Indological studies, and how the work is being carried on by present-day scholars in about 12 countires of Europe which he visited—Eire, Belgium, France, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy and Great Britain. He could not visit Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Spain and Portugal, but he has added brief notes on the situation there. He has at the end of his survey given a brief account of the work of the Association of British Orientalists, and of the International Union of Orientalists, in which he was, as one of the Secretaries of the All-India Oriental Conference, the representative from our country. He has also reproduced in his book a paper of his contributed in England on *The Orient and the West*.

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This book has its value to us in India, and it will be accepted in the countires of Europe as well, as it gives within a short compass the salient things that should be known about the endeavour of Europe to understand India. The Indological studies in Europe are fruitful in two ways—not only they are helping Europe to extend

the horizon of her mind by understanding India, but also the reaction of European Scholars to India and her culture has exerted a very potent influence indeed in our own country. At the beginning of the last century, Indian intellectuals were losing heart and also losing nerve because of the tremendous impact of the material culture of Europe, as typified by the English power, upon people already exhausted by several centuries of struggle with the uncompromising and aggressive forces of Islam in India. The study of Sanskrit in Europe and its reaction on the European mind put heart in us, and it filled us in India also with an urge to know ourselves and to find our place in the world, and in this way to vindicate our position. This curiosity which Europe showed towards India was in a way her greatest gift to India (a gift which she herself obtained from ancient Greece with its conception of *Anthropotes* or Humanity), as through this it was possible for us to know ourselves and to learn and appreciate our bearings in the present-day world. The immediate purpose of Dr. Raghavan's visit to Europe, of course, lay in the signalling of the unnoticed Sanskrit manuscript collections and in the writing of descriptive catalogues of these manuscripts. This he is doing elsewhere. But as a sort of a chip from his workshop, we have got this little book, which seeks to present the whole picture of Indian studies in present-day Europe.

There are in a book like this, embracing so many countries and written single-handed, from notes taken in the course of his busy wanderings, some faults of omission and commission, naturally enough. But these are very trivial, and they do not detract from the merits of the book. Thus occasionally foreign names outside of the English orbit have been misprinted, and here we would be justified in blaming the proverbial printer's devil rather than a scholar of the erudition and carefulness of Dr. Raghavan. Dr. Raghavan has mentioned the work that is being done in other domains of Indology than those connected with Sanskrit and allied languages. Thus, for example he has mentioned the work that is being done with regard to the Dravidian question. I would have liked him to mention also the work which the Norwegian scholars are doing through their Institute for Comparative Cultural Research at Oslo. Beginning from the second half of the last century, a bril-

liant group of Norwegian missionaries in India have done very valuable work in the Kol or Munda languages—particularly Santali. We may mention the work of Skrefsrud and P. Boddington. The latter scholar brought out in sumptuous editions an entire mass of Santali texts giving the popular literature of the Santals, with the original Santali in Roman characters and English translation opposite; and these texts, and other monographs, are invaluable for one section of the Indological studies. I would have liked also Dr. Raghavan to say more about the kind of work that is being done or was being done by Indian scholars in Europe, like the late K. V. Ramaswami, and Prof. Aravinda Bose, who is teaching Indian Philosophy at Durham University in England.

Having obtained so much from Dr. Raghavan, we are still inclined to ask for more. The personality of Dr. Raghavan has impressed, I am glad to note, European scholars of distinction. Prof. Louis Renou has referred to him in these terms; "carrying with a smiling ease the weight of an erudition, scarcely common, he knows to combine with a critical spirit the best traditional knowledge with the exigencies of research as practised in the West". Indeed, whenever I think of Dr. Raghavan, who has been my intimate friend for so many years, and was my very valuable colleague in the Government of India Sanskrit Commission, I have before me the picture of a "radiant energy" which suffuses the depth of his learning and the breadth of his vision. In spite of his other pre-occupations, I can only end with one suggestion: that Dr. Raghavan should bring out in the not very distant future a full and comprehensive account of Indological studies in all the countries of Europe and America ever since Sanskrit was introduced to these countries. I think that there would be very few scholars who would be able to do it properly: and let this present work, which all interested persons will appreciate and admire, be but an earnest of something fuller to follow, which will enable us all, in India and outside India, to understand and appreciate this New Renaissance which has come to the West through the latter's contact with India and with Sanskrit.

REVIEWS

STUDIES IN INDIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, by
Dr. U. N. Ghoshal, M.A., Ph.D. (Orient Longmans,
Bombay, Calcutta and Madras : 1957, pp. 538)

Dr. U. N. Ghoshal is one of our senior scholars of Indian History who, after retirement from active teaching work as Professor, are still carrying on their work of research and of bringing before the people the results of their investigations. As the author of *the History of Hindu Political Theories, Contributions to the History of the Hindu Revenue System, the Agrarian System of Ancient India* and *a History of Hindu Public Life*, Dr. Ghoshal is among the top-ranking scholars who are seeking to unravel India's past in the domain of not only actual achievement but also of theories and ideologies. The present work is a substantial one, running up to over 500 pages, and we have in it a number of valuable and suggestive papers on different aspects of Indian History and Culture in the different periods. In this work, which is in a way a restatement of some of his views, embodying as it does portions of previous articles which Dr. Ghoshal had produced some years ago, the variety and quality of the contents form quite a noteworthy addition to our exact knowledge of certain aspect of ancient Indian thought and culture.

The book consists of four Parts, each divided into a number of Chapters (the total number of Chapters comes up to 17) and the titles of these parts would indicate the scope of the work.

Part I is on "Studies in Ancient Historiography", in which the method of utilising relevant passages in Vedic, early Buddhist and Purāṇa texts for salvaging precious facts of positive history are discussed. In this part also Dr. Ghoshal has given a sort of an appreciative study of and commentary upon two of the most important historical compositions of ancient India—the *Harṣa-Carita* of *Bāṇa-Bhaṭṭa*, and the *Rājataranginī* of Kalhana. In this part a good deal of information which has not yet become the common property of students of History has been given about the

historical background of Vedic and Upanishadic texts, and the theories as well as methodologies of prominent workers in the domain of Purāṇa chronology are also critically discussed. It is interesting to find that one source for secular history in the Vedas, which survives only in fragments, occurred in the *Nārāśamsi* verses (*dāna-stutis*) and these are panegyrics of ancient Kings (the word literally means "praises of men"—and this was an old Indo-Iranian custom to have such panegyrics, because the equivalent word in Avestan, *Nairosangha*, is also found). I only wish that Dr. Ghoshal's criticism of the methodology followed by F. G. Pargiter, H. C. Ray Chaudhuri, S. N. Pradhan, A. D. Pusalker, G. S. Bose and P. L. Bhargava were discussed in greater detail. The methodology of some of these scholars would hardly stand the test of sober historical investigation, and a scholar of the authority of Dr. Ghoshal might have given his final appraisal, so that certain main chronologies which have been suggested by some of the above scholars, could be shown to be untenable. But we hope that in a subsequent edition, or, preferably, in a fresh article, Dr. Ghoshal would do this.

The chapters on the *Harṣa-Carita* and on the *Rājatarāṅgiṇī* are exceedingly readable, and the political and cultural history in its human background is very convincingly brought out. In this connection we are glad to note that Dr. Ghoshal has also appreciated the fine work in Hindi by Dr. V. S. Agravala on the *Harṣa-Carita*, in which he makes the age of Harṣa-Vardhana come up to us in its very living form. I think this chapter is a very readable critical study of the *Harṣa-Carita*, and so also is the next chapter on Kalhana's work.

Part II of Dr. Ghoshal's book discusses two topics—(1) Periods of Indian History, and (2) Dynamics of Indian History. He rightly condemns the division of Indian History into three categorical periods like Hindu, Muslim and British or Christian. It is indeed to be admitted that all serious historians of India do not follow this division any more. Although still the boundaries between ancient, mediaeval and modern periods in Indian History remain a little vague, nevertheless for practical purposes this is the best division. In section on the Dynamics of Indian History,

Dr. Ghoshal has given a rapid survey of the more important periods—the critical ages, so to say of the History of India.

Part III embodies some of the more important contributions of Dr. Ghoshal himself to ancient Indian Polity. He has here dealt with the basic genius of ancient Indian Polity, and has sought to find out political and constitutional significance of the various ceremonies which were in vogue in connection with the kingship and the kingly state in the Vedic Period, involving sacrifices like the *Rājasūya*, the *Punarabhiṣeka* and the *Aindramahābhiṣeka*. More interesting, because the matter goes to the fundamentals and even touches upon the bases of primitive Indo-European socio-political notions, are the conclusions on Vedic Political Institutions where he discusses terms like *Sabhā* and *Samiti*. He also takes into note the character of the ancient Indian Republics in so far as the subject can be studied from early Buddhist literature and from the writings of the Greeks who came to India after Alexander the Great. The status and functions of the king's ministers are also taken into consideration and Dr. Ghoshal gives his own interpretation of certain ancient Indian administrative terms and nomenclature, e. g. the Maurya terms (as in the inscriptions of Asoka) like *Rājūka*, *Prādesika* and *Yuta*, besides some terms which came into use in later periods like *Kuṇārāmātya*, *Daṇḍanāyaka* and *Mahādaṇḍanāyaka*. From the Pāla inscriptions of Bengal, a few terms like *Khola*, *Kaṭuka*, *Mahā-kaṭuka*, *Khaṇḍapāla*, *Khaṇḍa-rakṣa* are discussed. It is rather interesting that the word *Khola*, which has not been properly explained, is given as a *deśi* or aboriginal word by the lexicographers, and it may be questioned that, if it really means some kind of state official of a lower rank, like a messenger or a runner, can it be connected with the Munda word* *Kol* or in its ancient form *Kolla*, which means just 'a man', particularly of the aboriginal classes. And as for *Khaṇḍapāla* I would suggest the consideration of this meaning. It can be taken to mean just a 'sword bearer'—the word *khaṇḍa* is the source of the Bengali and other new Indo-Aryan *Khāṇḍā* (खण्डार) meaning 'a sword', specially when it is used for animal sacrifice. We have in Bengal a surname *Khāṇḍār* (खण्डार), the exact duty in ancient times of the caste bearing this title is not known.

Now, in Bengali we have also the word *Khāṇḍār* (খান্ডার), which means 'aggressive, bellicose, full of fighting spirit'.

In Part IV, Dr. Ghoshal has touched upon four different topics—one is an objective appraisal of slavery in India right down to about 800 A. D.; another, on that gruesome rite of cult or religious suicide by trying to decapitate oneself in honour of the Divinity one worshipped, of which practice there are several literary evidences and evidences in art; in another chapter, he discusses the two personalities in ancient Bengal History, Divya and Bhima, and suggests a number of problems for the Pāla period.

The last chapter within this part traces in what way there was political downfall of ancient India in its political side, and he has discussed it under six heads—political, military, social, economic, religious, and literary and artistic.

This work therefore, from a bare survey of its contents given above, indicates its wide scope; and the material collected so very conscientiously, and the interpretations offered by Dr. Ghoshal with such a judicious objective attitude, will certainly commend them to all students of Ancient Indian History and Culture.

Suniti Kumar Chatterji

SAMŚODHANA LEKHA SAMGRAHA, The late Shri H. N. Nene, Vidarbha Samsodhana Mandal Granthamala, No. 9 (Part I), Vidarbha Samsodhana Mandala, Nagpur, 1957, pp. 24 + 210, Rs. 4

The Student of Marathi language and literature will gladly welcome this collection of research articles a few of which deal with certain characteristic features of the Old Marathi language and the rest bring into light some works of the Mahānubhāva literature. Out of the 27 articles (enlisted towards the end) written by the late Shri NENE, the present collection includes 13 divided into two sections called (i) Old Marathi Literature (1-5) and (ii) Literature of the Mahānubhāvas (6-13). In fact the former section mainly considers the language of *Jñāneśvarī* and curiously includes *Pañcopākhyāna* of the Mahānubhāvas which ought to go to the next one strictly speaking. The latter part acquaints the reader with different pieces of works by the Mahānubhāva authors

written between śaka 1213 and 1697 approximately. Title of the first section is rather misleading.

A short biographical note by MM. Prof. V. V. MIRASHI informs the reader of the varied social activities of Shri NENE during his 30 years of stay in Nagpur. Besides his research in connection with the Mahānubhāvas NENE has to his credit two Sanskrit Text-books and a selection called "*Saṁskṛt Puṣṭakāra*" as also a book on education. This foremost explorer of the Mahānubhāva lore has fully utilized with unabating zeal what leisure he could steal from hazardous duties of a school teacher. NENE's genuine interest in his chosen field was so deep that it led his acquaintances almost to identify him with the Mahānubhāvas and call him one in joke. NENE is well-known for his editions of *Līlācaritra*, *Drṣṭāntapāṭha*, *Ācāraśhaḥ Lakṣṇa-ratnākara*, *Ratnamālāstotra* etc.

Besides the above mentioned works of Mahānubhāva literature, NENE has taken thorough notice of the following compositions as incorporated in the second section of this collection on hand. *Rukmiṇī Svayaṁvara* of Narendra (śaka 1213), *Saihādri-varṇana* of Raval Vyāsa (śaka 1254), *Sthāna Pothī* of Muni Vyāsa (śaka 1275), *Anvayasthaḥ* and *Vṛddhācāra* of Kṛṣṇa bāsa, *Anvayasthaḥ* of Kṛṣṇa Muni, *Gadyarāja* of Hayagrīvācārya (śaka 1238-46) which is the commentary in verse on the 10th skandha of the *Bhāgavata*. *Rukmiṇī Svayaṁvara* of Gopāla Kavi (śaka 1506) and *Praśnārṇava* of Gopi Bhāskara (śaka 1515-1600) containing 1500 questions and answers to them. *Pañcopākhyāna* which is the Mahānubhāva version of Sanskrit *Pañcatantra* is written by Amkuranera Datta Muni in Śaka 1697.

It is to be noted that these are not mere Ms-notices. One finds here discussions about the author, his date, contents of the work, broad features of its language, orthographic peculiarities, style etc. taking due cognizance of opinions of other scholars. NENE has reproduced text-material sufficient to substantiate his statements and in the case of the two *Anvayasthaḥ* and *Vṛddhācāra* he has made the entire text available as that is an important record of the Mahānubhāva tradition of authors and their compositions together with some anecdotes connected with them.

Article on the grammar of *Jñāneśvarī* is only a rapid survey recording some salient features of the language of *Jñāneśvarī*.

A representative instance of NENE's critical acumen is his presentation of the variety of derivations with their significances from the verbal base *lāga-*, but one has to be cautious before accepting some of his statements especially about phonology. Since the publication of this article in *Jñāneśvara Darśana* about 25 years back the language of *Jñāneśvarī* has been studied in its phonological and morphological details but syntax has not been done justice hitherto.

NENE points out that a form like *jūntale* would be more suitable in the place of *kāmtale* but for want of trust-worthy support he could not accept it. No noun meaning "a horse" appears any where in the group of stanzas concerned but it is to be understood for its adjectives. The significant nominal variant *Vārū* for *Kāmtale* is found only in the Vipra text of *Jn.* which has that ovi as:--

हो कां सार विजयाचें । कीं तें आंडार महातेजाचें ।
तेथ गरुडाचे जावलिचे । वारु च्यारि ॥

In the presence of this ovi the difficulty dissolves of itself but the problem of the meaning of *Kāmtale* remains unsolved.

Kāmtale "carved, well cut" is not out of place in *Śiśupālavadha* 994 as against *Olilā* "cast, moulded" in the next line. Its occurrence in *Rukmiṇī Svayamvara* of Saṁtoṣa Muni Kṛṣṇadāsa preceded by the word *karḍe* "grey" should mean 'shining, bright,' as the grey colour is in itself a combination of white and black. Moreover the word *śveta* "white" is to be seen in the preceding line which contains another word *Kumaita* which kind of horse has nothing of whiteness in his colour. White colour is, however, signified by the word *Kāmtalā* in *Śiśu* - 996 supported by the *Tipanagrantha*. Where it is an extension of meaning "shining, bright" to be derived from √*Kam* and not √*Krt* as in the other case.

Sphurat < *Sphura* < *sura* in the etymology of *Suravāḍa* as suggested by NENE is not acceptable because the consonant cluster *Sph* in Sk tends to be *pph* in Pk and *ph* in Marathi e. g. *phāra* (Sk. *sphāra*), *phuṭaneṁ* (Sk. *sphuṭ-*) etc. It is, however, to be remembered that NENE was interested much more in new finds in the unexplored field of literature than in deep study of the language.

During the last 35 years a band of scholars like NENE, BHAVALKAR, BHAVE, DESHPANDE, KOLTE and others have brought forward adequate literary material of the Mahānubhāvas. It is time now to evaluate properly Mahānubhāva literature as a whole with a fresh outlook and to analyse thoroughly the language in all its aspects from a scientific view point which is still a desideratum.

M. G. Panse

A CRITICAL STUDY OF ŚRĪHARṢA'S NAIṢADHIYACARITAM, M. S. University of Baroda Research Series 2
By Dr. A. N. Jani, M.A., Ph.D. Oriental Institute, Baroda
1957, Pp. XXXII+281+60+XXXVI; Price Rs. 15

This critical study of the Naiṣadhiyacaritam is remarkable for its stupendous labour, its indefatigable search for minute details, and the scrupulous care with which every statement and observation is corroborated with appropriate references. It deals comprehensively with every aspect of the work. It is divided into two parts: part I deals with (A) the text and (B) the author. In (A) the author gives a summary of the poem, discusses the sources and innovations as also the controversies regarding the extent of the poem and interpolations, and lastly, by almost monumental patience and industry brings to light for the first time as many as fifty commentaries, giving such details about the personal history, works and dates of these commentators as could be gathered by an exhaustive study of all available Mss catalogues, by correspondence with scholars working in the field, and by wide divagation into research journals in search of information about the subject. In (B) he discusses such topics as the life and personality of Śrīharṣa, his home, his works, his date and his erudition. In examining the question of the home of the poet, Dr. Jani has marshalled together all internal evidence such as peculiar words like tāla, lalaḍḍimba, annamīna etc. which are peculiar to Bengal; the peculiarities of the Bengali tongue which makes no distinction in the pronunciation of the three sibilants শ, স, ষ; regards the letters ঞ, ণ, ণ্ (when ণ্ begins

a word) as identical with न्, व्, and ज्ञ; looks upon ष in क्ष as ख्. The poet has taken advantage of this Bengali mode of—pronunciation and as a result we have many instances of alliteration, analogue-ridden or otherwise—such as वृषस्य पश्यता, बालामभाषत सभासततप्रगल्भा, यातु ततो जातु न यातुधानः and others, which clearly indicate that the poet's mother-tongue was Bengali. There are again quite a large number of Bengali customs alluded to by the poet which points in the same direction. Dr. Jani wisely refrains from giving a dogmatic judgment, but cautiously concludes that Śrīharṣa was a Bengali by blood and his father being patronized by the king of Kanouj, lived at his court. Dr. Jani certainly deserves the high compliment given to him by MM. Prof. V. V. Mirashi who says "In controversial matters he has stated all views clearly and has evaluated the available evidence dispassionately".

Part II gives a cultural and literary evaluation of the poem. For this he has ransacked the text for geographical, political, social and religious data—but one feels that this attempt to give a picture of mediaeval society scarcely leads to any very convincing or fruitful result. One may ask what addition to our knowledge is made by findings such as these:— the institution of castes, characterized the Indian Society of Śrīharṣa's day and that Brahmins were highly respected; that occupations in ancient India were hereditary and that those for different castes were laid down by the law-givers; that the system of Gotra and Pravara exogamy was prevalent, and that marriages were celebrated with pomp and ceremony; that people were superstitious and believed in different kinds of omens and so on. Indian Society, despite cataclysmic political upheavals, has remained almost static during the mediaeval period, and contact with foreigners has but touched the fringe and surface of its conservative soul. Beyond confirming these glimpses of our land, Dr. Jani's meticulous study of these aspects of our society does not carry us any further, or shed any new light on the subject. One may question the relevance of the entire disquisition on Pauranic Geography with a detailed description of the Sapta-Dvīpas; and similarly the inventory of places and of kings and the countries ruled by

them does not make any distinct contribution to our knowledge of history, as it is not possible to regard it as a reflex of the actual political condition of his day, but is merely a conventional and imaginary description.

In regard to the literary estimate of the poem, the author rightly observes that as in the case of Somadeva, the author of the *Vasantatilakacampū*, so in the case of the author of the *Naiṣadhiya*, his poetry is merely a by-product of his philosophical studies. Gadādhara, one of the numerous commentators of the poem, informs us that the poem was written by Śrīharṣa only to remove the charge against him that he was only a dry philosopher. It was our poet's boast that the Goddess of learning sported with him whether it was the rosy bed of poetry or the thorny bed of logic: (साहिष्ये सुकुमारवस्तुनि दृढन्यायग्रहग्रन्थिले तर्के वा मयि संविधातरि समं लीलायते-भारती ॥); unfortunately, however, the thorns are mixed up with the roses with the result that his poem is a masterly specimen of the poetry of erudite oddity. It is rightly described as *विद्वदौषधम्*—and being a repository of traditional learning it has proved a touchstone to Sanskrit scholarship. But this very weight of heavy erudition together with a style which is artificial in the extreme, the studied attempt at obscurity, his predilection to use difficult grammatical forms, the stilted phrase and awkward periphrasis, and words which seem to be culled from the lexicons, the recondite allusions forbid the claim of the poet to take his rank among the foremost of our Olympians. We look in vain for the winged phrase, for the magic and witchery or the transcending and transforming vision that declare the true poet. There is considerable truth in the story which narrates that the great critic Mammaṭa expressed deep regret that he had not seen the poem earlier: for to him the work was invaluable not for its merits, but for its defects, and that he would have been saved a lot of trouble in hunting out defects from a large number of literary works for the chapter on Doṣa in his *Kāvya-prakāśa*, if only he had come across the work before writing that chapter! Equally sound is the judgment of Jagannātha that Śrīharṣa's style is *क्रमेलकवत् असंशुल*,—jagged and uncouth like a camel's body. In view of this it would be difficult to endorse Dr. Jani's view

that the poem is a fine specimen of the Vaidarbhi style. This is not to say that the poem is entirely devoid of poetic charm—for in several places he surprises us by the lyric flow of his diction. The fact of the matter seems to be that the style is most unequal and many of the defects are peculiar to the age of decline.

The work is fully documented. There are as many as fourteen very useful appendices; and the full bibliography in the beginning makes the work a veritable encyclopaedia on Śrīharṣa.

A word about the language of the book. It is with very great reluctance that one has to remark that the author is very careless in the use of the English language—as is clear from his misuse of the definite article, the mistakes of spelling, his disregard for the sequence of tense and the indiscriminate use of the present continuous. A few examples will suffice:—Articles:— In honour of Sun (P. 231); we have *the* reference to the idols of Śiva, Viṣṇu (P. 231); where in case of Damayanti; Spelling mistakes:— Betal (P. 212); anointing (P. 227, and 231); younder (P. 207); gynaeceum for gynaecium (P. 105); grammer for grammar (P. 118); interpretes for interprets (P. 256); *Tourse de force* for *tour de force* (P. 246 and p. 259); Tense-sequence:— the presence of the goddess Śaśī was essential during a Svayamvara ceremony if it is to pass off smoothly (P. 235); thus he conveyed that he is craving for her etc. (P. 213); a youth suggested by cutting a piece of pickle that he *will* kiss his beloved on her lips (P. 213); the ladies were educated and they *can* read and write letters (P. 215); It was an age of learning and hence the scholars *were considering* themselves blessed if they *can* defeat their adversaries in disputation (P. 205); Present and Past continuous:— Ladies *were taking* as usual, the prominent part (P. 198); Ratnākara's Haravijaya, which *is consisting* of 50 cantos (P. 25); he informs us that the Nc *was consisting* of one hundred cantos (P. 24); A person who did not have any guests to treat *was lamenting* his misfortune and was considering him a cursed one (P. 233).

Here are violations of the idiom of the language:— these drawbacks are *too less* to belittle the greatness of the poem (P. 271); a copy of the Ms of the Nc was purchased by *some* Ānā

Suśrāvaka (P. 216). It was actually stolen by *some* Śivabhaṭṭa Landge (P. 280), obviously for *one* Śivabhaṭṭa Landge: the body of a lewd woman *who was addicted to polygamy* (P. 229); she insists once more to tell him his name (P. 5); a banquet where the guests are *treated with* different types of dishes (P. 9). Here are a few very queer and novel words coined from his mint—a religious *observant* (P. 233); *simpletonness* (P. 213). Here is a sentence from which one is unable to extract any meaning:—“It is difficult to have an ideal society which is entirely immune from vices and which is ever glorious on account of leading a pious, virtuous and honest life in contradistinction to societies which we have, where social sanctions and social codes to uphold the customs, conventions which inhibit the aberrations of behaviour of the units of the society, e. g. commission of crimes rules of etiquette, vices etc, will be nullified and will be the objects of dreams” (P. 228-329). I have taken a few instances at random. But here is the result of the patriotic fervour of our politicians who have pontifically laid down that English must not be studied for more than four years in the Secondary Education stage!

C. R. Devadhar

THE PADĀRTHATATTVANIRŪPAṆAM OF RAGHUNĀTHA ŚĪROMANĪ Ed. by Karl H. Potter, Pub. by Harvard University Press (Cambridge, Mass., U. S. A., 1957, pp. ix, 102), with Introduction, Skt. Text in Roman characters, and Translation Commentary, Select Bibliography and Skr. Index.

This work contains the text, an English translation and a running commentary thereon of the ‘Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam’ of Raghunātha Śīromanī, who lived about 1500 A. D. The most important work of Raghunātha, however, is his commentary on Gaṅgeśa’s ‘Tattvacintāmaṇi’, and consequently he is known as the founder of the Navadvīpa-school of Nyāya.

Dr. Potter deserves to be congratulated on having performed the task very well indeed. In his commentary Dr. Potter shows a very keen insight and seems to have entered into the very

spirit of the Navya-Nyāya. In the introduction Dr. Potter refers to the difficulty of proper English equivalents for words like द्रष्टृ etc.. This difficulty is encountered by all translators of Sanskrit philosophical works; the present writer having tried a number of equivalents for द्रष्टृ decided ultimately to leave the word as it is to be understood by the reader to the best of his ability !

The introduction, though a small one, is compact with much valuable material and on the whole we have nothing but praise for this monograph which is well printed and has an attractive appearance. By the by, why does Dr. Potter, who is very careful to use the diacritical marks correctly, write 'Sutra' instead of 'Sūtra' (p. 1 introduction-twice, p. 2.)? Possibly he considers the word sufficiently baptized in the English language so as not to require the appendage of a diacritical mark.

R. D. Karmarkar

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- 1 VEDĀRTHASAMĠRAHA OF ŚRĪ RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA by S. S. Raghavachar (Publishers—Sri Ramkrishna Ashrama, Mysore); pp. vi, 168, Price Rs. 3.
 - 2 INTRODUCTION TO THE VEDĀRTHASAMĠRAHA OF ŚRĪ RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYA by S. S. Raghavachar (Publishers—The Mangalore Trading Assn. (Private) Ltd. Mangalore 1), pp. xiii, 122+4, Price Rs. 3-8.

The above two volumes containing the text and translation of 'Vedārthasamgraha' of Śrī Rāmānujācārya and an English introduction to the same by S. S. Raghavachar are very nicely printed and have an attractive appearance. The 'Vedārthasamgraha' is an important work of Śrī Rāmānuja and is said to be his first work. The translation, on the whole, is well done; the difficulties in translating philosophical works in Sanskrit are patent enough. A literal translation becomes cumbrous and unintelligible. A free translation, on the other hand, does not make it quite clear whether the writer has really understood the text. The 'Vedārthasamgraha', however, being only intended to be a work more or less for the beginners, does not present many obstacles in this behalf.

The introduction to the 'Vedārthasaṃgraha' is a more ambitious work. It tries to put forward Rāmānuja's philosophy in its proper historical setting. There is a detailed discussion of the various points on which Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara differ, and the view of Rāmānuja is put forth ably. It appears to us, however, that the writer should have tried to answer the possible criticism against the view of Rāmānuja by the Advaitins; for instance, while pointing out the 'Anupapattis' in the Avidyā doctrine it should have been noted that the Advaitin could easily dispense of the same by simply saying that he is not interested in discussing the whereabouts of Avidyā as he would not be interested in knowing the same of the अविद्या. However, on the whole, the book contains sufficient material for detailed study and the proper understanding of Rāmānuja's view-point. Now and then, the writer compares the views of Rāmānuja with those of modern philosophers like Bradley etc.. One is annoyed to find that the book does not show its contents; it is only by running through the various pages that one finds that there is a preliminary section containing 7 sub-sections, pp. 1-26. Then follows the expository section, pp. 27-123. Then comes the philosophy of the end, pp. 123-147; and lastly the philosophy of the way, pp. 148-167. But this material could certainly have been rearranged in a more methodical manner. A very serious defect in the book is that it has no index. It is now regarded as an essential part of a book to have an index referring at least to the important points. We hope that some of these points referred to above would be taken into account at the proper time. On the whole, we think that the book will enable the reader to grasp Rāmānuja's philosophical ideas without great difficulty. The book would be a good addition to philosophical literature about Rāmānuja.

R. D. Karmarkar

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES—1 by Prof. M. Hiriyanna, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, First Published in 1957, Cloth bound, pp. 149.

This book contains in all nineteen essays in philosophy by the late Prof. Hiriyanna. Of these the first sixteen are reprints of what the Professor had written from time to time in different Journals during the period 1924-1946. Some extra notes have been added to these essays in this present edition, which are extremely valuable. The three additional essays namely, *Drk-drśya-viveka*, *Abhāva* and *The Paradox of Negative Judgment*, printed for the first time comprise only some fifteen pages; but they are compact with rich philosophical thought.

It is quite unnecessary to say anything by way of praise of this valuable work in the realm of Indian Philosophy the late Professor has done. We are quite sure that students of Indian Philosophy would heartily welcome this volume and profit very much by a careful perusal of it.

R. D. Karmarkar

DATTĀTREYA by His Highness Sri Jaya Chamarajendra Wadiyar Bahadur, Maharaja of Mysore, Published by—George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, First published in 1957, pp. XV, 285.

The book comprises four chapters. Ch. I mentions 'The divine in man' or the grace of god as the essential character for the co-ordination of all into a meaningful experience.

Ch. II Speaks of 'Dattātreyā—the Absolute'; four ślokas from the Śāṇḍilya-Upaniṣad are here paraphrased and a few words on 'Meditation' follow.

Ch. III provides us with the text, translation, and the commentary on the 'Jīvanmukta-gītā', an unpublished work so far. It also considers the conception of the incarnation of Dattātreyā, Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic versions of the birth of Dattātreyā who is conceived as the essence of everything in the world.

Ch. IV introduces us to the 'Avadhūta-gītā'. A brief comparison between the 'Avadhūta-gītā' and the 'Bhagavadgītā' is given; the first five ślokaś from the 'Avadhūta-gītā' are translated and commented upon. Then follows an academic discussion of the defects of empirical philosophy, the importance of verbal testimony and so on; then the scope of 'Avadhūta-gītā' is discussed and lastly the text, translation and commentary on the 'Avadhūta-gītā' are offered.

Thus the author has cleverly arranged the contents of the book. The translation, though not literal is true to the meaning to a large extent. Copious quotations from all the different major and minor Upaniṣads and other works, reveal the scholarly bias of the author.

The system of relegating the quotations towards the end is inconvenient to readers. The academic discussions, at times, seem tiresome and the repetitions mar the interest in reading. The outlook seems to be devotional rather than critical. One would have very much liked a more detailed account of the evolution of the present image-form of Dattātreya, of the manner in which this worship came into prominence and how it is carried out in the different regions of Bhārata. Such an account could have considerably enhanced the value of the book. The author could have referred to several 'Dattagītās' in this connection.

On the whole, it would be a valuable piece of work adding to our knowledge of Dattātreya.

Mrs. S. V. Oka

ANANDAVARDHANA'S DHVANYĀLOKA OR THEORY
OF SUGGESTION IN POETRY (Translated into English
with notes) by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, M.A., B.L., Ph.D.,
Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Kanara
College, Kumta (Karnatak University). Published by
Oriental Book Agency, 15 Shukrawar, Poona 2. (1955)
Pages xxii + 184. Price Rs. 12-8-0

The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana (9th century A. D.) is acknowledged to be a classic of the Principles of Sanskrit Literary Criticism. It has not, however, been as widely and deeply studied as it deserves. This advanced work on Sanskrit Rhetorics with its subtleties and intricacies has proved rather difficult and frightening to the common student and the general reader. The present work, the *first complete* English translation of the Dhvanyāloka with notes, is therefore, a veritable boon to the students of Literary Criticism in general and of Sanskrit Literary Criticism in particular.

Sanskrit Rhetorics, and particularly Dhvanyāloka has been the translator's special subject of study for over a decade. 'The Dhvanyāloka and its Critics' formed the subject of his thesis for the Ph. D. degree which he took in 1947. Some parts of the thesis have already appeared since then in the academic journals. The present translator has also published a complete Kannada rendering of not only Dhvanyāloka but also of Kāvyaadarśa, Kavyālamkāra and Kāvyaaprakāśa. The present English translation, therefore, comes from a deep scholar well-versed in the subject.

In the translation of such standard Sanskrit treatises teeming with technical terms and involved expressions, the translator has to perform a very difficult and delicate task. He has to be faithful to the original and, at the same time, lucid and readable. He has to steer clear of the Scylla of inaccuracy and the Charybdis of obscurity. It is a matter of gratification that the present translator has done his task admirably. The translation generally reads well and being on the whole, faithful to the original is generally free from clumsiness and obscurity.

Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar, M.A., D.Litt. of the Andhra University has written a fine, discerning foreword to the book in which he has brilliantly indicated the importance of such translations as the present one from the perspective of the canons of Aesthetic Criticism.

V. M. Bedekar

SANSKRIT STUDIES BY M. HIRIYANNA published by Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, (1954), pages 63, Rs. 4

The late Prof. M. HiriyanNA is well-known as a great exponent of Indian Philosophy. The present volume presents him as a connoisseur of Sanskrit Literature. The present work is a collection of his early writings on Classical Sanskrit Literature most of which he had contributed to several journals. Among the articles included in this volume, three are more or less summaries of the plots of 'Svapna-Vāsava-Dattam', 'Mālati-Mādhavam' and 'Uttara-Rāmacaritam', and two are reviews of Keith's 'Classical Sanskrit Literature' and 'A History of Sanskrit Literature'. Only two articles in the collection—one on 'Sanskrit Poetry: a historical retrospect' and the other on 'Kālidāsa'—deal with some fundamental aspects of Sanskrit Literature and Literary Criticism. All the articles are, of course, marked by the same succinctness and clarity which are the hall-mark of Prof. HiriyanNA's philosophical writings.

V. M. Bedekar

CĀṆAKYA'S APHORISMS IN THE HITOPADEŚA (I-IV)

by Ludwik Sternbach

This is a collection of the author's papers which recently appeared in the Journal (vols 76 and 77) of the American Oriental Society. This valuable study forms part of the author's well-known series of studies called "Juridical Studies in Ancient Indian Law".

Nārāyaṇa who is believed to be the author of the Hitopadeśa has drawn copiously for his didactic material on other literary sources. As Ludwik Sternbach, the author of these papers, remarks, Nārāyaṇa has borrowed nearly one-third of the didactic stanzas in the Hitopadeśa from the Pañcatantra. The other source from which Nārāyaṇa has lavishly borrowed is Cāṇakya's compendia of aphorisms which are known today under numerous titles. The author has traced 163 stanzas (158 in the body of his papers and 5 in the post scriptum added to this present collection of papers) i. e. more than one-fifth of the stanzas of the Hitopadeśa to compendia attributed to Cāṇakya.

The compendia of Cāṇakya, on which the author has drawn, fall as divided by him, into the following versions: (i) The Vṛddha Cāṇakya (ii) The Laghu Cāṇakya (iii) The Cāṇakya-rāja-nīti-śāstra (iv) the Cāṇakya-sāra-saṁgraha (v) the Cāṇakya-nīti-Śāstra.

The date of the composition of Cāṇakya's aphorisms is, of course, a matter of speculation. But as the author has remarked, it is safe to assume that the aphorisms of Cāṇakya were known as early as the 7th century A. D., since Daśakumāracaritam mentions that Ācārya Viṣṇugupta compiled for the Maurya King six thousand Ślokaś on Political Science. The work referred to by Daṇḍin more probably refers to the compendia of Cāṇakya than to Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra which is written in prose.

The Hitopadeśa stanzas which the author has quoted are grouped by him according to ten different topics such as the King and his officials, wealth and poverty, knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, women in general etc. Such a grouping, as the author remarks, makes it possible to analyse together similar stanzas.

This highly painstaking and scholarly study is very valuable not only from the point of the analysis of the some of the source-material which has gone to make up the compilation of the Hitopadeśa but also from the fact that it has precisely indicated the nature and the extent of the borrowing from that particular source viz. the aphorisms passing under the name of Cāṇakya.

V. M. Bedekar

AVADHŪTA : REASON AND REVERENCE by H. H. Sri Jayachamarajendra Wodiyar, Governor of Mysore, published by the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore 4 (1958), pages 16, Re. 1

This brochure presents an address delivered by H. H. Jayachamarajendra Wadiyar, Governor of Mysore, on the occasion of the opening of the new hall of the Library of the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore. The author, who has already published his great scholarly work on 'Dattātrēya', has chosen for his present eloquent discourse the concept of Avadhūta—the ascetic of the highest order 'who signifies the highest development of the life of

the spirit attainable by a human being' (p. 3). According to the author, the Avadhūta combines in himself 'a harmonious blend of reason and reverence'. The author illustrates his interesting thesis by narrating in detail a story from the Bhāgavata-Purāṇa in which the Avadhūta points out to king Yadu how his intellect, 'through the help of observation and inference', had led him to discover the 24 preceptors including among them such diverse ones as the great Elements, the moth, the raven and the worm who by their example and behaviour taught him to be a great wanderer all over the world without attachment and with perfect bliss. Here are "logic and reason combined with a deep love and reverence for God's creation".

V. M. Bedekar

'RĀMA-BHAKTİMĒṆ RASIKA-SAMPRADĀYA'—by Dr. Bhagavati Prasād Simha, M.A., Ph.D., Principal, D. A. V. College, Balarāmpur. Publisher: Avadhā-Sāhitya Mandir, (Gouda) U. P. (Samvat 2014=1957 A. D.), pages 16 + 627. Price: Rs. 15

To a general reader interested in the history and the development of the religious systems in India, it is a matter of common knowledge that the cult of erotic devotional mysticism ('Madhurā Bhakti' or 'Rasika Sampradāya') developed as an integral part in the Vaiṣṇavite or Kṛṣṇaite Sect and reached its culmination in some of the most important Vaiṣṇavite sub-sects. But few, outside the small circle of scholars and the esoteric coterie of the initiated devotees, would have an idea of how a similar tendency of erotic devotion developed in the Rāma Sect and growing in all its full strength finally culminated in the full-fledged 'Rasika' cult of that sect commanding the unswerving allegiance of millions of adherents. This lacuna from the point of the general reader has been very ably and generously filled by the learned author of the present volume in Hindi under review. Not only the general lay reader but also the scholar will feel deeply indebted to the author for having been furnished with a vast source-material, presented with great industry and scholarship—the fruit of study of over two decades.

In this impressive tome of over 600 pages, Dr. Bhagavati Prasād Simha has traced, with a rich wealth of quotations from original literary sources, the historical growth of the element of Love entering the Rāma Sect and its development, during the last four hundred years, into a full-fledged cult of Erotic Mysticism attended with all the grand paraphernalia of a full-scale Tāntric system of worship. Kṛṣṇa has come to be considered in popular imagination and tradition as a paragon par excellence of the spirit of 'sport and play' (Līlā-Puruṣottama), and could well become the idol of erotic devotion. Rāma, on the other hand, was regarded, in popular tradition, as the paragon par excellence of 'restraint, propriety, control' (Maryādā-Puruṣottama) and as such would not, one can imagine, lend himself as an ideal object for erotic devotion. From the point of the psychology of religious experience, however, it is interesting to find how in the 'Rasika' cult, the imagination of highly devotional people, perhaps under the impact of the rival Kṛṣṇa cult, dallied with the personality of Rāma and created out of him a supreme Divine Lover disporting himself in the company of his Beloved Sītā in Sāketa, an imaginary heaven of exuberant sensuousness. The author has described (chap. III) this heaven and its terrestrial counterpart in the minutest details taken from the canonical literature of the cult. In the centre of Ayodhyā which is considered a terrestrial counterpart of the heavenly Sāketa-Loka, there is, it is believed, a golden Palace of Love and Sport where in one of the inner apartments, Sītā and Rāma lie in repose. The devotees of this 'Rasika' Cult are to consider themselves the brides of Rāma or the female friends (Sakhī) of Sītā. They have, however, no direct access to the presence of the Lord. They are only a part of Sītā's entourage and can only indirectly seek the Lord's favour through His Beloved Sītā who is therefore, the focus of their attention. It is she who wields, with her feminine charms, great power over her Lord and in her infinite mercy, makes him relent towards the human devotees.

A reader can have an idea of the deep devotional fervour and the *penchant* for creating esoteric minutiae which had seized the mystic saints of this cult, from a perusal of chapters IV and V of the book. In chap IV, the author gives an elaborate description

of as many as 24 different sub-schools into which this 'Rasika' cult of Rāma has proliferated, each having its own separate tradition, technique and insignia of worship. In chap. V, the author has given a short survey of the literature of the cult during the last four hundred years of its growth, along with a short review of the lives of the saints who contributed to its literature and growth by their noble precept and practice. It was the saint Agradās 'Agra-Ali' of Rajputana who gave the 'Rasika' cult of Rāma its first organized form which was perfected later on by the Saint Rasikāchārya Rāmacharanādās of Ayodhyā (c. 1760 A. D.).

This cult of erotic mysticism naturally laid a more or less exclusive emphasis on the erotic aspect of Divine Love. From the point of the psychology of the ordinary people, it had its obvious limitations. The author of this book, alive to these limitations, has very candid and pertinent remarks to offer in the concluding chapter of the book. He says: "It is the erotic sentiment of youthful love which plays the dominant role in this cult. Consequently, the larger aspect of Rāma's life has been ignored. In an attempt to invest ordinary incidents and situations with an erotic meaning, a total perspective has been lost, resulting in general imbalance and fall from fine literary taste", (p. 549) "The discriminating teacher-saints of this cult are against throwing open or propagating the doctrines and literature of this cult to all and sundry. They regard it as a secret and esoteric doctrine to be imparted only to the few initiated individuals" (p. 552). (—translated from the original Hindi).

The book is copiously illustrated with the photographs of the mystic saints of the cult and the pictures of the various symbols of the system. There are useful appendices at the end, extending over 69 pages, dealing with the bibliography, the technical terms of the cult and the names of literary works and their authors.

A learned and discerning foreword is written by Mahamahopādhyāya Gopināth Kavirāj. Regarding the pioneering character of this work, we can do no better than quote the following words of Mm. Gopināth Kavirāj: "The record of the sentiment of erotic devotion and the play of the Lord, which the author has presented

in this book on the basis of the literature dealing with the erotic devotional mysticism centred around Rāma, convinces us that this great literature deserves to be regarded as one of the highly precious treasures of Hindi Literature. It is a matter of regret that it lay neglected so long for want of good research in this field". (translated from the original Hindi).

V. M. Bedekar

EARLY INDIAN MONASTERIES by B. C. Law, M. A.,
Ph. D., Transaction No. 22 (January 1958) of the Indian
Institute of World Culture, Bangalore 4, pages 2+24,
Price Rs. 2

The Āśrama, the Vihāra, the Ārāma, and the Sanghārāma connote an institution which has from very early times profoundly influenced the religious and spiritual life of India. In this short monograph under review, the author has given a short description, with a geographical location, of the early Indian Monasteries, supported by evidence from literary and other sources. Especially interesting is the information culled from Buddhist Sources and from the travel-accounts of the two famous Chinese pilgrims Fā-Hien (5th century A. D.) and Hiuen Tsang (7th century A. D.). About 8 monasteries where, according to the Buddhist canonical literature, Buddha and his disciples lived during their itineraries have been described, as also the 3 monasteries which Fa Hien had visited and also over three dozen other monasteries visited by Hiuen Tsang. Many of these monasteries were big monasteries which could accommodate 3000 to 8000 monks. Regarding the remarkable architecture which distinguished many of them, the following passage is worth quoting :

" The Pigeon (Pārāvata) monastery as seen by Fa-Hien at Dakṣiṇa was hewn out from a large hill of rock. It consisted of 5 storeys the lowest having the form of an elephant with 50) apartments in the rock, the second having the form of a horse with 300 apartments, the fourth having the form of an ox with 200 apartments and the fifth having the form of a pigeon with 100 apartments " (p. 10).

Taking into account the fact that these monasteries, occupied by thousands of monks, once studded the whole land, particularly the northern part of India, one can not fail to be impressed by the

dynamic part which Buddhism once played in the cultural life of India.

The author in his preface has referred the more inquisitive reader to his other special studies on the subject such as 'Historical Geography of Ancient India', 'Geography of Early Buddhism', 'The Holy Places of India', 'The Magadhas in Ancient India' etc.

V. M. Bedekar

DĀNASĀGARA OF BALLALA SENA (Fascicles 1-4)
edited by Bhabatosh Bhattacharya M. A., B. L., Kāvya
Tīrthā, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal,
(Calcutta).

This complete and critical edition of the Dānasāgara in four fascicules is the fruit of the Editor's continuous labour extending over nine years. The first three fascicules, covering 722 pages, contain the text of the work and were published between 1953 and 1955 as work no. 274 of the Bibliotheca Indica. The last i. e. the fourth fascicule of 97 pages embodying the contents, bibliography, index and an introduction was published in 1956 as a concluding volume of the same work.

This work, as the Editor remarks in the preface, is almost the earliest and most comprehensive digest on Dāna. It is, moreover, one of the six digests pronounced as authoritative by Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane in his 'History of Dharmaśāstra' Vol. II (in a chapter on Dāna). Mm. Dr. P. V. Kane was not able to utilize the Dānasāgara as it, then, existed only in the form of Mss. The publication of this complete and critical edition of the work, therefore, fulfils a desideratum from the point of view of the students of the Dharmaśāstra.

The editor has concluded from the internal evidence from the works of king Ballala Sena of Bengal that the period of the literary activity of the latter extended between 1150 and 1175 A. D. The author Ballala Sena has utilized 52 works in the preparation of this Digest, the works including the Purāṇas, the Smṛtis, and the Epics, the copious quotations from which have been identified by the editor as far as they were available in printed form. Ballala Sena in the introductory stanzas, refers, in glowing terms, to his teacher Aniruddha who is described as

निस्तन्द्रोज्ज्वलधीविलासनयनः सारस्वतब्रह्मणि ।

(p. 2 fascicule 1).

Dr. R. C. Majumdar reading in the above line सारस्वतब्राह्मणः instead of सारस्वतब्राह्मणि has remarked in his 'History of Bengal' that Aniruddha, the teacher of Ballāla Sena, was a Brāhmaṇa of the Sārasvata clan. The Editor of the present critical edition, referring to this statement of Dr. Majumdar, points out that no manuscript of the Dānasāgara is found to possess the reading as read by Dr. Majumdar. Thus the latter's conclusion regarding the clan of Aniruddha turns out to be unfounded. The editor translates the above line thus: "... having ever active eyes, showing manifestations produced by a brilliant intellect, bent upon the Shastric lore (Sārasvata-Brahmaṇi)". The editor, on the authority of another source, points out that Aniruddha belonged to one of the sub-sects of the Virendra Brāhmaṇas of Bengal.

The Dānas or religious gifts form an important institution of Hindu Religion and the present work presents a picture of this institution as it was viewed by the royal author of Bengal of the 12th century. The religious gifts embrace all sorts of life's necessities—eatables, cattle, horses, houses, land, medicines etc. The following cullings made by the royal author of the work regarding Bhūmi-dāna and Ārogyadāna may be found of interest today:

"The donor lives in heaven as a reward of making a gift of land for a period of time in proportion to the extent of the land so given and to the annual increase or decrease of the produce of that land". The purport of the latter quotation is 'one should never donate a barren or scorched piece of land'.

"Whatever sins a man may have committed even from his very birth, he is purified of them by making a gift of only as much land as is equal to a *gocarma*". ['That land which a hundred cows with one bull occupy without being closely packed together is called *Gocarma*'] (chap. 11).

The 'gift of healing' (Ārogyadāna) possibly refers to the charitable hospitals of the day:

"One should have a hospital (Ārogyasālā) founded and have it equipped with highly efficacious drugs, patient's dresses, a competent physician and menials' quarters. ... One also attains the permanent world, by curing another person suffering from excess or paucity of either wind, bile or phlegm, either with the help of a root or by means of massage" (Chap. 59). The reference to this chapter is misprinted as 61 on page lxiv of the concluding fascicule. The misprint is not included in the Errata.

V. M. Bedekar

[COMPARATIVE AESTHETICS, Vol. II, (Western Aesthetics), by Dr. Kanti Chandra Pandey. Published by the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Banaras, 1956. Pp. xxxvii+612. Price Rs. 20.00]

The book under review is the fourth volume of the Chowkhamba Sanskrit studies. Dr. Pandey had planned three volumes covering the whole subject of Indian and Western Aesthetics of which the first volume was earlier published (in 1950) under the title ' Indian Aesthetics '. It is followed by the present volume which mainly deals with aesthetic theories of Greek and European thinkers from Gorgias (about 470 B. C.) to Croce (1866-1952). In the third volume of the series, now under preparation, the author proposes to present a detailed comparison of Western aesthetic thought, past and contemporary, with Indian theories of aesthetics. The basic approach of the author is best described in the general title given to all the three volumes, viz. ' Comparative Aesthetics '. It is his conviction that " the East and the West have thought on the problem of the beautiful in ways which have marked similarity and, therefore, there is ample scope for a comparative approach to the problem of aesthetics. Such an impression has been responsible for my thesis ' Comparative Aesthetics ' " (vide Introduction, p. xxix).

The present volume presents to the reader the various aesthetic theories of Greek and European thinkers, generally in a chronological order, grouping together the thinkers of a particular country. While introducing each thinker, the author gives a concise characterisation of his aesthetic theory and also indicates the points of similarity between his theory and that of some Indian thinker on aesthetics. Thus, for instance, the author introduces Aristotle with a comparison of his concept of ' Ideas ', as immanent and not as transcendent, with the Vaiśeṣika concept of the ' universal '. According to the author, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that the ' universal ' is inherently present in the particular (vide, page 26). Then he compares the ' pedagogic view of art ' of Aristotle and his view of the ' recognitive nature of aesthetic experience ' with the views of

Śrīsaṅkuka. He applies this comparative method again in showing 'marked similarities' between the aesthetic theory of Hegel and that of Abhinavagupta (vide pp. 356-361).

Indian and Western students of Aesthetics will ever remain grateful to Dr. Pandey for the vast amount of material on the subject that he has placed before them for such comparative study. His comparison of the Greek theories of imitation in art, and the theory of *anukṛti* in Bharat and his suggestion that this principle of imitation reveals the link between Religion and Art in early human civilisation, opens out a valuable line of research in the subject of the historical development of aesthetic theories in relation to different epochs of human culture.

But, while the comparative approach has its merits it has also some serious limitations. For instance, there may be 'marked similarities' between Hegel and Abhinavagupta, but these two great thinkers are widely separated, not only in time and space, but in their very basic approaches to all human problems. The 'similarities' between their particular views have only apparent validity when we give proper consideration to the basic divergences between the general postulates and intellectual disciplines which conditioned the thoughts of these two great minds. The comparisons, suggested by the author, while discussing Greek and European theories have, therefore, the effect of blurring the essential contrasts between the Eastern and Western approach to aesthetics, as to other problems of value.

Thus, for instance, he shows points of similarity between Hegel's theory and that of Abhinavagupta, and compares Hegel's view that art is 'sensuous presentation of the Absolute' with the doctrine of 'Īśvarapratyabhijñā' of Abhinavagupta. But Hegel's Absolute is in no way comparable to the 'Īśvara' of Kashmir Śaivism. The former is a dynamic entity and in Hegel's philosophy cosmic evolution and the march of human history are identical with the Absolute, in its dynamic aspect. Thus, artistic, rational and social life of mankind is conceived as an organic, historically-developing process in Hegelian thought. This very basis and essence of Hegel's aesthetic theory is lost sight of in the attempt to emphasise the apparent points of similarity between his theory and

that of Abhinavagupta. Students will eagerly await Dr. Pandey's third volume in which he has promised to apply the comparative method comprehensively and fully to the whole problem. His study on Abhinavagupta and his three-volume study of 'Bhaskari' have already placed students of Indian thought under a debt of gratitude. We hope that 'Comparative Aesthetics', with its three volumes, will also be of great help to all students, particularly to students of aesthetic theory.

D. K. Bedekar

INDIA IN THE TIME OF PATAÑJALI, by J. N. Puri,
published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay 7,
Price Rs. 20

This work, submitted originally as a thesis for the degree of B. O. L. (Oxford) by Dr. B. N. Puri is a careful and critical survey of the age of the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali i. e. of a period round about 150 B. C. . It is based upon the available material of all kinds — literary, epigraphical, archaeological, numismatical and the like, collected exhaustively and arranged systematically by the author.

2 The author has divided his work into 9 chapters dealing with Patañjali's date, political history, geographical data, social life, economic life, educational life, religious condition, literature and architecture in which detailed information available from all sources is given. There are no two opinions about the date of Patañjali which has been taken as fixed by scholars as 150 B. C., on the strength of the important internal evidence supplied by references to the siege of Ayodhyā, Puṣyamitra's sacrifice and Maurya rulers. The question whether Patañjali, the author of the Mahābhāṣya, was the same as the writer of the Yoga Sūtras and the reviser of the Caraka-Saṁhitā, is a knotty one; but the traditional belief that one and the same Patañjali was the author of the three works on Vyākaraṇa, Yoga and Vaidyaka, goes back to a very early period and cannot be easily discarded. There is nothing, which is hard to believe, in supposing that the sage Patañjali was equally proficient in three different Śāstras. There have been a number of scholars, in India, like Vācaspati Miśra, Mādhavācārya or Nāgeśa competent in many Śāstras. A sound study of one Śāstra like Vyākaraṇa or

Nyāya makes one competent in India to master without help of another man, other Śāstras like Vedānta, Dharma, Alankāra and the like.

3 The chapters on Political History, Geographical data and social, religious and economic life and others are more or less based upon the various articles written by the learned scholars of the East and the West and there is not much material for them in the technical work like the Mahābhāṣya. In the chapter on Literature the author has made use of many casual observations of Patañjali and the conclusions drawn therefrom are acceptable in general. It has of course to be observed in connection with the chapter on Literature that a very close and critical study of the text of the Mahābhāṣya would have enabled the author to add a few more paragraphs or even a chapter dealing specially with Sanskrit grammar, its study existing works on it at the time, development of the subject, Patañjali's contribution to it, the specific theories stated by Patañjali, and so on. Observations in this connection could be seen in the Seventh Volume of the Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya published by the D. E. Society, Poon on pages 349 to 374.

4 The book, in short, can be of help to students, ancient scholars and teachers of Sanskrit Grammar, but, of considerable help to scholars of History and Culture in connection with their study of Ancient India after the Maurya Kings. It is of course, hoped, that the author will make a critical study of the text of the Mahābhāṣya as also similar works written in that period and present to scholars interested in Grammar a treatise on "Grammar and its study in the time of Patañjali".

K. V. Abhyankar

BHĀSA- (Indian Men of Letters Series). By A. S. P. Ayyar. Published by V. Ramaswamy Sastrulu & Sons, 292, Netaji Subhash Chanda Bose Road, Madras 1. Second, revised and enlarged Edition, 1957. Crown Oct. pp. iv + 4 + 584 + 8, with a portrait of the author. Price Rs. 5/- Justice A. S. P. Ayyar is well known as a novelist, story writer, humorist, as also a writer of serious books and a versatile genius with over twentyfive works in English to his credit. The fact that

some of these have run into the second or third editions, while most have been rendered into regional languages like Tamil, Telugu and Malayalam, a few into Gujarati and Kannada as well, indicates the great popularity enjoyed by Justice Ayyar as an author. He has done the reviewer honour by mentioning his work as "a learned book well worth a perusal" and by referring to his views several times.

Despite the large volume of material gathered round Bhāsa during the last fifty years since the discovery of Bhāsa's works by the late MM. T. Ganapati Sastri in 1909, nothing like a solution of the baffling problem that would be acceptable to all seems to have been reached. The differences are fundamental and unless some decisive evidence is forthcoming the same inconclusive state of affairs is bound to continue.

In Part I entitled "Bhāsa Re-discovered" Justice Ayyar has taken a survey, in his charming style, of the entire Bhāsa problem, including the *Yajñaphala*, in which he does not agree with the views of the present reviewer. It is indeed interesting to find that three years before Ganapati Sastri's discovery, one K. Sampathkumar Chakravarthi, a copyist in the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, had, without realizing their importance, transcribed into Devanagari script the *Svapnavāsavadattā* (with full title, instead of mere *Svapna*) and the *Pratijñāyugandharāyaṇa*. A good running account of the thirteen plays, which captures the spirit of the original, occurs in the next Part (Bhāsa's Plays). The manifold aspects of these plays, such as characterization, descriptions of nature, *navarasas*, figures of speech, profound psychological insight, etc., including also Bhāsa's defects and his Stage, have been reviewed in interesting detail under suitable headings in Part III (The Greatness of Bhāsa). The concluding Part (Bhāsa, the Man: His Ideas and Ideals) portrays the several facets of Bhāsa as a man. The reviewer feels that references should have been given to the Subhāṣitas listed on pp. 572-581.

The book will, no doubt, stimulate interest in Bhāsa and his works. Some sort of Index would have considerably enhanced the reference value of the book. The printing and get-up are quite good. For a cloth-bound book, with a jacket, of about 600 pages, the price is very moderate.


A. D. Pusalker

ŚRĪ KṚṢṆA : THE DARLING OF HUMANITY. By A. S. P. Ayyar. Second Edition. Published by the Madras Law Journal Office, Madras, 1957. Crown Oct. pp. xxx+560. Price Rs. 5/-

The fact that the first edition of the book was sold out in a short time, no doubt, indicated the great interest in the world today regarding Śrī Kṛṣṇa and the Gītā as the author states in his preface, but it also attests to the great popularity of the present work, necessitating the printing of the second edition. We have already reviewed the first edition in the pages of the *Annals* (Vol. XXXIV, pp. 191-192).

Justice Ayyar has utilized this opportunity in adding three new stories in Part III, and has made some other additions and revisions enhancing the value of the book. We have no doubt this edition also, like its predecessor, will be highly popular, and strongly commend it to the notice of all. Looking to the good printing, excellent get-up, and the cloth binding with nearly 600 pages, the price will be felt quite moderate.

A. D. Pusalker



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